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The purpose of the research investigation is to consider the potential opportunities through which 
corporate governance may be developed to better suit the developing commercial culture within 
Poland.  
 In order to do this, I formulate the following research questions: ‘What are the weaknesses 
of the Polish corporate governance system?’, ‘What changes should be made to corporate 
governance in Poland?’, and ‘Is a hybrid corporate governance model a choice for Poland?’ 
The concept of hybridisation is fairly new, and involves combining different approaches to 
corporate governance, eg it embraces combining elements of the board management and 
monitoring models.  
I examine several changes to corporate governance that can be called hybrid. They were 
implemented in South Africa, Japan, Malaysia, the UK and the US. The main focus, however, is put 
on Polish corporate governance, which I investigate from the angle of those changes.  
 Doctrinal research is combined with a set of interviews conducted with business 
practitioners in Poland. Interviewees are asked to express their opinion about corporate 
governance in Poland. Questions are asked in the context of changes that were made to corporate 
governance in countries mentioned above.   
 The interviews produce results that overlap with the doctrinal research. Polish companies 
have a highly consolidated share ownership structure, which has a negative influence on the 
allocation of power between corporate organs. The supervisory board is an organ through which 
the controlling shareholders extend their power. Under the Company Code 2000, the supervisory 
board usually appoints and removes members of the management board, and instructs them in the 
decision making process. The statutes might give a broader scope of powers to the supervisory 
board. All this results in various forms of expropriation in companies, such as, for example, stealing 
of profits by governing bodies, overpaying executives, or installing unqualified family members in 
managerial positions. 
In general, interviewees are pleased with the currently binding corporate governance in 
Poland. The majority of them are pessimistic about implementing such large changes in Poland as, 
for example, a one-tier board system. A significant number of interviewees propose minor changes 
to the Polish system of corporate governance.  
 It should be highlighted that several non-managerial interviewees turn out to have more 
liberal approaches to potential changes to corporate governance in Poland.  
 The research fills a gap in knowledge on hybrid corporate governance, as this issue has 
hardly been touched by the Polish legal doctrine. It also systematises and develops knowledge on 
hybrid corporate governance worldwide, and develops knowledge on legal transplant.  
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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
The internal structure of the Polish joint-stock company (the equivalent of an English public limited 
company (plc.) or a German Aktiengesellschaft (AG))1 is traditionally based on the two-tier (‘dual’) 
board system of German origin with two obligatory boards – a management board and a 
supervisory board (optional in a smaller limited liability company (the equivalent of an English 
private company (Ltd.) or a German Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH))2). The 
supervisory board supervises the management board and oversees the company’s financial 
statements, it also reports to the shareholders on the activities of the company. The management 
board carries out the day-to-day business of the company and is accountable for issues that are not 
the responsibility of the supervisors or the shareholders’ meeting. The company’s articles of 
association/statutes3 often expands on the areas to be covered by the management board. 
Such a picture of corporate governance in Poland is usually presented in business reports 
addressed to investors and sponsored by the government. But when we place it under a magnifying 
glass, the system turns out to be far less coherent.  
Generally speaking, a problem of Polish corporate governance lies in that a supervisory 
board is only theoretically a supervisory body and not a management body4. In practice, members 
of the management board are strongly reliant on the majority shareholder, spreading the power 
via the supervisory board. Members of the management board in a joint-stock company (JSC) are 
typically appointed and removed by the supervisory board5, which might be composed of the 
shareholders exclusively. The statutes may provide for a broader scope of powers of the supervisory 
board6. 
Speaking more precisely, the main feature of the Polish corporate governance system is the 
prevalence of consolidated ownership that significantly weakens the system of protection of the 
minority shareholder. Voting control in listed companies in Poland shows a median concentration 
rate of 39.5%7 (the concentration might be a lot higher in non-listed companies; see chapters V and 
                                                          
1 Marat Terterov and Johnathan Reuvid (eds), Doing Business with Poland (4th edn, GMB Publishing Ltd 2005) 53. 
2 ibid.  
3 Articles of association, together with the memorandum of association, are the constitution of a limited liability company. Statutes 
perform the same function in a joint-stock company. 
4 Piotr Kozarzewski and Richard Woodward, ‘Secondary Privatization in Poland (Part I): Evolution of Ownership Structure and Company 
Performance in Firms Privatized by Employee Buyout’ (Center for Social and Economic Research, Case Reports No. 47, Warsaw 2001) 
<www.case-research.eu/upload/publikacja_plik/RC47.pdf> accessed 29 March 2014. 
5 Art. 368§2 and 4CCC. 
6 Art. 383 and 384 CCPC (for a JSC) and Art. 220CCPC (for an LLC).  
7 Krzysztof Oplustil and Arkadiusz Radwan, ‘Company Law in Poland: Between Autonomous Development and Legal Transplants’ in 
Christa Jessel-Holst, Rainer Kulms and Alexander Trunk (eds), Private Law in Eastern Europe: Autonomous Development or Legal 
Transplants? (Mohr Siebeck 2011) 453. 
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VI, where the issue is explained in detail). It results in such problems as conflicts between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders, private benefits of control at the expense of the minority 
(eg tunnelling of assets and profits to majority shareholders, payment of hidden dividends), and the 
inequality in treatment of minority shareholders by company authorities8. There are also cases of 
abuse of shareholders rights by individual investors, in particular challenging important resolutions 
of the shareholders’ meeting in order to intimidate the company or its majority shareholders9. 
The main law on corporate governance in Poland is encompassed in the Act of 15 
September 2000, the Commercial Partnerships and Companies Code (the Company Code of 2000). 
Both the Company Code of 2000 and its predecessor, the Commercial Code of 1934, were 
principally founded on the German and Austrian legal tradition10. While Polish law has long been 
under the influence of both German and French law for historical and cultural reasons (with certain 
influences from Anglo-American law), the Company Code of 2000 is fundamentally entrenched in 
the tradition of German company law (the German Commercial Code of 1897)11. The choice of the 
German model for reforming Polish company law is mostly due to the fact that the 1934 codification 
earned itself a brilliant reputation and survived until the new Millennium, even though in the era 
of centrally-planned economy in Poland (1945-1989) it had no practical meaning12. 
Nonetheless, the Company Code of 2000 as well as other legal acts regulating corporate 
governance structures in Poland are not particularly adequate or instructive, often giving general 
ideas and principles rather than concrete solutions. This goes together with the weakened system 
of rights and safeguards regulating corporate governance relations within companies. As a result, 
minority interests can be (and sometimes are) abused with the help of anti-collusion provisions, eg 
the right of supervision shall be conferred upon each shareholder in a limited liability company 
(LLC), but the articles of association may exclude or restrict individual control by shareholders 
                                                          
8 Maciej Dzierżanowski and Piotr Tamowicz, ‘Ownership and Control of Polish Listed Corporations’ (Gdańsk Institute for Market 
Economics, May 2003) <www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=386822> accessed 9 September 2011. 
9 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 455. 
10 Stanisław Sołtysiński, ‘Reform of Polish Company Law’ in Bernhard Grossfeld (ed), Festschrift für Wolfgang Fikentscher zum 70. 
Geburtstag (Mohr Siebeck 1998) 419, where he expresses the opinion that the majority of the Commercial Code rules can be 
characterised as a ‘slavish’ imitation of their German models. 
11 For a description of the main features of the Company Code, as well as of the sources of foreign inspiration in its drafting, see Stanisław 
Sołtysiński, ‘Sources of Foreign Inspiration in the Draft of the Polish Company Law’ in Theodor Baums, Klaus J. Hopt and Norbert Horn 
(eds), Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the Law (Kluwer Law International 2000) 533; Rafał T. Stroiński, ‘Takeovers in Poland 
– Current Regulations and Towards Implementation of the Takeover Directive’ (2005) 16 (6) European Business Law Review 1443; see 
also Stanisław Sołtysiński, ‘Transfer of Legal Systems as Seen by the “Import Countries”: A View from Warsaw’ in Ulrich Drobnig, Klaus J. 
Hopt, Hein Kötz and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (eds), Systemtransformation in Mittel- und Osteuropa und ihre Folgen für Banken, Börsen 
und Kreditsicherheiten (Mohr Siebeck 1998) 70-72. 
12 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7); Dennis A. Rondinelli and Jay Yurkiewicz, ‘Privatisation and Economic Restructuring in Poland: An Assessment 
of Transitional Policies’ (1996) 55 (2) The American Journal of Economics and Sociology <www.jstor.org/stable/3487075> accessed 12 
July 2011.  
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where the supervisory board or auditors’ committee has been established13.14  
Some changes to corporate law in Poland have been made by the EU legislation after the 
date of accession of Poland to the EU, eg the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive 
(2007/36/EC) resulted in significant amendments to the Company Code of 2000. It should be added 
that the overwhelming majority of the EU company law directives have been implemented in the 
Company Code (including the Third, Sixth and Tenth Company Law Directive).15 However, it did not 
change considerably the politics of controlling shareholders towards minority shareholders in 
Poland. 
 A kind of recovery mechanism for relations between majority and minority shareholders 
was the Code of Best Practices, adopted first time in 2002 by the supervisory board of the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange (WSE)16. The latest version of the Code was then issued by the WSE in 2010 (it has 
been amended several times since then)17. According to its preamble, the Code is to strengthen the 
protection of shareholders’ rights (including those not regulated by legislation), enhance the 
transparency of listed companies, and improve the quality of communication between companies 
and investors18. 
 The Code adopts or refers to many principles, recommendations and codes of good practice 
issued in other countries or by international organisations, such as the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, British corporate governance codes – mainly Cadbury and Hampel, the EASD 
Corporate Governance Principles, as well as the recommendations and guidelines issued by 
Euroshareholders19. The Code inter alia addresses the issue of independence of supervisory board 
members, or the necessity of preparation by the supervisory board and presentation to the 
ordinary shareholders’ meeting a brief annual assessment of the company’s standing (including 
evaluation of the internal control system and of the risk management system) as well as a self-
evaluation report20. It does not, however, resolve problems of corporate governance, mainly 
because the Code is not legally binding. The Code of Best Practices can be regarded as a soft law-
instrument aimed at improving corporate governance in companies listed on the WSE21. 
                                                          
13 Art. 212§1 and 213§3CCC. 
14 See Piotr Kozarzewski, ‘Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland: Problems and Trends’ (Centre for Social and Economic 
Research, Studies & Analyses No. 325, Warsaw 2006) <www.case-research.eu/en/node/55442> accessed 17 May 2014. 
15 Other company law directives did not revolutionise Polish law either. This is explained by the fact that early directives bore a strong 
German influence, which in turn was to a significant extent ‘directly’ (without European intermediation) reflected in the Polish pre-war 
legislation. See Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 464. 
16 ibid 488. 
17 In May 2010, the Code was reviewed and amended in order to adjust its ‘soft’ regulation to the latest amendments of the Company 
Code of 2000, as well as to the current trends in corporate governance. 
18 An English version of the Code is available on <www.corp-gov.pgw.pl> accessed 2 March 2014. 
19 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8).  
20 Text to n 18. The issues will be developed in subsequent chapters.  
21 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 492. 
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The main undertaking of the research therefore was to search for practical solutions that 
would equalise the right of all shareholders in Poland within foreign legal systems. I focused, 
however, primarily on the achievements of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance, because its 
common law orders are considered to have good protection of shareholders’ rights22.  
According to La Porta et al.23, efficient protection of shareholders rights has a key influence 
on the type of ownership and control structure in a given legal order: ‘Often, if the legal 
environment does not have good protection of shareholders’ rights, then this discourages a diverse 
shareholder base whilst being more conductive to family-owned firms where a relatively small 
group of individuals can retain ownership, power, and control’ (see Appendix 1). A survey 
conducted by La Porta et al.24 proved that companies in traditionally civil law legal systems, such as 
in France, Germany and Russia have a weaker dispersed share ownership structure. Meanwhile, in 
Anglo-Saxon countries (especially in the US and the UK) great corporations are owned by millions 
of middle class shareholders, each owning a few hundred or a few thousand shares. Only a handful 
of institutional investors accumulate large stakes – 3 or even 5% of an occasional large firm’s 
stock25. 
The Anglo-Saxon corporate governance approach has however also been experiencing 
troubles since the early 1990s. The greatest high-profile corporate collapses, eg Enron, WorldCom, 
Barings Bank, took place either in the US or in the UK26. As Mallin27 describes:  
 
‘These corporate collapses have had an adverse effect on many people: shareholders who 
have seen their financial investment reduced to nothing; employees who have lost their jobs 
and, in many cases, the security of their company pension, which has also evaporated 
overnight; suppliers of goods or services to the failed companies; and the economic impact 
on the local and international communities in which the failed companies operated.’  
 
The main threat for the good prosperity of companies in the UK is probably the non-binding 
character of the UK Corporate Governance Code (the UK Code of 2012)28. Enforcement of key legal 
provisions, eg those concerning the appointment of non-executive directors, the establishment of 
                                                          
22 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 
58 Journal of Financial Economics 3. 
23 ibid.   
24 ibid. 
25 Randall K. Morck and Lloyd Steier, ‘The Global History of Corporate Governance: Introduction’ (The National Bureau of Economic 
Research, November 2005) <www.nber.org/papers/w11062> accessed 5 June 2012. 
26 See, for example, Nancy B. Rapoport, Jeffry D. Van Niel and Bala G. Dharan, Enron and Other Corporate Fiascos: The Corporate Scandal 
Reader (2nd edn, Foundation Press 2009).  
27 Christine A. Mallin, Corporate Governance (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 1. 
28 The full text of the Code is available on <www.frc.org.uk> accessed 19 May 2014.  
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an audit committee or a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders, relies on the ‘comply or explain’ 
principle29.  Listed companies have to state in their annual reports whether they comply with the 
Code provisions, identify any areas of non-compliance, and explain clearly and carefully to 
shareholders the reasons in light of their own particular circumstances30. Yet, the ‘comply or 
explain’ mechanism has been rather effective over the last decade. Research31 published in 2010 
illustrates that, overall, nearly 84.7% of companies declare compliance with the Code.  
On the other hand, the US legislative body set an example that sanctioning for non-
compliance with a code (‘comply or else’) can also be uncertain for business. Codification of a part 
of corporate governance in the US by Congress, known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 
significantly increased the cost of running a business. Due to an exacerbation of the internal control 
system in companies32 during 2004, US companies with revenues exceeding $5 billion spent 0.06% 
of revenue on SOX compliance, while companies with less than $100 million in revenue spent 
2.55%33. It is said that ‘[t]he total cost to the American economy of complying with SOX is 
considered to amount to more than the total write-off of Enron, World Com and Tyco combined 
[the biggest corporate collapses in the US]’34. Romano35 declares: ‘SOX’s corporate governance 
provisions were ill-conceived. Other nations, such as the members of the European Union who have 
been revising their corporation codes, would be well advised to avoid Congress’ policy blunder.’ 
This advice however requires a deeper consideration. For example, a Finance Executives 
International Survey36 (annual) on SOX Section 404 costs finds that they have continued to decline 
relative to revenues since 2004. The 2007 study shows that, for 168 companies with average 
revenues of $4.7 billion, the average compliance costs were $1.7 million (0.036% of revenue). The 
2006 study indicates that, for 200 companies with average revenues of $6.8 billion, the average 
                                                          
29 ibid. The issues will be expanded in further chapters.  
30 ibid. 
31 Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno and Antoine Faure-Grimaud, ‘Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply or Explain Approach 
Working? (2010) 30 International Review of Law Economics 193. 
32 Section 404 requires management and the external auditor to report on the adequacy of the company's internal control on financial 
reporting, and this is the most costly aspect of the legislation for companies to implement, as it requires enormous effort. See, for 
example, Morgen Witzel, Builders & Dreamers. The Making and Meaning of Management (Pearson Education Limited 2002) 39. 
33 Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies to the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission’ (Washington, 23 April 2006) <www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf> accessed 
17 May 2012. 
34 Mervyn E. King, ‘Introduction and Background’ in Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, ‘King Report on Governance for South Africa 
2009’ <www.iodsa.co.za/> accessed 14 March 2013. 
35 ibid.  
36 Finance Executives International, ‘Fei Survey: Management Drives Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Costs Down by 23%, But Auditors Fees 
Virtually Unchanged’ (May 2007) 
<www.web.archive.org/web/20071011142102/http://fei.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_releases&item=187> accessed 28 
November 2013. 
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compliance costs were $2.9 million (0.043% of revenue), down 23% from 2005.37 
There is also another reason for which the Anglo-Saxon legal orders might set a benchmark 
for other legal orders in the area of corporate governance. Except for good protection of 
shareholders rights, both the American and British regimes draw attention to a higher degree of 
protection of stakeholders. This has a very positive impact on the financial performance of 
companies, eg Verschoor and Murphy38 found empirical evidence that companies devoted to social 
and environmental issues that are significant to their stakeholders also have ‘superior’ financial 
performance. The approach is called the ‘enlightened stakeholder value’, and is a halfway 
standpoint of the stakeholder value and the shareholder value.   
The shareholder value – to which the US and the UK used to adhere – assumes that the 
main responsibility of a company is to maximise shareholder interests, while the stakeholder model 
argues that governing bodies also have a responsibility to parties other than shareholders 
(employees, suppliers, customers, local communities, etc). What is more, there is an opinion that 
‘any fiduciary obligations owed to shareholders to maximize profits might be subject to the 
constraint of respecting obligations owed to such stakeholders’39. Many continental European 
countries have legislated the stakeholder theory into action. They require such measures as 
employee representation on corporate boards and consultation with labour about mergers and 
acquisitions, in addition to detailed reporting on a variety of social and environmental issues40.  
In the US, more than 100,000 federal, state, and local rules and regulations on 
environmental protection have been issued41. Compared to 20 years ago, corporations are much 
more likely to employ such stakeholders as suppliers, customers, employees, and members of the 
public on their boards of directors42. There is considerable evidence that court decisions also favour 
a responsibility to non-shareholder stakeholders (see for example decision in Unocal v. Mesa 
                                                          
37 ibid. 
38 Curtis C. Verschoor and Elizabeth A. Murphy, ‘The Financial Performance of Large U.S. Firms and Those with Global Prominence: How 
Do the Best Corporate Citizens Rate?’ (2002) 107 (3) Business and Society Review 371. 
39 Darryl Reed, ‘Corporate Governance in Developing Countries’ (2002) 37 Journal of Business Ethics 223. 
40 Moreover, the EU also aims to promote stakeholder law within its territory. See, for example, Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 
8.10.2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees 
<www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/modern/index_en.htm> accessed 7 June 2012. See also Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. 
Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications’ (1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 
65; John Martin Conley, ‘CPR Perspective: Changing Corporate Behavior in a Socially Responsible Direction’ (Centre for Progressive 
Reform, 2008) <www.progressivereform.org/perspCorp_behav.cfm> accessed 15 June 2012. 
41 Michael A. Berry and Dennis A. Rondinelli, ‘Proactive Corporate Environment Management: A New Industrial Revolution’ (1998) 12 (2) 
Academy of Management Executive 38. 
42 Patrick Luoma and Jerry Goodstein, ‘Stakeholders and Corporate Boards: Institutional Influences on Board Composition and Structure’ 
(1999) 42 (5) Academy of Management Journal 553. 
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Petroleum Co. on corporate defensive tactics against take-over bids43). In the UK, the Companies 
Act of 2006 mandates that company directors shall include, inter alia, the interests of the 
company’s employees, the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, and the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment in their decision making44.  
A similar tendency can be observed in legal orders originating from the Anglo-Saxon law 
tradition. The South African legislative body has developed the ‘enlightened stakeholder’ value. The 
so-called ‘stakeholder inclusive’ was included in the African Code of Governance Principles 2009, 
King III.  
Despite the fact that the ‘stakeholder inclusive’ as well as the ‘enlightened shareholder’ 
approach to corporate governance assume that the board of directors should also consider the 
legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders other than shareholders, the way in which 
they are treated by the board in the two approaches is very different. As King45 declares:  
 
‘In the ‘enlightened shareholder’ approach the legitimate interests and expectations of 
stakeholders only have an instrumental value. Stakeholders are only considered in as far as 
it would be in the interests of shareholders to do so. In the case of ‘stakeholder inclusive’ 
approach, the board of directors considers the legitimate interests and expectations of 
stakeholders on the basis that this is in the best interests of the company, and not merely as 
an instrument to serve the interests of the shareholder. (…) The integration and trade-offs 
between various stakeholders are then made on a case-by-case basis, to serve the best 
interests of the company.’  
 
Inter alia, this change in South African corporate governance was called by Andreasson46 a 
‘hybridisation’ of corporate governance. For Andreasson47 this means linking solutions of both the 
shareholder and the stakeholder approach to corporate governance, taking however into 
consideration all social, legal and economic changes that have taken place within the community. 
It should be noted that this clearly complies with the prevailing opinion about legal transplantation: 
                                                          
43 The Delaware Supreme Court weakened the so-called ‘business judgment rule’, which vests management with exclusive authority over 
the conduct of a company’s affairs only on the condition that the financial welfare of shareholders is single-minded pursued. According 
to the ruling, a board of directors may only try to prevent a take-over where it can be shown that there was a threat to corporate policy 
and the defensive measure adopted was proportional and reasonable given the nature of the threat.  
44 Part 15, Chapter 5, section 417 of the Companies Act of 2006. 
45 King (n 34).  
46 Stefan Andreasson, ‘Understanding Corporate Governance Reform in South Africa: Anglo-American Divergence, the King Reports and 
Hybridization’ (December 2011) <www.works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=stefan_andreasson> accessed 2 
February 2013. 
47 ibid.  
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that one needs to provide a broader context to understand the nature of the reception within the 
legal system and its practices48. The contrasting standpoint is that the process of borrowing is, at 
least occasionally, insulated from social and economic change in the recipient legal culture49.  
 Interestingly, other former British colonies have also made the same step forward in terms 
of companies’ management. They have introduced several changes to their corporate governance, 
which created a kind of compromise between the shareholder approach and the stakeholder 
approach to corporate governance. This can be exemplified by reforms in Malaysia and Singapore. 
Surveys50 reveal that some 86% of Malaysian companies have a clear division between the 
CEO and chairman roles, and 96% of companies have one-third independent board members and 
almost half have appointed a senior independent director to whom minority shareholders can 
directly report to. Malaysia appeared to be making a great deal of progress promoting the 
development of sound corporate governance systems and practices, and ‘had in fact stolen a lead 
over the US in its drive for higher standards of corporate governance.’51 
However, arguably the most innovatory reform in Malaysia was the Mandatory 
Accreditation Program, which required all directors of publicly listed companies to go for 
mandatory training52. For some Malaysian critics it turned out to be the most rewarding for 
companies in Malaysia53. It enhanced directors’ professionalism through constant reskilling54.  
Malaysia was apparently the only country in the world where directors were trained 
obligatorily55. The tendency to sanction activities is common for countries adhered to the civil law 
tradition56.  
Malaysia was ranked number one in Asia for having the most effective rules and regulations 
for corporate governance, on the basis of a survey conducted by independent brokerage and 
research house CLSA Ltd. The survey57, conducted in 2005, took into consideration three factors: 
adaptation to international generally accepted accounting principles, political and regulatory 
                                                          
48 See, for example, William Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplant’ (1995) 43 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 489.   
49 The main advocate of the viewpoint is Watson; see, for example, Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 
(Scottish Academic Press 1974).   
50 Philip Koh Tong Ngee, ‘Corporate Governance in Malaysia: Regulatory Reform and Its Outcomes’ in Asian Productivity Organization, 
‘Best Practices in Asian Corporate Governance’ (Tokyo 2007) <http://www.apo-tokyo.org/publications/files/ind-20-bp_acg.pdf> 
accessed 16 June 2012. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid.  
53 ibid. 
54 ibid.  
55 ibid.  
56 John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin 
America (3rd edn, Stanford University Press 2007). 
57 Philip Koh Tong Ngee (n 50).  
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environment, and international mechanism and corporate governance culture.  
Similarly, Singapore ‘made considerable progress in introducing best practice and a 
corporate governance framework with systems in place to encourage good governance’58. In 2010, 
corporate governance rankings in 11 markets in Asia conducted by the Asian Corporate Governance 
Association and Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia-Pacific Markets, Singapore is ranked first – up from 
second from the prior rankings in 200759. 
These are fairly high standards of corporate disclosure compared to its neighbours in the 
Asian region, as well as the US and European countries, which contributed to the success60.  
The disclosure system is a middle ground for the system that exists in Canada and the 
United Kingdom, and it aims to avoid two extremes: a prescriptive approach under which 
companies must comply and a non-prescriptive self-regulatory approach where every company is 
free to adopt its own practices. Accordingly, in Singapore companies are encouraged to ascertain 
their level of disclosure independently.61  
The Anglo-American corporate practice also influenced corporate governance in Japan. The 
beginning of the 21st century saw some radical changes in Japanese corporate law, which made 
Japanese corporate authorities more protective of the shareholder establishment.62 Previously, 
Japanese corporate governance was modelled on the European corporate law63.  
Since April 2003, Japanese companies have, for example, had a choice between two 
approaches to corporate governance: the two-tier board system and the one-tier (‘unitary’) board 
system. The so-called committee system is similar to the system adopted by listed US companies64. 
In this system, the board of directors is accountable for monitoring the management and an 
executing role is given to executive officers. Besides, the board of directors is required to have the 
following three committees: an auditing committee, an appointment committee and a 
remuneration committee, consisting of at least three directors of which a majority have to be 
outsiders65. 
Despite the choice given to Japanese entrepreneurs, an overwhelming majority (some 98%) 
                                                          
58 ibid. 
59 KPMG Audit Committee Institute, ‘Singapore’s Corporate Governance, Transformed: The Strategy to Get It Right’ (Singapore, 2011) 
<www.kpmg.com/SG/en/IssuesAndInsights/CFOPublications/Documents/SingaporeCorporateGovernanceTransformed.pdf> accessed 
25 June 2014. 
60 Tan Wee Liang, ‘The Evolution of the Disclosure Regime in Singapore’ in Asian Productivity Organization, ‘Best Practices (…)’ (n 50).  
61 ibid. 
62 See, for example, Toru Yoshikawa, ‘Corporate Governance in Japan: Flexible Adoption of Shareholder – Oriented Practices’ in Asian 
Productivity Organization, ‘Best Practices (…)’ (n 50).  
63 See, for example, Mark Levin, ‘Continuities of Legal Consciousness: Professor John Haley's Writings On Twelve Hundred Years of 
Japanese Legal History’ (2009) 8 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 317 <www.ssrn.com/abstract=1551420> accessed 
23 May 2014. 
64 Yoshikawa (n 62).  
65 ibid.  
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of Japanese companies have elected to retain the auditors structure66. Meanwhile, ‘the future of 
Japanese corporate governance may lie in the development of hybrid systems that are intended to 
combine the best elements of the board management and monitoring models’67. Japanese 
companies have actually been criticised for not appointing independent directors68. There has been 
a long discussion about the issue over the last fifteen years69. 
The reluctance of Japan to adopt the committee system of corporate governance 
encouraged me to do research which will have, as a main object, Polish corporate governance. I 
thought that it would be worth considering whether an ‘alternative’ corporate governance system 
could be implemented in Poland. The idea was dictated purely by my curiosity. The concept of the 
effectiveness of a one-tier board system in a traditionally two-tier board system, and vice versa, has 
not been explored yet.  
Gradually, I broadened out my research proposal into other corporate governance issues 
that were subject to reforms in the Anglo-American law-based countries. So such issues as, for 
example, the Singapore disclosure system, those two combinations of the stakeholder value and 
the shareholder value, the ‘enlightened shareholder’ value and the ‘stakeholder inclusive’ value; 
the independence of board members, or some other boardroom reforms, eg concerning board 
committees, were also included with my research. I formulated the following research questions 
based on all those issues:  
 
Figure 1. Questions for research on corporate governance in Poland  
 
                                                          
66 Bruce E. Aronson, ‘Fundamental Issues and Recent Trends in Japanese Corporate Governance Reform: A Comparative Perspective’ 
(2014) Hastings Business Law Journal (forthcoming) <www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448076> accessed 25 June 
2014. 
67 ibid. 
68 Kosaku Narioka, ‘Corporate-Governance Code Is Urged in Japan. Ruling-Party Proposal Would Be Aimed at Luring Foreign Investors’ 
(The Wall Street Journal, 27 May 2014) <www.online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304811904579587853072014222> 
accessed 14 May 2014. 
69 Aronson (n 66).  
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 One of my first objectives was to, through my research, contribute to knowledge on legal 
transplantation, which has been mainly captured by legal theorists. My aim was to approach the 
concept on a more practical level, providing real examples of legal transplant from the Polish 
corporate system. I also addressed the issue of possible transplantation of those hybrid corporate 
governance innovations.  
 
 
Figure 2. Objectives of this research project 
 
Another objective was to systematise knowledge on hybrid corporate governance, 
scattered over several publications. What is more, Polish legal doctrine is practically silent about 
the issue.  
In order to fill the gap in knowledge on potential hybridisation of Polish corporate 
governance, I decided to conduct interviews with business practitioners in Poland. I deliberately 
chose this group of people, as their point of view concerning corporate governance is usually free 
of theoretical influences, and therefore fresher and more practical.  
Actually, my research is a combination of both practical knowledge and theory on corporate 
governance. Information coming from these two sources was compared against each other. This 
comparative research embraced several legal orders, which made it very interesting to me. 
This research might also contribute to knowledge in that, legal solutions in the area of 
commercial law have commonly been shared by countries worldwide (see section ‘Legal Transplant 
in Polish Corporate Law’ in chapter VI). Accordingly, information gathered during interviews in 
Poland might turn out to be useful for researchers in other legal orders.  
In chapter III, I analyse the ‘critical points of current knowledge’70 on hybrid corporate 
governance in the world. This includes an analysis of some aspects of corporate governance in 
South Africa, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore. In this chapter, I also define hybrid corporate 
                                                          
70 Amy B. Dellinger, ‘Validity and the Review of Literature’ (2005) 12 (2) Research in the Schools 41. 
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governance and refer to the issue of legal transplantation, with which the research topic is strongly 
associated.  
Chapter IV deals with corporate governance in the US and the UK. Solutions of both were 
incorporated into hybrid regimes in South Africa and Asia. Besides, the latest changes to corporate 
governance in both countries also have a hybrid character.  
Chapter V examines the structure and functioning of corporate governance in Poland. The 
aim was to catch the essence of the mechanism, and present its main problems. Issues raised in 
this chapter are then developed in chapter VI, which I dedicated entirely to an analysis of the 
interviews.  
My final conclusions are incorporated in chapter VII, where I also describe the limitations 
of this research.  
In general, my research concerns only limited companies. I develop the issue of 
delimitations of this research in chapter VII.  
The subsequent chapter deals with methodology applied to this research. It also contains a 
part dedicated to ethical considerations. 
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II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
I devote this chapter to the research methodology applied to this research, the data collection 
methods used in this research and an analysis of the two (section D). I also explain reasons why 
particular research methods were not employed in this project.  
 The following subsection of this chapter is divided into the doctrinal, non-doctrinal and 
comparative approaches to research. Subsection C is dedicated to an analysis of qualitative, 
quantitative and mixed methods of research, and strategies of inquiry associated with them, eg a 
case study, hermeneutics, a survey, which were either applied or rejected in this project.  
In the following subsection, I also refer to philosophical worldviews (postpositivist, social 
constructivist and pragmatic), on which my research is based.  
 Finally, the issue of ethics, which I had to address while conducting this research, is 
distinguished as a part of this so-called research design71. 
 
 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN: 
DOCTRINAL, NON-DOCTRINAL AND COMPARATIVE RESEARCH 
 
1. Doctrinal approach to research and its application to corporate 
governance 
 
Generally speaking, this research is a combination of both doctrinal and non-doctrinal research.  
The doctrinal approach is commonly known in law as ‘black letter law’72. Salter and Mason73 
argue that the main goal of doctrinal analysis is to disclose ‘implications and assumptions’ out of 
existing rules and precedents, seeing it as a coherent system. For Hofheinz74 these are simply ‘(…) 
the rules applicable to a particular area of the law, stated (often in outline form), without 
                                                          
71 See John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches (3rd edn, Sage Publications 2009) 
5-11. 
72 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal Research (Longman Pub 
Group 2007) 44. 
73 ibid. 
74 Walter Wm. Hofheinz, ‘Legal Analysis’ (1997) <http://www.hofheinz.com/LANLSYS.php> accessed 12 October 2012. 
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application to the particular facts and circumstances of a hypothetical or real legal problem, plus 
the pattern of questions necessary to apply those rules in a logical manner.’ The doctrinal approach 
is thus nothing else than an analysis of statutes, precedents and academic work, combined with the 
ability of researchers to evaluate the implications arising from these texts. 
Due to the fact that the issue of corporate governance is subject to legal regulation, it was 
necessary to precede my research with an analysis of legal acts, as well as other documents 
referring to them, such as commentaries, precedents, court rulings, journal articles and textbooks. 
Their availability in both hard copy and electronic forms also contributed to the decision to use the 
doctrinal approach in this project. There was no danger that some ethical difficulties associated 
with empirical fieldwork would appear here, as gathering public documents does not raise them75.  
On the other hand, restricting myself to using only the doctrinal approach would be 
insufficient in relation to this research, whose agenda is to determine the possibility of the 
hybridisation of corporate governance in Poland. Salter and Mason76 rightly note that the focus on 
law itself precludes researchers from ‘an imaginative reconstruction of how law could, in principle, 
be substantially different from how it currently is and operates.’ 
An alternative to doctrinal research is the non-doctrinal approach to research, which 
confronts a legal problem with society members, actual facts and circumstances. 
 
 
2. Non-doctrinal approach to research and its application to 
corporate governance 
 
The non-doctrinal approach to research is also known as ‘law in action’77 or ‘law in context’78. It is 
based on the social constructivist worldview, which assumes that all knowledge, including the most 
basic, is derived from and maintained by social interactions79. People interact ‘with the 
understanding[,] that their respective perceptions of reality are related, and as they act upon this 
understanding[,] their common knowledge of reality becomes reinforced’80. Accordingly, non-
doctrinal legal research is ‘(…) the social effects of the law, legal process, institutions, and 
services’81. It can ‘produce empirical results that question key tenets of the black letter tradition’s 
                                                          
75 Salter & Mason (n 72) 110. 
76 ibid 108. 
77 See, for example, Paul D. Carrington and Erika King, ‘Law and the Wisconsin Idea’ (1997) 47 Journal of Legal Education 297.  
78 See, for example, Paul Havemann, ‘‟Law in Context” – Taking Context Seriously’ [1995] 8 Waikato Law Review 
<www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/WkoLRev/1995/index.html> accessed 17 November 2012. 
79 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luekmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treaties in the Sociology of Knowledge (Anchor 1967) 21. 
80 ibid.  
81 Salter & Mason (n 72) 126. 
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emphasis upon formal rules as vital devices for minimising unbridled executive and administrative 
discretion’82. It can also investigate issues that ‘(…) are simply beyond the abilities of doctrinal 
analysis’, eg a dissertation could aim to clarify the reasons for which certain kinds of legal regulation 
can be expected to fail to consistently achieve their stated objectives in specific contexts, including 
pan-European forms of legal regulation through the implementation of directives83.  
 Like the doctrinal approach to research, the non-doctrinal approach has its strengths and 
weaknesses. One strength is certainly the fact that it refers to the lived experiences of a group in 
society84. As a consequence, the utilisation of the approach expands the scope of legal analysis 
beyond law reports and statutes to include the social, economic and political factors shaping the 
emergence and enforcement of legal regulations85. One of the weaknesses is that participants of 
socio-legal research are often tied indistinguishably to specific liberal and radical political agendas, 
which have an impact on their objectivity and subsequently the overall research outcome86. 
Moreover, the presence of individuals in empirical research raises serious ethical difficulties, 
namely the necessity of ensuring their privacy and confidentiality87. 
 Typical methods of socio-legal studies are an interview and an observation. I did not utilise 
an observation as a research method in this project. Instead, I employed structured and 
unstructured interviews to research chosen issues and fill the existing gap in knowledge on 
corporate governance in Poland. 
 
 
a) Interviews 
 
Structured interviews (also known as ‘standardised interviews’88) use questionnaires based on 
prearranged and ‘standardised’, or identical sets of questions89. The very formal character of 
structured interviews is the reason why they are used to collect quantifiable data (thus, they are 
also referred to as ‘quantitative research interviews’)90. 
Unstructured interviews (also known as ‘non-standardised interviews’ and ‘in-depth 
interviews’91) are based on open questioning, so there is no predetermined list of questions to work 
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through92. The researcher prepares only a list of themes and possibly some key questions to be 
covered (although their use may differ from interview to interview). The interviewee is given the 
opportunity to talk freely about an event, behaviour and beliefs in relation to the topic area. This 
protects interviewees from getting distracted by excessive guiding.93  
 These two types of interviews, applied to this research, enabled me to perceive an 
‘imaginative reconstruction of how law could, in principle, be substantially different from how it 
currently is and operates’94, which is the purpose of the second and third research question (see 
chapter I). The actual attitude of the business environment to possible hybridisation of Polish 
corporate governance also facilitated an analysis of my findings on the strengths and weaknesses 
of the present model of corporate governance in Poland (my first research question; see chapter I), 
taken from my doctrinal research.  
It should be added that I mainly arranged structured interviews to gather more statistical 
data for this project. I assumed that sole entrepreneurs and members of partnerships, who were 
invited to take part in structured interviews, would not be interested in answering my questions 
extensively, as they were interviewed by questionnaire and might feel that their knowledge of 
corporate governance and related issues was not sufficient. However, my assumptions turned out 
to be mistaken. The majority of those participants answered my questions almost as 
comprehensively as participants of unstructured interviews – corporate directors and supervisors. 
This had a significant impact on the degree to which my research objectives were fulfilled, which is 
discussed in detail in chapter VII. 
The outcome of these interviews allowed me to avoid making observations in this research. 
 
 
b) Observations 
 
The main similarity between observations and interviews is probably the degree of participation of 
a researcher in the research. It can also vary during unstructured observations: ‘At one extreme, 
the researcher can be a complete participant, being another member of the group involved. At the 
other extreme, the researcher might ‘take a back seat’, not taking a prominent role when there is 
action, or have his role agreed [upon] as being the researcher in their midst’95. Here, the identity of 
the observer is exposed to other members of the group. Meanwhile, it is possible to hide the fact 
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that the group is being observed for research purposes when the researcher is its active member96. 
 The application of unstructured observations to corporate governance would not be 
possible. An observation of corporate authorities without their consent would raise serious ethical 
issues, and might result in criminal liability. There is only a small possibility that a company would 
give such permission. Furthermore, some technical difficulties could arise while observing 
corporate officials. They could perform their duties away from the observed space and at a different 
time. Finally, an observation of people from the ‘back seat’ would not allow the researcher to ask 
the type questions which could clarify unclear issues. 
 In addition, the research method of a structured observation might turn out to be 
unsatisfactory while doing research on corporate governance in Poland. 
  As Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill97 declare, ‘[b]oth the full participation in observation and 
taking the ‘back seat’ allow researchers to determine reasons for which certain things occur.’ This 
differentiates an unstructured observation from a structured observation. A structured observation 
is quantitative and is more concerned with the frequency of actions. So, its function is to say how 
often things happen rather than why they happen.98 My research, however, aims to determine the 
reasons for which corporate governance in Poland operates in a particular way and the way in which 
it might operate. It is not focused on the frequency of certain occurrences within corporate 
governance. Thus, a structured observation would not bring a sufficient amount of information to 
answer my research questions. 
 
 
3. Comparative research and its application to corporate governance 
 
My research on corporate governance largely takes the form of a comparative analysis. As O’Reilly99 
argues, such an analysis is meaningful because by researching other countries’ practices, 
researchers are better able to understand their own countries’ practices:  
 
‘On an instrumental level, this means the borrowing of ideas from other countries in the spirit 
of learning from one context into another. On a less instrumental dimension, this also allows 
researchers to reflect upon their own social systems and cultural ways of behaving.’ 
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As a result, this approach facilitates more critical, questioning attitudes towards law by 
undermining the ‘taken for granted’ positions and practices. It does so by highlighting the relative 
peculiarities and distinctive features of a particular version of ‘law’ or a specific type of legal 
response to an issue.100 
Salter and Mason101 rightly note that comparative research might be very time-consuming 
and, in particular, difficult to timetable accurately. It can be added that an analysis of a foreign 
system of law, which the researcher is not familiar with, can be very intricate and provide numerous 
occasions to lose the focus of the research. For example, while conducting this research, I learnt on 
several occasions that a legal act has been nulled and replaced by another act. Another 
disadvantage of comparative research is limited access to documents, mainly legal, in the language 
of a researcher. This research embraced seven legal systems, of which the Malaysian and Japanese 
ones have their legal documents published mainly in their national language. Thus, I had to rely on 
either legal acts’ translations found on the Internet or journal articles available in English. In this 
case, the fact that some professional business and governmental web pages are accessible in 
English, turned out to be invaluable.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Research methodology applied to corporate governance 
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C. RESEARCH DESIGN: 
QUALITATIVE, QUANTITATIVE AND MIXED METHODS RESEARCH 
 
The other methodological division is a division into qualitative and quantitative research. Saunders 
et al.102 argue that many business and management research designs are likely to combine 
qualitative and quantitative elements. In this way qualitative and quantitative research may be 
viewed as two ends of a continuum, which in practice are often mixed. My research on corporate 
governance in Poland is also predominantly qualitative. 
 
 
1. Qualitative research and its application to corporate governance 
 
Qualitative research can be defined simply as ‘(…) non numerical and contrasted as such with 
quantitative (numerical) research’103. But, it can also be defined in a slightly more expanded way. 
The leading writers on qualitative research, Denzin and Lincoln104, describe the approach as follows:  
 
‘Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists 
of a set of interpretative, material practices that make the world visible. These practices 
transform the world. They put the world into a series of representations, including field 
notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self.’  
 
Creswell105 verbalises a definition that relies less on sources of information, but conveys similar 
ideas: ‘Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological 
traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, 
holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a 
natural setting.’ 
 The following strategies of inquiry (also known as approaches to inquiry106 or research 
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methodologies107) are distinguished within qualitative research: phenomenological inquiry, 
hermeneutical inquiry, narrative inquiry, case study, grounded theory and ethnography. While the 
grounded theory and ethnography did not match my research objectives, the other approaches to 
inquiry fulfilled the role well.  
 
 
a) Phenomenological inquiry 
 
Phenomenological research is ‘(…) a design of inquiry coming from philosophy and psychology in 
which a researcher describes lived experiences of individuals about a phenomenon as described by 
participants. This description concludes in the essence of the experiences for several participants 
who have all experienced the phenomenon.’108 
This design has a solid philosophical underpinning and normally includes conducting 
interviews109.    
Phenomenological research has already largely been elaborated on in the section discussing 
non-doctrinal research. The social constructivist worldview, on which the non-doctrinal approach is 
based, has its roots in phenomenology110. 
 In the case of this research, the phenomenon is corporate governance, with respect to 
which Polish business people, familiar with its mechanism, expressed their opinions during 
structured and unstructured interviews, described throughout this section. These opinions were 
subsequently subject to my analysis. The most valuable ones for this research can be found in 
chapter VI. 
 
 
b) Hermeneutical inquiry 
 
Hermeneutics (‘the art or science of interpretation’111) emerged from biblical studies; it aimed to 
be a science of interpretation. Philosophically, hermeneutics discards the so-called 
‘correspondence theory of truth’. Generally speaking, ‘correspondence theories separated facts 
from values via methodology, offered the researcher as a neutral or objective figure, and sought 
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verification of phenomena in the generalizability and regularity of occurrences’112. Hermeneutics, 
on the other hand, tends to reject that there is a truth ‘out there’ with which ‘facts’ corresponded: 
‘[s]ome ‘perspectives’ (…) [are] more defensible than others, but the idea of objective truth (…) [is] 
an illusion’113. Instead, ‘it [emphasises] understanding as a situated event in terms of individuals 
and their situations – as an inevitably prejudiced viewpoint.’114 
 It can hardly be denied that legal scholars are frequently interpreting texts and arguing 
about a choice between deviating interpretations. In this way, legal doctrine is a hermeneutic 
discipline, in the same way as is, for instance, the study of literature, or to a slightly smaller extent, 
history. ‘Interpreting texts has been the core business of legal doctrine since it started in the Roman 
Empire.’115 
 In a hermeneutic discipline, ‘texts and documents are the main research object and their 
interpretation, according to standard methods, is the main activity of the researcher’116. As 
Hoecke117 argues, this is clearly the case with legal doctrine.  
 With respect to this research, the necessity of undertaking legal interpretation mainly 
occurred while conducting interviews, as interviewees’ opinions had to be appropriately 
understood in order to formulate further questions for them and converse with them at an 
appropriate level. Subsequently, I conducted a comparative analysis of all corresponding opinions 
gathered during interviews, which required additional interpretations. 
I also found it necessary, for further analysis and final conclusions, to explain the meaning 
of some statements included in various documents and legal provisions. In fact, it embraced the 
majority of legal acts that I had to study in the course of this research, including the ones most 
fundamental for Polish corporate governance, namely the Company Code of 2000 and the 
Privatisation Act.   
 Each text interpretation required arguments when differing interpretations could rationally 
be sustained. For example, it is hard to believe that members of the management board in the 
majority of LLCs do not receive remuneration, despite the fact that the Company Code does not 
regulate this issue. Thus, it must belong to the discretion of shareholders to decide whether the 
directors receive remuneration.118  
Actually, interpretation and argumentation cannot be detached from each other, both in 
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legal doctrine and in legal practice119. Hoecke120 states as follows: ‘So, legal doctrine and legal 
practice are both hermeneutic and argumentative, but interpretation and argumentation appear 
to be roughly two sides of the same activity, in which interpretation is the goal and argumentation 
the means for sustaining that interpretation.’  
 
 
c) Narrative inquiry 
 
While ‘interpretation is the goal and argumentation the means for sustaining that interpretation’121, 
narration is undeniably a part of both. Czarniawska122 defines it as ‘a spoken or written text giving 
an account of an event/action or series of events/actions, chronologically connected.’ In addition, 
Creswell123 stresses the human participation in narrative inquiry. For him it ‘(…) consists of focusing 
on studying one or two individuals, gathering data through the collection of their stories, reporting 
individual experiences, and chronologically ordering the meaning of those experiences (or using life 
course stages).’ I take such an approach to narration in chapter VI, in which I analyse experiences 
of individuals participating in the management of a business. 
 
 
d) Case studies 
 
Another approach to inquiry applied to this research was case study research. 
Admittedly, Stake124 argues that case study research is not a methodology but a choice of 
what is to be studied (eg a case within a bounded system), but others present it as a strategy of 
inquiry, a methodology, or a comprehensive research strategy125. 
According to Eisenhardt126, case study research can be defined as ‘a research strategy which 
focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings.’ Yin and Creswell127 develop 
this definition: case study research involves the study of an issue explored through one or more 
cases within a real-life, contemporary context or setting.  
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The most serious difficulty inherent in qualitative case study development is that the 
researcher has to recognise the case. The case study researcher has to decide which ‘bounded’ 
system to study, ‘(…) recognizing that several might be possible candidates for this selection and 
realizing that either the case or an issue, which a case or cases are selected to illustrate, is worthy 
of study’128. The researcher has to consider whether to study a single case or multiple cases. ‘The 
study of more than one case dilutes the overall analysis; the more cases and individual studies, the 
less depth in any single case. When a researcher chooses multiple cases, the issue becomes, ‘How 
many cases?’’129 
  Cases utilised in this research are corporate governance models that are in force in several 
countries. In this regard, the following definition of a case seems to be more appropriate: ‘(…) an 
instance of the occurrence, existence, etc., of something; the actual state of things; a question or 
problem of moral conduct; matter; situation, circumstance, plight; a person or thing whose plight 
or situation calls for attention.’130 
The corporate practices of several companies would not illustrate the major problems that 
occur in the corporate governance system of the country, eg some companies in Poland appoint 
independent supervisors, some do not; companies that appoint independent supervisors might 
have a highly consolidated ownership structure, while it might be dispersed in other companies. As 
a consequence, it would cause a number of difficulties to select the most appropriate companies, 
in particular countries, in order to compare their governance to each other. Moreover, the depth 
of research could be affected by the fact that company authorities would not permit access to all 
information.  
 
 
e) Ethnography 
 
Discussing a case study, it is also worth drawing attention to the fact that ‘[t]he entire culture-
sharing group in ethnography may be considered a case (…)’ 131. However, it must be noted that the 
intent in ethnography is to determine how the culture works rather than to understand an issue or 
problem using the case as a specific illustration132. 
As a process, ethnography implicates lengthy observations of a ‘culture-sharing’ group, 
most often through participant observation, in which the researcher is immersed in the day-to-day 
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lives of the people and observes and interviews the group participants133. Ethnographers describe 
and interpret the shared and learned patterns of values, behaviours, beliefs, and language of the 
group134.  
The aim of this research was not to investigate the values, behaviours and language of the 
corporate environment in Poland, but rather legal devices within corporate governance, which 
cause problems in the functioning of companies, eg financial misappropriations. Nevertheless, 
these areas did end up being addressed, as was the interaction between people involved in business 
in Poland. This is particularly noticeable in chapter VI, which is dedicated to an analysis of interviews 
with business practitioners.  
 
 
f) Grounded theory 
 
Finally, the grounded theory as a research methodology was rejected in this project. 
The intent of a grounded theory study is to move beyond description and generate or 
discover a theory, a ‘unified theoretical explanation’135. This differentiates grounded theory 
research from narrative research which is focused on individual stories told by participants, and 
phenomenology emphasising the common experiences for a number of individuals136. Grounded 
research participants are also unlikely to be situated in the same place or interact frequently to the 
extent that they develop shared patterns, behaviours, beliefs, or a language. Still, like an 
ethnographer, a grounded theory researcher develops a theory from examining many individuals 
who share in the same process, action, or interaction.137 A key idea is that this ‘theory development 
does not come ‘off the shelf’, but rather is generated or ‘grounded’ in data from participants who 
experienced a process or were involved in an action or interaction.’138 
The aim of my research was to neither generate nor discover a theory. The scope of 
research merely allowed me to learn its main weaknesses and the attitude of people involved in 
business activity to particular changes which could be made to corporate governance in Poland. 
The grounded theory study is a process of constant comparison, in which ‘[e]ach item of 
data collected is compared with others, as well as against the codes being used to categorise data 
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(…)’139. The following codes are used to categorise data: 
• open coding, which means coding the data for its main categories of information; 
• axial coding, in which the researcher finds one open coding category to focus on (called the 
‘core’ phenomenon), and goes back to the data and generates categories around this 
principal phenomenon; 
• selective coding, in which the researcher takes the model and develop propositions (or 
hypotheses) that interconnect the categories in the model or gathers a story that describes 
the interrelationship of categories in the model.140  
 
Continuous comparison involves moving between inductive (generalising from the specific 
to the general) and deductive (generalising from the general to the specific) thinking141. As a 
researcher codes data into categories, a relationship might begin to suggest itself between specific 
codes (here, the researcher is using inductive thinking because he or she will be linking specific 
codes to form general proposition)142. This emerging interpretation will need to be ‘tested’ through 
collecting data from new cases (here, the researcher will use deductive thinking ‘to test the abstract 
generalisation back to a new set of specific cases, to see if it stands up as an explanatory relationship 
to form a higher-level code’)143. 
 Both deductive and inductive thinking are an integral part of legal inference144. So, it must 
also be present during research on corporate governance. For example, if we observe an 
improvement in performance of a small company after it has implemented a set of good practices, 
this means that a big company is also likely to benefit from a similar change in its business conduct 
(inductive thinking). A lack of an appropriate number of independent supervisors in the Japanese 
job market means that we are likely to observe a similar difficulty in Poland, where this market is 
less developed (deductive thinking). 
 
 
2. Quantitative research and its application to corporate governance 
 
As I have mentioned, I also applied the quantitative approach to research in this project. What is 
quantitative research? 
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 Quantitative research is generally associated with positivism, which assumes that research 
is based on testing, verifying and refining existing theories145. Thus, problems studied by 
postpositivists reflect the need to identify and assess the causes that influence outcomes, such as 
those found in experiments. In other words, quantitative research examines relationships between 
variables, which are measured numerically and analysed using a range of statistical techniques146.  
This type of research is usually associated with a deductive approach, when the focus is on 
using data to test hypothesis. However, it may also incorporate an inductive approach, where data 
is used to develop hypothesis.147 
Quantitative research is principally associated with experimental and survey research 
strategies. A survey research strategy is normally conducted through the use of questionnaires or 
structured interviews or, possibly, structured observations (analysed above)148.  
The survey strategy is common in business and management research, and is most 
frequently used to answer ‘what’, ‘who’, ‘where’, ‘how much’ and ‘how many’ questions149. It 
therefore tends to be used for explanatory and descriptive research150. The data collected by a 
survey is unlikely to be as wide-ranging as those collected by other research strategies151. For 
example, there is a limit to the number of questions that any questionnaire can contain ‘if the 
goodwill of the respondent is not to be presumed on too much’152.  
This is the reason why a survey was not suitable for my research. It is exploratory, and 
therefore the main objective was to find out whether it is possible to implement hybrid corporate 
governance in Poland. In such a case, I required greater freedom in the choice of questions while 
conducting my non-doctrinal research (unstructured interviews). Nonetheless, my participants 
received a paper with a number of questions, which enabled me to collect more quantifiable data 
(structured interviews). They, however, differentiated from typical survey questions, as they had an 
open character153.  
Conducting an experiment was also an inappropriate research method for this project.  
The most convenient place for carrying out an experiment is a laboratory. There, the 
researcher has better control over aspects of the research process, such as sample selection and 
the context within which the experiment occurs.154  
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It is a common practice to run a company from a designated place, such as a room or a 
building, or a number of buildings. It is also possible to keep control over some aspects of doing 
business, including the decision making process and people management. However, establishing a 
company for experimental purposes would be costly and, in some cases, might be considered illegal. 
For example, it would not be legally possible to establish in Poland a company with a one-tier board 
system, because its actions towards third persons would be void by law155.   
 Methodologists156 also explain that the extent to which the findings from a laboratory 
experiment are able to be generalised to all organisations is likely to be lower than for a field 
(organisation) based experiment. With respect to corporate governance, this issue has already been 
explained in the section dedicated to case study research. I explain there that a case of a company 
or of a number of companies, in a particular country, might not illustrate all the inefficiencies that 
a corporate governance model suffers from. 
 
 
3. Mixed method approach and its application to research on 
corporate governance 
 
As I have already declared, my research is a combination of qualitative and quantitative research. 
This is, thus, the so-called mixed method approach to research.  
The approach is based on the pragmatic worldview, ‘opening the door to multiple methods, 
different worldviews, and different assumptions, as well as different forms of data collection and 
analysis’157. Speaking precisely, instead of focusing on methods, researchers emphasise the research 
problem and use all approaches available to understand the problem158.  
In this project, I focused on qualitative research because it looks at context and social 
meaning and how it affects individuals159. So, this type of research gave me the possibility ‘to 
empower individuals to share their stories, hear their voices (…)’160. It was necessary to answer my 
research questions. On the other hand, the social aspect made me profoundly involved in this 
project, which gave me rather a subjective view of this study and its participants161. This meant that 
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I was likely to interpret this research according to my own biased view, which skewed the data 
gathered.  
The qualitative character of my research was also useful during its early stages, when I was 
unsure of exactly what would be studied or what to focus on162. In addition, it did not require a 
strict design plan before it began163. This gave me freedom to let this study develop more naturally. 
I also gained more detailed and rich data in the form of broad written descriptions164.  
A serious disadvantage of my qualitative study was the fact that it was time-consuming and 
lasted for months165. 
 This research was also quantitative. I came across quantifiable data while analysing legal 
documents and gathered such data during my interviews with business people in Poland. This 
turned out to be beneficial because my findings became more objective this way166.  
 In fact, I could not fully apply quantitative research to this project, as this type of research 
does not discuss the meaning that things have for different people and their natural setting167. So, 
the application of quantitative research would not enable me, for example, to find out what changes 
– according to the Polish business environment – should be made to corporate governance in 
Poland.    
 
 
 
Figure 4. Methodology rejected in research on corporate governance 
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D. COLLECTION AND AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
1. Data collection 
 
Once corporate governance in Poland and the possibility of its hybridisation became the subject of 
this research, I undertook a literature review. It involved the relatively new occurrence of hybrid 
corporate governance in the world and the functioning of corporate governance in Poland. As 
chapter I shows, it was also necessary to refer to the American and British corporate governance 
systems.   
After over a year of reading on these topics and with a firm understanding of the majority 
of problems arising from them, I began a set of interviews within the Polish business environment. 
Their main goal was to find out about the practical application of certain rules of corporate law and 
the actual functioning of the internal structure of companies in Poland. They also gave me the 
opportunity to learn the views of business practitioners concerning corporate governance, for 
example about the prospect of implementing a one-tier board system in Poland. Thus, they allowed 
me to partially fill a significant gap in knowledge of corporate relations in Poland.   
 
 
Figure 5. Data collection scheme applied to research on corporate governance  
 
The two first interviews were a pilot study, which enabled me to prepare a complete list of 
questions for the remaining interviewees, and also to find out which data would finally be available 
and the way in which it would be accessed.    
While conducting interviews, I was at the same time reviewing literature while conducting 
interviews. In fact, I finished reviewing the literature a day before I submitted this thesis. It was 
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necessary to have updated knowledge of hybrid corporate governance and continuously occurring 
amendments to corporate law in Poland.  
In total, I conducted 37 interviews in four Polish regions (Lower Silesian, Lubusz, Greater 
Poland, Pomeranian and Masovian). My interviewees were: board members (14), minor 
shareholders (11), employees of limited companies (2), sole entrepreneurs (6; of which four are 
suppliers for limited companies) and members of partnerships (4; including employees of two legal 
firms). Recruitment criteria for the research participants were either vast work experience within 
corporate authorities or wide knowledge of corporate practice in Poland.  
23 of the 37 interviews were structured. Interviewees received a sheet of paper with my 
questions and they were asked to justify their answers168. After they returned the question sheets, 
I did not ask them any additional questions. Nevertheless, shareholders and two corporate lawyers 
(members and employees of professional partnerships at the same time) received a different 
question sheet (with one additional question) than the other participants who took part in the 
structured interviews.  
All corporate officials took part in the unstructured interviews, which took the form of an 
open dialogue. However, questions asked during these interviews mirrored those asked in the 
questionnaire.  
Unstructured interviews were either tape recorded (and transcribed), handwritten 
(interviews conducted by Skype and phone), or conducted via e-mail correspondence (in fact, the 
majority of interviews were conducted by electronic devices – by e-mail and Skype). The tape 
recorded interviews were conducted in participants’ offices. Interviews conducted via Skype took 
place away from people in a closed room in a building. This Anglia Ruskin ethics policy requirement 
is described in greater detail later in this chapter.  
All interviews were scheduled to fit around the timetable of participants. It took over two 
years to conduct them. The first contact was made via a telephone conversation or an e-mail 
message, during which board members were asked to choose how they would like to be interviewed 
(by e-mail, Skype, telephone or face to face).  
All 37 interviewees gave their consent to take part in this research. Eight other persons 
initially agreed to participate, but after several months they informed me of their withdrawal from 
this research, all putting it down to a lack of time. However, they returned partially filled 
questionnaires. I took their answers into consideration while analysing the data. The other 
candidates declined to participate straight away. The reasons for the refusal varied from issues of 
‘confidentiality’, ‘not familiar enough with corporate law’ and ‘time shortage’.   
The next stage of this research was data analysis.  
                                                          
168 The questions used in the interviews are presented in chapter VI. 
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2. Data analysis 
 
While comparing several legal systems, I employed a multiple analysis. I analysed the Polish 
corporate governance system and subsequently I compared it to selected foreign equivalents, 
which had also been subject of an analysis. With respect to my interview findings, each of my 
interview was analysed and, at the final stage, compared with other interviews and the outcomes 
of my doctrinal research. Therefore, the entire analysis was conducted using a ‘cross findings’ 
process169. Altogether, all findings formulated the so-called ‘integrated findings’ (methodological 
triangulation) of the research. At this stage, new knowledge emerged.170  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Comparative analysis applied to research on corporate governance 
 
The process of comparing data was preceded by its classification – according to the 
research questions, the research aims and the conceptual framework that underpinned the 
research171. In interview transcripts and e-mail prints (with respect to interviews conducted by e-
mail), each category was marked in a different colour (this process enabled me to group the 
answers together according to their respective categories). Furthermore, documents were 
classified according to their binding power – primary legislation, followed by regulation and legal 
writers172.  
It was not only geography and corporate power structures that were of my interest while 
analysing data, but also legal structures in each of the systems investigated by me. Thus, the aim 
                                                          
169 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (4th edn, Sage 2011) 111; see also Hoecke (n 115) 171. 
170 ibid. 
171 Charles Chatterjee, Methods of Research in Law (2nd edn, Old Bailey 2000).  
172 ibid.   
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was also to understand the national setting out of which the law arises and is used173. Besides this, 
the national lawyer’s normal institutional approach was complemented by a wider social and 
cultural contextualisation of legal developments in the various systems.  
I based my conclusions on the premise that: 
•  a test for the correctness of a legal solution is whether it makes the law the best it could 
be174,  
• a legal solution is compatible when it is predominantly consistent and coherent with the 
rest of the law175, and 
• where more than one solution is possible, then the choice is made according to the value 
perspective that the interpreter thinks is right within the institutional context of that legal 
system176.  
 
Finally, to avoid subjectivity in presenting personal views, I checked whether opinions 
largely prevailed amongst legal scholars or amongst lawyers in general.  
 
 
E. ETHICS IN RESEARCH ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Research involving human subjects requires ethical approval in order to protect the rights and 
welfare of participants, and minimise the risk of physical and mental harm. These are also followed 
in order to protect the rights of the researcher to carry out legitimate investigations, as well as the 
reputation of the University for which the research is being conducted.177  
 Conventional practice and ethical codes support the view that various safeguards should 
protect the privacy and identity of research subjects178. In accordance with research ethics 
guidelines, the subjects’ right to privacy is preserved by keeping the subjects anonymous. The major 
safeguard to guard against the invasion of privacy is the assurance of confidentiality.179 This 
research respected the privacy of the respondents, their anonymity and the confidentiality of the 
data.  
 I obtained ethics approval from Anglia Ruskin University Ethics Committee prior to 
commencing the study. Subsequently, I provided all my interviewees with information sheets 
                                                          
173 See George P. Fletcher, ‘Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline’ (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 683. 
174 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana 1986) 228-238.  
175 See Neil McCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press 1978). 
176 See John Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in Hoecke (n 115) 166. 
177 Anglia Ruskin University, ‘Research Student Hand Book 2013’ (September 2013) 14. 
178 See, for example, Creswell (n 71) 92-101. 
179 ibid. 
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written in plain language180, which included the title of the project, the name of the researcher and 
how she could be contacted. In addition, these sheets also stated that the participant could ask to 
withdraw from participation in this project at any time and for any reason.  
I also discussed anonymity and confidentiality with my participants. Both were promised in 
the written form and verbally before I commenced this research. I assured both anonymity and 
confidentiality both during interviews and at the documentary stage. Accordingly, I conducted 
interviews in public utility buildings in closed rooms during normal hours of work and away from 
other people. I promised to keep all transcripts on the hard drive of my password protected 
computer, and then to destroy them after the submission of the thesis. I either coded or kept the 
names of my participants on my secured computer. They are also not revealed in this thesis. 
Participants are either called ‘participants’ or ‘interviewees’, or by the name of their business 
profession. However, the name of the company for which they work is not identified.   
 
 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, I analyse research methods applied and rejected in this research project, including 
the philosophical worldviews, from which they are drawn, the data collection and the process of its 
analysis. 
 Section B is an analysis of the doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches to research, which 
were applied in this study. I also briefly elaborate on the meaning of comparative research and the 
impact that they had on my research. In Section C, I discuss qualitative, quantitative and mixed 
methods research, and research methodologies distinguished within them. I explain which of them 
were applied to my research, eg I based my research on a case study (qualitative strategy of inquiry) 
and some methodologies were rejected, eg I decided not to use a survey as a research methodology 
(quantitative research). I also refer to such philosophical worldviews as postpositivist, social 
constructivist and pragmatic, as I based my research on them.  
The issue of data analysis applied to this project is discussed in detail in section D. Here, I 
also describe the research ethics requirements with respect to my research. Finally, I explain the 
process of data collection while conducting interviews in Poland. 
The subsequent chapter is a literature review of hybrid corporate governance. This is also 
an introduction to an analysis of the Anglo-Saxon models of corporate governance in chapters IV 
and V and of Polish corporate governance in chapters V and VI. 
                                                          
180 An example of the information sheet and the consent form is attached as Appendix 11 and 12.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
Following Dellinger’s181 standpoint on a literature review, the chapter aims to analyse the ‘critical 
points of current knowledge’ on hybrid corporate governance in the world, ‘including substantial 
discoveries as well as theoretical and methodological contributions’ to the theme. Such an analysis 
is necessary to understand what is currently known about the topic, and what needs to be 
researched to fill gaps in knowledge182. A literature review was also used in this research to identify 
methods of doing research, and to find out where to get support to successfully conduct it183. In 
order to present an in depth analysis of core aspects of worldwide hybrid corporate governance, I 
limited the review to eighty articles and seven countries (see chapter VII ‘Concluding Remarks’, 
dealing with the delimitations of this research).  
 This chapter begins with an explanation of the notions ‘hybrid corporate governance’ and 
‘legal transplant’, which is tightly combined with the concept of hybrid corporate governance. This 
introductory part is then followed by an analysis of particular legal orders in which legislators 
decided to implement various hybrid solutions to corporate governance (sections D-H). Section B is 
dedicated to hybrid corporate governance in Poland, in which I present legal literature raising the 
issue of hybridisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
181 According to Dellinger, ‘a literature review is a text written by someone to consider the critical points of current knowledge including 
substantive findings as well as theoretical and methodological contributions to a particular topic’. Literature reviews are secondary 
sources, and as such, do not report any new or original experimental work; Dellinger (n 70). There are other definitions of a literature 
review, which however, do not differentiate from each other significantly. Hart writes that a literature review can also be interpreted as 
a review of an abstract accomplishment; Christopher Hart, Doing a Literature Search: A Guide for the Social Sciences (Sage Publications 
2001) 194. For Lane, a literature review is simply ‘a description of the literature relevant to a particular field or topic’ (Nancy D. Lane, 
Techniques for Student Research: A Practical Guide (2nd edn, Longman 1996) 58), and for Bell it is ‘an account of what has been published 
on a topic by accredited scholars and researchers’ (Judith Bell, Doing Your Research Project (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1999) 28). 
182 A literature review might also be conducted by researchers for personal or intellectual reasons, or because they need to understand 
what is currently known about a topic and cannot or do not want to do a study of their own; Arlene Fink, Conducting Research Literature 
Reviews. From Paper to the Internet (Sage Publications 1998) 3. A literature review might produce conflicting or ambiguous results or 
might not adequately cover a topic. Experts are then often called in to help resolve the uncertainty that arises when data is inconclusive 
or missing; Fink, ibid 8.  
183 See Fink, ibid 7 and 9. For Fink, a literature review can be used to identify methods of developing and implementing programmes. 
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B. THE NOTION OF HYBRID CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
1. The Andreasson definition of hybrid corporate governance 
 
Explaining the general meaning of ‘hybrid corporate governance’ is difficult, as the concept is 
associated with particular legal systems, eg the South African, Japanese, Malaysian ones. In 
addition, only one paper, namely Understanding Corporate Governance Reform in South Africa: 
Anglo-American Divergence, the King Reports and Hybridization184, contains a complete definition 
of hybrid corporate governance. The author of the article, Andreasson185, reports that ‘successful 
hybrid corporate governance must be capable of addressing both shareholder and stakeholder 
concerns, and to effectively anchor these concerns in a cultural framework that confers popular 
legitimacy on the system as a whole.’ Andreasson, however, does not provide any general definition 
of ‘shareholder and stakeholder concerns’ and the ‘cultural framework’.  
What do ‘shareholder and stakeholder concerns’ and a ‘cultural framework’ mean for 
Andreasson and other researchers? What can we infer from their research in this regard? An answer 
to these questions is essential for the following reasons: 
• one of the hybrid solutions – elaborated in detail later in this thesis – involves a combination 
of the shareholder and stakeholder approaches to corporate governance, and 
• theoretical discussions on corporate governance generally begin with the premise that 
corporate governance regimes are based on either the shareholder model or the 
stakeholder model186. 
 
Thus, corporate governance regimes are based on either the shareholder model, which is 
most common in liberal market economies, like the US and UK, or the stakeholder model, typical 
for coordinated market economies, like Germany and Japan187.188 It should also be added that the 
corporate governance literature differentiates an Anglo-American ‘outsider’ and a Continental 
‘insider’ model189. In the legal and financial literature, corporate governance models (and financial 
                                                          
184 Andreasson (n 46). 
185 ibid. 
186 Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 25.  
187 ibid.  
188 In the political economy literature, this split has been referred to as ‘stock market capitalism’ versus ‘welfare capitalism’ (eg Ronald 
Dore, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism – Japan and Germany Versus the Anglo-Saxons (Oxford University Press 2000) 16), 
and in a more propagated setting as ‘Anglo-Saxon’ versus ‘Rhineland’ capitalism (eg Michael Albert, Capitalism Against Capitalism (Whurr 
Publishers 1993) 27). 
189 Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller and B. Burcin Yurtoglu, ‘Corporate Governance and Globalization’ (2004) 20 (1) Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 129. 
  
36 
 
regulation more broadly) have usually been divided into market-centred, like in the US and UK, and 
bank-centred, like in Germany or Japan190. I refer to both divisions later in this thesis.  
 According to Andreasson191, the shareholder model upholds that ‘a corporation is an 
extension of its owners and ultimately responsible to these owners.’ West192 clarifies that the 
shareholders own a company and therefore have exclusive rights to define its priorities and to any 
profit produced, and that only market forces can attain economic effectiveness. In this respect, 
Andreasson193 states that this model generally excludes any serious consideration of market 
interference in achieving the goals of the company, eg reflecting on matters beyond the financial 
‘bottom line’. 
For a later discussion on the shareholder model, it is also worth referring to Pratt’s and 
Zeckhauser’s194 opinion, according to which the shareholder model involves potential conflicts of 
interest between owners (principals) and managers (agents). Letza, Sun and Kirkbride195 report that 
these conflicts are usually resolved by linking managerial rewards to corporate performance, which 
is measured by share price and exercised by means of stock options.  
  Contrary to the shareholder model, the stakeholder one perceives a company as a ‘social 
entity’, which is responsible and accountable to a wider set of actors beyond its owners196. These 
actors typically include suppliers, customers, employees, government and local communities, which 
are influenced by the behaviour and performance of a company197. A normative version of the 
stakeholder model assumes that ‘the need to take stakeholders into account is an end in itself due 
to moral obligation and social values that extend beyond the liberal emphasis on the owners’198. A 
descriptive version notes that the considerations of stakeholders (and owners) are taken into 
account, whereas an instrumental version emphasises the need to be responsible towards 
stakeholders in order to gain better economic efficiency199. 
 The linkage between economic performance and the stakeholder model has recently been 
stressed by American researchers, who had observed that a company devoted to social and 
                                                          
190 Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (MIT Press 2000) 6. 
191 Andreasson (n 46).  
192 Andrew West, ‘Theorising South Africa’s Corporate Governance’ (2006) 63 (4) Journal of Business Ethics 433. 
193 Andreasson (n 46).   
194 John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Harvard Business School Press 1985) 
57. 
195 Steve Letza, Xiuping Sun and James Kirkbride, ‘Shareholding versus Stakeholding: A Critical Review of Corporate Governance’ (2004) 
12 (3) Corporate Governance: An International Review 242. 
196 Josef Wieland, ‘Corporate Governance, Values Management, and Standards: A European Perspective’ (2005) 44 (1) Business and 
Society 74. 
197 West (n 192). 
198 Donaldson & Preston (n 40). 
199 ibid.  
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environmental issues, which are significant to its stakeholders, has ‘superior’ financial 
performance200.  
 The pro-stakeholder approach in countries where the shareholder model had only 
previously been in force is the so-called ‘enlightened stakeholder value’, and it has also gained 
considerable attention in the UK, where the Companies Act of 2006 imposes on corporate directors 
the duty to – while performing their function – have regard (amongst other matters) for the 
community and the environment in which the company operates and which might be affected by 
this operation201.   
 In South Africa, enlightened stakeholder value has recently been pushed forward and 
turned into the so-called ‘stakeholder inclusivity’, according to which the shareholder does not have 
a predetermined place of precedence over other stakeholders202. The ethical foundation for this 
concept is the Southern African value system of Ubuntu, whose guiding principle can be stated in 
one sentence: ‘Ubuntungubuntu’. Khoza203 translates it as follows: ‘I am because you are, you are 
because we are. We are interrelated beings, we operate best when we care about one another.’ 
 The Ubuntu principle is a part of the cultural framework, which Andreasson204 includes with 
the definition of hybrid corporate governance (see above in this subsection). He does not explicitly 
state that Ubuntu is a component of the cultural framework, but we can deduce that from the 
context of his paper, according to which ‘[t]he hybridization of South African governance is a result 
of tensions between a traditional liberal emphasis on individual property rights imbued in the 
Anglo-American model and the communitarianism inherent in the concept of “African values,” or 
ubuntu.’ 
Andreasson’s205 paper also contains the following: 
• an analysis of the King I and II codes and the possibility of hybridisation of South African 
corporate governance in the King III Code through better protection of stakeholders’ 
interests. 
• a referral to the South African corporate tradition, which was shaped by British 
achievements in this area; and 
• the complicated economic situation of South Africa, as a consequence of a colonial legacy 
of uneven development, extreme inequalities and unsettled state-business relations.  
                                                          
200 See, for example, Verschoor & Murphy (n 38). 
201 Part 10, Chapter 2, section 172. 
202 King (n 34); King Code of Governance for South Africa 2009; 8.1. – 8.3. 
203 Albert Luthuli Centre for Responsible Leadership, ‘Interview Summary Report Compiled by Jess Schulshenk’ (University of Pretoria, 
August 2012) <web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/2013_alcrl_Interview%20summary%20report%20web.pdf> accessed 4 April 2013; see also 
Andreasson (n 46). 
204 Andreasson, ibid. 
205 ibid. 
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Alongside the Ubuntu principle, we could assume that these are also components of what 
Andreasson206 calls the cultural framework. We need to take into account that this is the only 
document defining hybrid corporate governance, and entirely dedicated to this issue. Therefore, 
the fact that Andreasson either analyses those issues or refers to them may not be accidental.  
 At this point, I would like to mention Ewald’s207 Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of 
Legal Transplant, in which he argues that the process of borrowing cannot be insulated from a social 
and economic change in the recipient legal culture. The Andreasson208 definition of hybridisation, 
which involves linking the shareholder and the stakeholder approaches to corporate governance 
and fitting them into a particular cultural framework, contains the element of borrowing from other 
jurisdictions. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that what Andreasson209 understands by a cultural 
framework is the society, law and economy of a country.  
 While interviewing business people in Poland, I discussed the Andreasson210 definition of 
hybrid corporate governance with corporate officials and shareholders (in total 14 people in total). 
They all agree that Andreasson considered the society, the legal system and economic conditions 
of South Africa as components of the cultural framework. In addition, one of interviewees211 
pointed out that they are interrelated with each other and shaped by the politics of a country. As 
he stated, the government, which represents a particular viewpoint on business, creates the law of 
a country, which determines the life of its citizens, because, among other things, it decides about 
the economic performance of the country. However, he also noted, that the economy, as well as 
the society, have a significant impact on the shape of a democratic country’s legal system. Citizens 
choose their representatives in the government, which creates the law of the country. It is also 
limited in its decisions (for example its legislative initiatives) by the following: 
• the scope of the government’s competences, which might have been broadened or 
lessened by the previous government; 
• the opinion of the public at large; and  
• the current economic situation. 
 
The economic performance of a country depends on a set of decisions made by the government of 
that country or by the governments of a number of countries, since we live in a globalised world, in 
                                                          
206 ibid.  
207 Ewald (n 48). See also Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ [1997] Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 111; Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1; Ann and Robert B. Seidman, 
State and Law in the Developing Process: Problem Solving and Institutional Change in the Developing World (Macmillan Publishers 1994) 
44-46. 
208 Andreasson (n 46). 
209 ibid. 
210 ibid. 
211 A vice-president of the management board of a JSC, interviewed in August 2013.  
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which the economies of individual countries are linked to each other.212  
 
  
Figure 7. Components of hybrid corporate governance according to Andreasson 
 
The definition of cultural framework, ie a mixture of social, legal and economic factors of a 
country, was then utilised during further stages of this research, eg in order to consider the 
possibility of implementing the ‘stakeholder inclusivity’ and a one-tier board system in Poland. I 
also refer to it several times in the subsequent chapters. 
The above-mentioned notion of hybrid corporate governance was employed in my 
research, and, based on it, I chose to analyse issues concerning Polish corporate governance and 
formulated questions for my interviewees. However, in this regard, I also employed the Aronson213 
definition of hybrid corporate governance.  
 
 
2. Alternative definitions of hybrid corporate governance 
 
According to Aronson214, hybrid systems intend ‘to combine the best elements of the board 
management and monitoring models.’ This is directly associated with the implementation of the 
one-tier board model of corporate governance in Japan (analysed later in this chapter), which co-
exists with the traditional two-tier board system. 
I employed the Aronson definition to my research because my further considerations are 
focused on the possibility of implementing a one-tier board system in Poland  and of the 
implementation of a law that would impose on companies in Poland the obligation to appoint a 
larger number of independent supervisors and to create board committees. Both solutions were 
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first introduced into British and American law, and therefore they are an integral part of board 
management.  
 Thus, the application of the Aronson approach to hybrid corporate governance to my 
research findings enabled me to include those issues within this project. In other words, 
Andreasson’s definition, which states that corporate hybridisation is a combination of shareholder 
and stakeholder concerns, would not enabled me to discuss board issues, as neither the one-tier 
board model nor the two-tier board model are inseparably integrated with the shareholder and 
stakeholder approaches to corporate governance. For example, the Polish two-tier board system 
was based on the shareholder model for almost a century, while the German two-tier board system 
is commonly considered a stakeholder-based approach to corporate governance215.  
 At this point, I would also like to refer to the document Best Practices in Asian Corporate 
Governance216, in which Gonzalez217 expands on Aronson’s and Andreasson’s understanding of 
hybrid corporate governance, declaring that it may combine local and (or) foreign elements 
(‘[c]orporate governance innovations may reflect the shaping forces of local circumstance as much, 
if not more, than stimulants from abroad’). Accordingly, except for the ‘enlightened stakeholder’ 
approach, eg in relation to Philippine corporate governance, and the Japanese reform of the board 
model, Best Practices (…) discusses the issue of the Singaporean disclosure-based system, which is 
a combination of a voluntarily binding Code of Corporate Governance and a set of mandatory laws, 
and mandatory training for corporate officials in Malaysia. What these solutions have in common 
is that neither of them combines (a) the shareholder model of corporate governance with the 
stakeholder corporate governance model, (b) the best elements of the board management and 
monitoring models and (c) local and/or foreign elements. Nevertheless, we may assume that 
Malaysian training reform links the common law system, on which the Malaysian system of law is 
based, with the civil law system one, of which the main features are that the majority of rules are 
included with statutes and that non-compliance with them is often sanctioned218. On the other 
hand, the Singaporean government might have combined some foreign solutions concerning 
disclosure systems with local solutions in this area (see section G in this chapter).  
Due to the fact that the above-mentioned issues have a significant impact on the entire 
model of corporate governance, eg the level of knowledge that board members possess can 
determine the flow of information between corporate bodies, I decided to include them with my 
research and this thesis (see chapters IV, V and VI). In particular, I drew significant attention to the 
                                                          
215 Hall & Soskice (n 186).  
216 Asian Productivity Organization, ‘Best Practices (…)’ (n 50).  
217 Eduardo T. Gonzalez, ‘“Best Practice” Benchmarking in Asian Corporate Governance: A Review’ in ibid.  
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problem of remuneration disclosure in Poland, which is only partially regulated by universally 
binding law.  
Thus, the definition of hybrid corporate governance is neither restricted to the process of 
combining board elements with each other nor that of combining shareholders’ interests with 
stakeholders’ interests. It may simply mean a combination of local and (or) foreign elements, or – 
in Dolowitz and Marsh’s219 opinion – a combination of objects from different jurisdictions. In any 
case, Watson220 reports that most changes in the majority of legal systems take place as an effect 
of borrowing221. 
 
 
3. Legal transplant 
 
The so-called ‘legal transplant’ indicates the moving of a legal rule or a system of law from one 
country to another222.  We may distinguish three approaches to transplant. 
According to Berkowitz et al.223, a transplant is successful ‘[if it] adopted the law to local 
conditions, or had a population that was already familiar with basic legal principles of the 
transplanted law (…). However, if the law was not adapted to local conditions, or if it was imposed 
via colonization and the population within the transplant was not familiar with the law, [Berkowitz 
et al.224 claim] that (…) we would expect that initial demand for using these laws to be weak.’ 
Contrary to this view, for Watson225, legal rules are equally at home in many places; 
‘whatever their historical origins may have been, rules of private law can survive without any close 
connection to any particular people, any particular period of time or any particular place.’ 
                                                          
219 David Dolowitz and David Marsh ‘Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer Literature’ (1996) 44 Political Studies 
343. 
220 Watson (n 49). 
221 For such authors as, for example, Reed (n 39) countries have recently been focused on adopting solutions from the Anglo-Saxon 
model of corporate governance (see also Philip Armstrong, Nick Segal and Ben Davies, ‘Corporate Governance: South Africa, a pioneer 
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The middle ground on this debate is taken by Jhering226, Zweigert and Kötz227, who report 
that the reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness and 
need. Therefore, the similarity of a legal system with that of the receiving legal order is not that 
essential for drafting teams as its functionality228. As long as the transplant can serve the social need 
to be addressed, the transplant can work well in the receiving legal order229.  
In fact, Xanthaki230 notes that, in the time when they are asked to generate legal acts at 
record speed, drafting teams often have to search elsewhere for ready solutions with verified 
results elsewhere, in both similar and different legal systems231.  
The sections below do not resolve the question of which approach guarantees a successful 
transplant. South African corporate governance is historically entrenched in the Anglo-Saxon legal 
tradition, and therefore any solution brought from it to the South African legal system may be 
effective, despite the approach chosen by the drafting team. In Japan, the implementation of the 
one-tier board system has not been well surveyed yet. Besides, it probably needs some more time 
to become rooted in Japanese corporate practice and to start working effectively within the system.  
Is it possible to transplant any corporate solution into the Polish corporate governance? I 
attempt to answer this question in chapter VI, which features my interviews with corporate officials 
in Poland and their views on this issue.  
 
 
4. The definition of corporate governance 
 
Two definitions of corporate governance were applied to this research, namely the OECD232 and the 
                                                          
226 Rudolf von Jhering, Geist des Römischen Rechts, vol 1 (Breitkopf & Hartel 1955) 8-9. 
227 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung, 3. neubearbeitete Auflage (JCB Mohr 1996) 17. 
228 Konrad Zweigert and Kurt Siehr, ‘Jhering’s Influence on the Development of Comparative Legal Method’ (1971) 19 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 215. 
229 Shaohong Zhaung, ‘Legal Transplantation in the People’s Republic of China: A Response to Alan Watson’ [2006] European Journal of 
Law Reform 215. 
230 Xanthaki (n 221). 
231 There is a group of comparatists supporting the opinion that only dissimilarities enrich our understanding of law in a given society 
(Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law 
Review 11; see also John W.F. Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical and Comparative Perspective on English 
Public Law (Clarendon Press, 1996) 16). As Rudolf B. Schlesinger (‘Research on the General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised 
Nations’ (1957) 51 American Journal of International Law 734) declares, ‘to compare means to observe and to explain similarities as well 
as differences’.  
232 OECD, ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ (2004) <www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecdprinciplesofcorporategovernance.htm> 
accessed 28 May 2014. 
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Cadbury Committee233 definitions.  
The OECD definition is as follows:   
 
‘Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and 
controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making 
decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the 
company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance.’ 
 
This definition was particularly utilised during my study on board models and corporate governance 
in Poland, as reflected in other chapters (chapter V in particular).  
 Furthermore, researching the shareholder and stakeholder theories of corporate 
governance, in particular ‘enlightened shareholder value’ and ‘stakeholder inclusivity’, and some 
other issues, eg the remuneration policy in particular systems, required a broader view of corporate 
governance. At this stage, the Cadbury Committee234 definition was applied, according to which:  
 
‘Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social 
goals and between individual and communal goals. The governance framework is there to 
encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the 
stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of 
individuals, corporations and society.’235 
 
Its application is mainly visible in this chapter – in the section on hybrid corporate governance in 
South Africa and Japan, and in chapter IV, where I discuss enlightened shareholder value in the 
context of changes that were made in this respect to American and British law.  
  During my doctrinal research, I came across a statement concerning corporate governance, 
which – from the perspective of conclusions reached in chapter VII – turned out to be valuable for 
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this research. It is the following description of corporate governance: 
 
‘Corporate governance is not only a method firms use to discipline themselves while 
remaining profitable. It is also one of the principal ways they “make the society” in which 
they operate and which in turn “makes” them. If this relationship is obscured, it is because 
the existing policy and regulatory environment confronts firms with an apparently 
readymade and opaque organization of means and ends, in which compliance is necessary 
but over whose purpose the majority of organizations, whether companies or civil society 
groups, have little or no control.’236   
 
 
C. HYBRID CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN POLAND 
 
After I had chosen my research topic, I reviewed Polish corporate literature in the context of hybrid 
corporate governance. This enabled me to create a framework through which I might analyse 
literature concerning the other legal systems.  
 In line with previous expectations, my research proved that Polish legal doctrine had not 
devoted considerable attention to the concept of hybrid corporate governance, which is probably 
a consequence of the Polish corporate tradition and the overall performance of the Polish economy. 
The Polish two-tier board model of corporate governance is the only well-known and therefore 
credible mechanism that Polish business people can use to conduct their affairs237. Therefore, there 
has not been pressure from the business establishment to borrow foreign solutions that would 
change it significantly and become a topic of discussion in various public forums. In addition, the 
latest economic crisis did not have as negative an impact on the Polish economy as they had in 
other countries238, for example, in the United States, where they forced the government to carry 
out deep reforms in the area of corporate law.  
 There are only three documents that refer to the issue of hybridisation of corporate 
governance in Poland by installing a new board model. There are also three documents, including 
court rulings, that deal with enlightened shareholder value in Poland, which should be elaborated 
in this subsection in view of the latest corporate governance innovations in South Africa.  
                                                          
236 Shigeo Takenaka, ‘Foreword’ in Asian Productivity Organization (n 50).  
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the EU of 25’ (2006) 4 European Business Law Review 1171. 
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 The author who first raised the idea of implementation of a one-tier board system in Poland 
was Sołtysiński239. Subsequently, this issue was developed by Oplustil and Radwan240 in Private Law 
in Eastern Europe: Autonomous Development or Legal Transplants?, in which they recall that the 
Codification Commission discussed the possibility of installing this system in Poland while working 
on the currently binding Company Code of 2000241. There was a proposal prepared granting 
shareholders the possibility to opt for an optimum model (be it one-tier or two-tier) to fit particular 
needs of a given company. However, in the end the Commission decided to preserve the traditional 
model of corporate governance. For Kozarzewski242, who briefly refers to the Commission’s choice, 
the resistance to the new solution stemmed mainly from the weak economic performance of 
Poland in the early 1990s.  
Another essential piece of work that is worth mentioning here is the Code of Best Practices 
of 2002243. Under this Code, at least half of supervisory board members must be independent. This 
far-reaching rule was not compatible with the main feature of the Polish corporate governance 
system, characterised by the dominance of consolidated ownership where controlling shareholders 
exercise their power via the supervisory board. Therefore an overwhelming majority of Polish 
companies refused to accept that rule.244 Oplustil and Radawan245 report that this ‘(…) attempt to 
transplant the Anglo-Saxon concept of independent directors into the Polish was a partial failure.’ 
The Code of Best Practices of 2002 has been replaced by a new version several times – in 
2005, 2007 and 2010. None of these new codes was as liberal in the approach to the issue of 
independent supervisors as Code of 2002 (for further explanation see section ‘The Independence 
of Supervisors’ in chapter V). 
 Enlightened shareholder value has not also brought a considerable change to corporate 
governance in Poland, but can be considered hybrid, if we take into account that it involves a 
combination of elements from different jurisdictions (see section B in this chapter).  
Corporate governance literature reports that ‘the interests of stakeholders should be 
respected in so far as they are covered by protective legal provisions (eg labour law, insolvency law, 
consumer law, banking law) and any extension of legal protection stemming from corporate law is 
generally allowed only if it can be aligned with the interests of shareholders as a group’246.  
Nevertheless, exceptional case-law extends the notion of company interest to 
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accommodate other stakeholders’ perspectives. For example, the Appeal Court judgment in Łódź 
(7 March 1994)247 provides that bank account holders might be perceived as stakeholders whose 
interests contribute to the interpretation of the company’s interest as a whole248.249  
It should also be remembered that Polish law provides for a certain degree of workers’ co-
determination (see chapters V – ‘Corporate Governance in Poland’ – ‘The Supervisory Board’ and 
VI ‘Analysis of Interviews’ – ‘Employees and Bank Representatives on Supervisory Boards in 
Poland’). Thus, employees’ ability to influence the determination of the company’s interests 
through their representatives in the company’s management organs is limited.  
Such understanding of the company interest can be described as enlightened shareholder 
value (for further explanation of its meaning see section D – subsection 1 in this chapter and section 
‘Shareholder Value’ in chapter IV). This was reflected in the Code of Best Practices of 2005250, 
according to which: 
 
‘[t]he main objective of a company’s authorities is to further the company’s interests, i.e. to 
increase the value of the assets entrusted to them by the shareholders, taking into 
consideration the rights and interests of entities other than the shareholders that are 
involved in the functioning of the company, especially the company’s creditors and 
employees.’    
 
In addition, a specific rule contained in the section pertaining to the board’s duties recapitulated 
the overlying role of company’s interest by stating that the management board, when establishing 
the interest of the company, should keep in mind the long term interests of the shareholders, 
creditors, employees and other entities and persons cooperating with the company, as well as the 
interests of local community251. The Code of Best Practices of 2007 repealed this broad definition 
of the company interest, leaving the determination of company interest up to the managers, 
commentators and ultimately to the courts. 
 The issue of enlightened shareholder value is developed in section ‘Enlightened 
Shareholder Value in Poland’ in chapter VI, as well as the issue of supervisors’ independence – in 
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section ‘The Independence of Supervisors’ in chapters V and VI. 
 
 
D. HYBRID CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1. The ‘stakeholder inclusive’ model 
 
The hybridisation of South African corporate governance was the next topic of my literature review. 
In the South African system, the concept of enlightened shareholder value was developed and 
turned into the so-called ‘stakeholder inclusivity’.  
King252 explains the stakeholder inclusive approach as follows: 
 
‘It is recognised that in what is referred to as the ‘enlightened shareholder’ model as well as 
the ‘stakeholder inclusive’ model of corporate governance, the board of directors should also 
consider the legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders other than shareholders. 
The way in which the legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders are being treated 
in the two approaches is, however, very different. In the ‘enlightened shareholder’ approach 
the legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders only have an instrumental value. 
Stakeholders are only considered in as far as it would be in the interests of shareholders to 
do so. In the case of the ‘stakeholder inclusive’ approach, the board of directors considers the 
legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders on the basis that this is in the best 
interests of the company, and not merely as an instrument to serve the interests of the 
shareholder.’ 
 
The integration and compromise between various stakeholders are made on a case-by-case basis, 
to serve the best interests of the company. For King253 ‘[t]he best interests of the company should 
be interpreted within the parameters of the company as a sustainable enterprise and the company 
as a responsible corporate citizen.’ 
The ethical foundation for corporate citizenship is the African value system of Ubuntu (for 
further explanation see subsection B in this chapter), which – in the corporate context – means that 
decision-makers should take into account that nature, society, and business are interrelated in 
compound ways254. Therefore, companies ‘(…) [are] considered as much a citizen of a country as is 
                                                          
252 King (n 34); see also Estelle de Beer and Ronel S. Rensburg, ‘Towards a Theoretical Framework for the Governing Stakeholder 
Relationships: A Perspective from South Africa’ (2011) 11 Journal of Public Affairs 208. 
253 King, ibid. 
254 Albert Luthuli Centre, ‘Interview Summary Report (…)’ (n 203). 
  
48 
 
a natural person who has citizenship’255. They are vital to society.   
Stakeholder inclusivity creates certain challenges. Andersen256 points out two: identifying 
exactly who the stakeholders are, and developing policy on how they should be engaged, and how 
the company reports back to them. According to Wilkinson257, a reflection of this can be seen in the 
increasing number of boards who are changing their mindsets and taking stakeholder issues into 
consideration.  
Godsell258 raises the following critique against stakeholder inclusive value. Africans have 
not reflected on how complicated stakeholder capitalism can be. The stakeholder model is entirely 
different from the shareholder approach to corporate governance, which is typical for market-
based societies like the US, Europe and Asia. In this regard, Godsell259 explains that the stakeholder 
model is complex because it involves different boards with different capacities and different 
behaviours.  
On the other hand, Adam260 wonders whether stakeholder inclusivity does not in reality 
stand for the same as the enlightened shareholder concept. For him, there is also not much 
cohesion between the principle and the remaining content of King III: 
 
‘The shareholder-enlightened model says that you engage and build relationships with 
stakeholders. As long as it adds value, then that’s the good thing to do. But in the same vein, 
does it mean that you don’t do it anymore when stakeholder inclusivity stops adding value? 
The stakeholder model says you engage with stakeholders because it is in the best interests 
of the company to do so. Establishing strong stakeholder relations will hold you in good stead 
as a company. The stakeholder model doesn’t give the shareholder de facto precedence in 
that debate. On a case by case analysis you say: ‘how do I take into account what all the 
stakeholders’ legitimate expectations are and, based on this decision today, I think we do it 
this way’. We have statements like that in King, but if you look through [the Report] it’s not 
obvious that this is the model being followed. In terms of an aspirational code and pushing 
for agreement, we’ve said something I don’t even think the King Committee themselves have 
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internalised.’261 
 
In Tullberg’s262 opinion, the stakeholder’s theory of the notion of a stakeholder includes too 
many subjects into the notion of a stakeholder. Clarkson263 expresses this point concisely: 
‘Stakeholder theory should not be used to weave a basket big enough to hold the world’s misery.’ 
The theory should probably be brought more in line with the ambitions of the ‘enlightened 
stakeholder’ theory264. 
 
2. The ‘apply or explain’ principle 
 
Another significant change to corporate governance in South Africa, which was a part of the 
hybridisation process, was the application of the so-called ‘apply or explain’ principle in the King 
Code of Governance for South Africa 2009 (King III). 
Generally speaking, the governance of companies can be on a statutory basis, as a code of 
principles and practices, or a combination of the two. The statutory regime is known as the ‘comply 
or else’ approach. This means that there are sanctions for non-compliance.265 
There is an important argument against the ‘comply and else’ regime. For Schulshenk266, a 
‘one size fits all’ approach is not suitable because the types of business carried out by companies 
vary to a large degree. For King267, the jeopardy is that the board and management might become 
absorbed in compliance at the expense of enterprise: ‘It is the duty of the board of a trading 
enterprise to undertake a measure of risk for reward and to try to improve the economic value of 
a company. If the board has a focus on compliance, the attention on its ultimate responsibility, 
namely performance, may be diluted.’ At this point, King268 mentions the American case of 
complying with SOX. He argues that the total cost to the American economy of complying with this 
document amounts to more than the total write-off Enron, World Com and Tyco combined. 
56 countries of the Commonwealth, including South Africa, and the 27 states of the EU, 
including the United Kingdom, ‘(…) opted for a code of practices and principles on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis, in addition to certain governance issues that are legislated’269. The issue of whether 
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the United Nations Governance Code should be ‘comply or explain’ or ‘comply or else’ was hotly 
discussed at the United Nations270.  
In theory, the ‘comply or explain’ mechanism provides both flexibility in the application of 
the code and a means by which to evaluate compliance:  
 
‘While it is expected that listed companies will comply with the Code’s provisions most of the 
time, it is recognized that departure from the provisions of the code may be justified in 
particular circumstances. Every company must review each provision carefully and give a 
considered explanation if it departs from the Code provisions.’271   
 
However, surveys of compliance with codes of corporate governance272 and the way in which 
companies make use of the option to ‘explain’, prove that the mechanism is not as efficient as 
it is expected to be273. Seidl et al.274 reports that just 51% of the 30 largest companies in the UK, 
and 40% of the 30 largest companies in Germany entirely followed the code.  
At the United Nations, it was eventually decided that the UN codes should operate on an 
‘adopt or explain’ basis. The representatives of several of the world bodies had opposed the use of 
the word ‘comply’, ‘because it connoted that there had to be adherence and there was no room for 
flexibility.’275  
In the Netherlands, the board can now decide to apply recommendations differently or 
apply another practice and still achieve the objective of the overarching corporate governance 
principles (‘apply or explain’). This gives far greater flexibility to companies in terms of governance 
compliance.276  
In South Africa, King III finally introduced the ‘apply or explain’ approach. This opens a door 
for a vastly wider scope of interpretation and application compared to inflexible legislation277. 
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King278 reports that this is in keeping with international norms. Citing the Netherlands as an 
example, he states the following: ‘[t]his is a practice adopted by most trade departments 
internationally.’ King279 notes that the UK is in the process of reassessing the ‘apply or explain’ 
model, about which he says: ‘Perhaps they missed a trick’. 
Other observers note that such an approach is both empowering – and potentially 
dangerous280.  
According to Bourne281, the ‘apply or explain’ approach is one of the biggest challenges 
contained in King III: ‘Corporate SA does not have an environment yet where stakeholders are 
vigilant or challenging. If a company does not apply the code, it will be interesting to see if 
stakeholders will take on the challenge.’ Botha282 declares that the ‘apply and explain’ approach 
forms a loophole for companies to evade liability. Adam283 further maintains that transparency 
should keep companies liable to both their shareholders and the stakeholders. In his opinion, the 
lost component is participation by both shareholders and stakeholders alike, who can hold 
companies to account on their decisions. Schulshenk284 summarises the dispute as follows: ‘(…) 
good behaviour will always exist without the codification of principles, but they serve as an 
important safety net against bad behaviour.’ In Schulshenk’s point of view, the right blend of 
principles and legislation is essential to be able to impose on companies, where necessary, 
minimum standards of satisfactory behaviour285.  
Certain principles and recommended practices have been legislated and companies must 
conform to the letter of law. Also, what was included within the common law is being reiterated in 
statutes.286 In this regard, the most important change is probably the incorporation of the common 
law duties of directors in the South African Companies Act 2008287. 
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3. Boardroom according to King III 
 
There are some other boardroom changes in South Africa, included with King III, which are in line 
with the latest international trends in this area. They might not be perceived as hybrid by the South 
African legal doctrine, as they come directly from British corporate governance, upon which the 
South African system is based. Therefore, here, there is no combination of elements from different 
jurisdictions, which is the essence of the definition of hybrid corporate governance (see section B 
in this chapter). However, if implemented in Poland, these changes might be considered hybrid, eg 
an increase in the number of independent supervisors, which for Oplustil and Radwan288 is an ‘(…) 
attempt to transplant the Anglo-Saxon concept of independent directors (…)’. 
 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)289 lists the following boardroom changes in South Africa: 
• every board should elect a chairman of the board, who is an independent non-executive 
director, and a CEO, and create an outline for the delegation of authority; 
• the roles of CEO and chairman should be separated; 
• the board should maintain a balance of power, with a majority of non-executive directors; 
• the majority of non-executive directors should be independent. 
 
In particular, the latter has already had an impact on the functioning of South African corporate 
governance. According to Armstrong et al.290, including independent directors on the board has 
raised the need for a more effective induction programme for directors, and strategies for their 
further development. The Institute of Directors has mainly earned a great reputation in establishing 
training programmes for directors, whether inexperienced or experienced291.  
Other innovations in the South African boardroom have also turned out to work effectively 
within the system. For example, the condition that directors and boards have to be evaluated 
regularly ensures that companies in both the private and public sectors stay competitive, with all 
directors very clear about their duties and obligations. This also allows the more sophisticated 
aspects of board governance to come into play.292 Andersen293 highlights how, in his international 
experience, South African boards can spend up to 40% more time on issues of corporate 
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governance than other boards: ‘Whilst much of the boards’ time may be spent on the issue of 
compliance, there has been a broader shift in the understanding of their role.’  
There has been an apparent move away from the primarily ‘big boss’ model to a more 
‘consultative board dynamic’294. Börzel 295 reports that the move is partially driven by the new 
Companies Act of 2008 and amplified liabilities, although concerns remain about the inactivity of 
some non-executive directors. In this respect, Andersen296 notes some positive occurrences:  
 
‘Directors are far more prepared. They seek more information. The non-executive directors 
are playing a far more active role, probably because they realise they are carrying far more 
responsibility and risk. It wasn’t unusual in the early days for there to be three or four so-
called ‘heavyweight directors’. I used to call them the ‘grumpy old men’ and they would call 
the shots, while the rest would nod wisely. But it doesn’t happen like that anymore. Boards 
are there for everyone to contribute.’ 
 
In line with the Albert Luthuli Centre for Responsible Leadership297, over the last two 
decades, South Africa has without a doubt evolved from low levels of governance awareness to a 
point where today it is constantly ranked as a leader in global competiveness surveys for its good 
corporate governance practices. The Centre298 notes that the perception of corruption299 has 
started to tarnish this image in recent years, but on the whole the country has certainly profited 
from high standards of corporate governance.  
 
 
E. HYBRID CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 
1. The new approach to shareholders 
  
Japanese corporate governance has also undergone a deep reform over the last decade, which 
has placed it in the new category of hybridised corporate governance. It is a very interesting case 
                                                          
294 ibid; see also Tanja A. Börzel and Christian Thauer (eds), Business and Governance in South Africa: Racing to the Top? (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013) 9. 
295 Börzel and Thauer, ibid. 
296 R. Andersen in Albert Luthuli Centre, ‘Interview Summary Report (…)’ (n 203). 
297 Albert Luthuli Centre, ‘Interview Summary Report (…)’, ibid.  
298 ibid. 
299 Lynn McGregor, ‘Improving Corporate Governance in South Africa. Discussion Paper Submitted for the 1st USB Colloquium on 
Corporate Governance 18th September 2008’ <www.governance.usb.ac.za/pdfs/UnitColloquiumPaper1_LynnMcGregor.pdf> accessed 
19 February 2013.  
  
54 
 
of implementing foreign corporate solutions from the common law system into the civil law 
corporate ground. It began from a radical change in the approach to the concept of shareholding 
in a company in Japan. 
Before the 1990s corporate governance in Japan did not receive much attention from a 
public policy or managerial perspective. The government adopted the stakeholder model of 
corporate governance, in which shareholders are simply treated as one of the stakeholders and 
their interests are not given precedence300. The stakeholder model is often called keiretsu, and is 
based on the Japanese industrial system that has been characterised by its tight network of 
suppliers, buyers, and financial institutions301. In particular, the long-term affiliation between a 
debtor company and the main creditor bank draws attention302:  
 
‘A main bank relationship is conventionally defined as a long-term relationship between a 
debtor firm and a main creditor bank. That is, the firm borrows the largest part of its loans 
from this bank. The main bank relationship is not characterized by bank loans alone, 
however. Main banks often hold shares in their client firms and take care of the firms’ cash 
management accounts. Further, market participants and government regulators perceive the 
role of the main bank as keeping an eye on its client firms and even intervening in the 
management of these firms if required.’303 
 
Another unusual occurrence in Japan’s corporate governance are the so-called ‘stable 
shareholders’. Stable investors own their shares largely to reinforce and grow stable business 
relationships rather than to earn on their share investments304. They also own shares to guarantee 
stability in profits and sales so that they can protect the interests of important stakeholders 
including employees, management, business partners such as banks, suppliers, and other affiliated 
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companies305.  
A survey306 reports that before 1990 as high as 70 to 75% of shares owned in Japan 
belonged to the stable investors category, defined as long-term, keiretsu- or business-affiliated 
holders of shares. As a consequence, managers of Japanese companies did not draw much attention 
to the concerns of financial investors who bought, sold, and held shares purely for financial 
purposes. As Yoshikawa307 says, ‘since these stable investors do not aim at maximizing the 
investment return on their shareholding, they do not impose much pressure on managers to 
improve firm performance.’ 
 Investors in Japan had enjoyed higher profits from their share investments than they would 
have received from other investment alternatives due to the great performance of the Japanese 
economy which pushed up the stock markets. Survey308 results have shown that investors in 
Japanese stock markets gained a nominal return of 17.9% or a real return of 11.7% during the period 
between 1962 and 1986. Thus, there was no strong motivation for those investors to pay much 
attention to how Japanese firms were governed. 
In the 1990s the situation began to change. Globalisation of share investment by 
institutional investors, especially from the US and Europe, led foreign investors to a buying spree of 
Japanese shares (see Table 1 below). In particular, relatively cheaper Japanese equity prices after 
the collapse of the bubble economy encouraged them to invest in Japan.309 
 In spite of the fact that domestic shareholders are still powerful in Japanese companies, 
the firm growth of foreign ownership is one of the most noticeable changes in ownership structure 
since the 1990s. Importantly, data from 2003 show that foreign investment in Japan tends to be 
dominated by institutional investors from the US and the UK. They own 41.8% and 30.9% of total 
foreign shares respectively.310 
Each foreign investor usually holds only a small number of shares. However, they tend to 
trade more often than domestic shareholders311. Foreign investors are those who buy, sell, and hold 
shares mostly for investment purposes, as opposed to business relationship purposes:  
 
‘The main investment objective of foreign investors is a high investment return because, 
unlike stable domestic investors, they only have arm’s-length relations with companies in 
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which they own shares. This means that they are under no constraint, unlike domestic stable 
investors, to reduce their expectations for maximization of investment return in order to 
maintain business relationships with companies in which they hold shares.’312 
 
 
Table 1. Shareholder ownership in Japan313 
 
 
Since the 1990s, there has been a significant deterioration in steady ownership and cross-
shareholdings among affiliated companies and banks in Japan. 
Nitta314 surveyed the effect of foreign ownership on company performance for the period 
between 1988 and 1997, and found that foreign ownership was positively associated with stock 
index, return on assets, return on equity, and earnings. Yoshikawa and Phan315 obtained the same 
result with respect to foreign ownership between 1997 and 1999. Yet, a study by Gedajlovic et al.316 
did not find any relationship between foreign ownership and return on assets during the period 
between 1996 and 1998. Interestingly, a survey conducted by the Ministry of Finance and the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE)317 shows that companies with large foreign ownership had higher return on 
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equity.  
 
 
2. Boardroom reforms 
 
The change in the ownership structure led to significant changes in corporate governance practices.  
Investors who were no longer interested in preserving stable relationships with companies 
began to put pressure on companies to concentrate on growth and market share in order to achieve 
higher productivity and returns318. The extensive call to recover the efficiency of board monitoring 
became particularly strong after the 1997 Asian economic crisis, which exposed the weaknesses of 
corporate governance in Asian countries319. 
Moreover, diminishing profits and growing public demand from such interest groups as 
home pension funds and the Japan Corporate Governance Forum stressed the necessity for 
Japanese boards to have a more active monitoring role in management320.  
This all required Japanese companies to change their strategy regarding interest 
dissemination among the shareholders321. 
In 1993, the Commercial Code introduced what became known as the kansayaku system, 
which required a company to establish a board with a minimum of three statutory auditors 
(kansayaku), including one outside auditor322. In addition, shareholders’ rights were also increased 
by: 
• the reduction of the minimum percentage of shares (from 10 to 3%) owned by those with 
the authority to demand an inspection of accounting records; and 
• reducing the legal fee for shareholder class-action lawsuits to ¥8200323.324  
 
Up to this point, management was monitored by the ‘main bank system’ in which a company’s bank 
was typically both its main shareholder and principal lender325.  
 The Commercial Code was reviewed in 2001 with the goal of improving corporate 
governance by requiring that kansayaku be better trained, willing to execute more rigorous 
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monitoring and willing to exert greater authority326.  
Kansayaku are responsible for monitoring the board of directors. The Commercial Code 
requires that companies: 
• elect three or more kansayaku; 
• ensure that no less than half of the kansayaku are outsiders; and 
• elect full-time statutory auditors327. 
 
The election of outsiders has, as one of its goals, the reinforcing of the auditing function. However, 
the entire revision aims to ensure the protection of investors and maintain confidence in the 
securities market.328 
In the kansayaku system, the board of directors (torishimariyaku) is responsible for 
strategic policy making and supervising top management decision-making. The Commercial Code 
does not require that companies adopting the kansayaku system appoint an outside director.329  
The majority of board members are insiders and come from the ranks of employees. A 
directorship in most of Japanese companies is still seen as a reward for those employees who 
survive a long internal competition.330 Heftel’s331 survey shows that employees who did not excel 
enough to become a director are often appointed as statutory auditors. 
 In 2002, the government announced a new corporate governance system that allowed 
Japanese companies to select either the traditional kansayaku system or a new ‘committees’ 
system. The committees system is similar to the system adopted by listed US firms. The board of 
directors is responsible for monitoring the management and an executing role is delegated to 
executive officers.332  
 In addition to board-management separation, the board of directors is required to have the 
following three committees under the committee system: an auditing committee, an appointment 
committee and a remuneration committee333. Miyajima et al.334 argue that this is the most 
significant departure of the system from the traditional mode.  
Each committee consists of at least three directors of which a majority have to be outsiders 
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(although the overall board may have a minority of inside directors). These committees have the 
following functions:  
• an auditing committee – monitoring of directors and executive officers; the appointment 
and removal of accounting auditors;  
• an appointment committee – the appointment and removal of directors;  
• a remuneration committee – policy and decisions concerning remuneration of directors and 
executive officers.335 
 
Despite the fact that the system offers more protection to minority investors and outside 
stakeholders compared to the kansayaku system, 97.3% of Japanese companies choose to adopt 
the kansayaku system. By 2008, the committee system was only adopted by 47 first section TSE 
listed companies, comprising a mere 2.7% of all the listed companies336.  
 
Table 2. Organisational structure of the Tokyo Stock Exchange first section (%)337 
 Number of companies Percentage 
2006 2008 2006 2008 
Companies adopting the kansayaku 
system 
1637 1670 97.0 97.3 
Companies with a committee system 50 47 3.0 2.7 
  Total 1687 1717 100.0 100.0 
 
Those who are critical of the committee system often mention that there are difficulties in 
finding appropriate outsiders who can be appointed as board members in the Japanese context, 
where the executive labour market is not as developed as in the US338. Some are also uncertain 
about whether outsiders who might not be very familiar with the business practices of a firm for 
which they serve as independent directors can perform their function efficiently. It is argued that 
those who perform the controlling role of the management should have both industry and 
managerial know-how.339 
 According to Mizuno and Tabner340, approximately 56% of kansayaku companies did not 
appoint an outsider director in 2008. However, they note that this percentage has dropped in 
comparison to 2006. They also maintain that kansayaku companies with foreign shareholders tend 
to elect outside directors as the foreign shareholder ratio rises. For example, kansayaku companies 
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with a foreign shareholder ratio of more than 30% elected an average number of 1.5 outside 
directors in 2008, designating the relationship between the foreign shareholder ratio and the 
average number of outside directors.341 Most kansayaku companies that decided not to appoint 
outside directors justified their decision by stating that their governance system had functioned 
adequately342.  
 
Table 3. Adoption ratio and the average number of outside directors of the Tokyo Stock Exchange-listed 
companies (kansayaku companies; foreign shareholder ratio)343 
  
Less than 10% 
 
From 10% to less than 20% 
 
From 20% to less than 30% 
 
No less than 30% 
Adoption 
ratio (%) 
Average 
number 
Adoption 
ratio (%) 
Average 
number 
Adoption 
ratio (%) 
Average 
number 
Adoption 
ratio (%) 
Average 
number 
 
2006 
 
39.2 
 
0.65 
 
39.4 
 
0.68 
 
44.7 
 
0.87 
 
50.6 
 
1.12 
 
2008 
 
41.0 
 
0.66 
 
42.0 
 
0.71 
 
50.7 
 
0.94 
 
60.7 
 
1.50 
 
There has been a dispute in Japan during the past 15 years over whether or not to impose 
on Japanese listed companies a legal obligation of appointing one outside/independent director344. 
Yoshikawa and Phan345 note that the independence of outside directors is rare in 
companies in Japan. In line with the Commercial Code, outsiders are defined as those who have 
never served for a company (or any its subsidiaries) for which they work as a director. This means 
that those people who have business or professional relationships with a company as well as 
managers and employees of the company’s parent company are seen as outsiders. As Yoshikawa 
and Phan346 declare, the majority of the outside directors of Japanese companies are from banks 
and affiliated or parent companies. 
‘Independent directors’ refer to ‘outside directors who additionally have no material 
relationship with the corporation as measured by the relevant independence standard’347. The 
standards of the TSE enumerates five groups of individuals who would normally not be 
independent, such as business managers, individuals from major clients, outside professionals 
whose organisations are major clients, major shareholders, and close relatives348. 
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In addition, since directors can concurrently work as executive officers, the roles of strategic 
decision-making and execution of strategy might not be clearly detached349.  
In fact, according to Yoshikawa350, a significant number of companies have decided to 
separate the roles of executive officers and directors. For example, Sony Corporation undertook a 
serious boardroom reform in 1997. From the late 1990s to 2000, for example, Orix Corporation, 
Toshiba, Nissan Diesel, and NEC restructured their boards by decreasing the number of directors 
and separating the roles of CEOs and chairmen. A survey conducted by Nihon Keizai Shimbun351 in 
1999 reports that 36% of the respondents in this survey had made the roles of the board members 
and executive officers distinct from each other. In line with the survey, this separation often 
resulted in the reduction of the board size, since many directors are also executive officers. 
 Research, conducted by Yoshikawa and Phan352, found that the percentage of outside 
directors, the separation of the board members and executive officers, and the reduction of board 
dimension is not related with return on assets or stock returns. On the other hand, the same study 
did find that involvement of outside directors in strategic decision making has a positive impact on 
stock returns. It surveyed the outcome of the boardroom reforms only after a fairly short period of 
time, and therefore there is a possibility that it has not been reflected yet in the performance 
measures353. 
It is often argued that the competitive advantage of Japanese companies lies in their 
employees’ commitment to their companies and in the company-specific knowledge of the 
directors. Thus, there is concern that switching to a shareholder model might erode Japanese 
companies’ long-term competitiveness.354  
In contrast, Aronson355 argues that further hybridisation might be the future of Japanese 
corporate governance. This should combine the best elements of the board management and 
monitoring models. If implemented properly – in Yoshikawa’s356 opinion – it will enhance the 
effectiveness of the company’s internal governance mechanism.  
I go back to the issue of board hybridisation in chapter VI, where I consider the possibility 
of copying the Japanese alternative board system in Poland.  
Below, I briefly elaborate on how the training system for directors in Malaysia was 
reformed, despite the fact that this may not be considered as hybridisation of corporate 
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governance. Nonetheless, the training system has a significant impact on the functioning of 
business, as it may improve company directors’ industry and managerial know-how (see section B 
of this chapter and the section below). This is particularly essential in light of discussions about the 
value of the one-tier and two-tier board systems of corporate governance.  
With respect to corporate governance in Japan, there is a link between the Malaysian 
training system and the board reforms implemented in Japan – in that Malaysian authorities also 
aimed to improve the contribution of management to the overall board performance. 
 
 
F. THE UNIQUE SYSTEM FOR TRAINING DIRECTORS 
IN MALAYSIA 
 
This unique system was created and introduced by the Bursa Malaysia Securities357, and involved 
mandatory training for all directors of public listed companies. It should be noted that Malaysia is 
probably the only country in the world where director training was mandatory358. 
The so-called Mandatory Accreditation Program (MAP) was a temporary initiative, 
implemented in January 2001359. The MAP embraced the major issues of corporate governance, eg 
the duties, responsibilities and liabilities of directors, risk management and the legal framework. 
Those who had gone through the MAP were subject to a Continuing Education Program from July 
2003. Under this program directors were required to collect at least 48 CEP points a year by taking 
part in appropriate seminars or courses to keep themselves up-to-date with the latest 
knowledge.360  
On the Mondovisione World Exchange Intelligence361 website, we can read that the 
mandatory training system for corporate officials in Malaysia ‘[has] created greater awareness [of] 
the significance of continuous training and skill enhancements for directors and it has promoted a 
culture of continuous learning and training. To date, approximately 6,329 [d]irectors have attended 
the MAP whilst 3,553 directors have attended the CEP.’ 
Despite this achievement, Bursa Malaysia Securities ruled that the boards of directors 
of the respective public listed companies should be responsible for determining the training 
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needs of their directors with effect from 1 January 2005362.  
 According to Yusli Mohamed Yusoff363, continuous education is important for keeping 
directors updated on regulatory and corporate governance developments, in addition to 
enhancing the professionalism and knowledge of directors by enabling them to discharge their 
duties more effectively. Philip Koh Tong Ngee364 maintains that an effective director needs to be 
well-versed in, among other things, financial literacy, strategic planning, human resource 
development and the vagaries of the business environment. Finally, the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance365 suggests that board members should act on a fully informed basis, 
which would mean acquiring a certain level of experience, competency and training.  
Corporate practice in Malaysia seems to be different. Most respondents of a survey 
conducted by Philip Koh Tong Ngee366 indicate that training is only given to directors only on an 
occasional basis. Boo Yeang Khoo367 suggests that the cause might be the high cost of training 
for directors. In this regard, he proposes that the government could give tax incentives to 
companies. Boo Yeang Khoo368 also suggests that companies should disclose in the annual 
report, the training sessions attended by directors. In his opinion, this might increase the 
awareness of how they are important for the development of business.  
The available data concerning the mandatory training system in Malaysia does not say 
what impact it had on the communication level between board members, the quality of board 
decisions or overall company performance. Therefore, I examined this issue during my research, 
in particular during my interviews with Polish business practitioners. In this thesis, the outcome 
of my research in this matter can be found in chapter VI, dedicated to these interviews.  
The next subsection concerns the disclosure system in Singapore, which has hybrid features, 
as it links solutions from different jurisdictions. According to Tan Wee Liang 369, the Singapore 
government chose a balanced approach, which is similar to the system that exists in Canada and 
the United Kingdom. 
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G. THE DISCLOSURE SYSTEM IN SINGAPORE 
1. The switch from merit-based regulation to a disclosure-based system 
 
Tan Wee Liang 370 explains that the main idea of the reform of the disclosure system in Singapore 
was to avoid two extremes: a prescriptive approach, under which companies must comply (merit-
based regime) and a non-prescriptive self-regulatory approach where every company is free to 
adopt its own practices (disclosure-based regime)371.  
This change was implemented in several steps. The most crucial step was, probably, the 
acceptance of a code of corporate governance by the Singapore government in April 2001. The 
Singapore Code of Corporate Governance was first issued by the Corporate Governance Committee 
in March 2001, and implemented from January 2003372. It came under the purview of the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore and Singapore Stock Exchange, with effect from September 2007.373  
Compliance with the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance is not mandatory but listed 
companies are required, under the Singapore Exchange Listing Rules, to disclose their corporate 
governance practices and give explanations for deviations from it in their annual reports374. The aim 
of this document is to encourage Singapore-listed companies to enhance shareholder value through 
good corporate governance375. 
 Apart from board and remuneration matters, the Code of Corporate Governance sets out 
principles and best practices to improve the quality of corporate financial reporting. It clarifies the 
apparatus to safeguard the company’s assets and resources (accountability and audit; internal 
controls) as well as accountability to shareholders through effective and comprehensive 
communications. The accounting, audit, internal audit and accountability to shareholders principles 
work towards strengthening companies’ corporate governance practices.376 Through board 
monitoring, ‘these changes will limit the discretion management has on the nature and extent of 
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information disclosed in annual reports.’377 
Efforts to develop a disclosure-based regulatory regime continued rapidly. The MAS 
implemented the Securities and Futures Act (SFA) and Financial Advisers Act in October 2002 to 
maintain fair and efficient markets. While the Singapore Exchange (SGX) is entrusted with the day-
to-day running of the market, the MAS has the job of overseeing the development of the financial 
markets, and that includes its disclosure regulations378. Issuers are, inter alia, required to lodge their 
prospectus with the MAS for a two-week period during which they will be published for public 
comment before they are registered. The MAS may refuse to register a prospectus if it does not 
comply with this requirement. The SFA also permits the MAS to stop an offer if a registered 
prospectus is later on found to be misguiding or substandard.379  
 The SFA has also attempted to develop disclosure in the secondary market, the idea being 
to make continuous disclosure of material information by listed companies a statutory requirement 
(formerly a listing requirement of the securities exchange). Substantial shareholders of a listed 
company had previously been required (under the Companies Act) to notify the company of their 
shareholdings and changes thereto within two days of their trades. The SGX requires the company 
to disclose such notifications to the SGX.380 The SFA makes disclosure to the SGX a legal 
responsibility by necessitating fairly large shareholders of listed companies to notify the SGX of their 
trades in a straight line381. 
 In order to ensure that the capital market remains confident in the integrity, transparency 
and quality of corporate financial reporting, the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority 
(ACRA) introduced the Financial Reporting Surveillance Programme in 2011382. The FRSP also aims 
to rebalance the roles of supervision of financial reporting between the auditors and the directors. 
Directors are expected to pay close attention to the financial statements and perform their legal 
duties thoroughly.383  
 Under the Companies Act (Chapter 50), directors of companies incorporated in Singapore, 
as well as Singapore branches of foreign companies, are responsible for the preparation of true and 
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fair financial statements that are in compliance with Singapore Financial Reporting Standards. In 
addition, directors are also required to maintain a system of internal accounting controls and keep 
proper accounting and other records to enable the preparation of true and fair profit and loss 
accounts and balance sheets.   
 The ACRA has stepped up efforts to review financial statements in order to monitor 
compliance with the Companies Act and Singapore Financial Reporting Standards384. Directors who 
are legally responsible for the preparation of financial statements will also be personally liable for 
all breaches identified by the ACRA under the FRSP. Thus, the change is that the ACRA is now actively 
checking the quality of financial reporting to ensure that the directors are correctly carrying out 
their legal duties.385   
 In order to supervise the areas of accounting standards and corporate governance review, 
the government established the Council on Corporate Disclosure and Governance (CCDG) in 2002. 
The CCDG was replaced by the Accounting Standards Council (ASC) in 2007.386 The ASC is 
responsible only for the formulation and promulgation of accounting standards. It, inter alia, 
reviews and enhances the existing framework on corporate governance and promote good 
corporate governance in Singapore whilst taking into account international best practices. The 
monitoring and enforcement of compliance with accounting standards for companies remains the 
prerogative of the ACRA.387 
 One best practice that ought to be highlighted lies in the establishment of an audit 
committee at the board level ‘as the arena for oversight over management in terms of financial and 
non-financial disclosures’388. Singapore incorporated the provision into its Companies Act (Section 
201B) and in the listing requirements of the Singapore Exchange. 
The audit committee is to be appointed by the directors. The committee is to comprise no 
less than three members of the board of directors, and must be chaired by a non-executive director, 
who is not employed by the company or its related companies. A majority of the committee must 
also be independent non-executive directors. Survey results show that most of the listed companies 
meet this minimum requirement.389  
In March 2002, the MAS announced that it is compulsory for banks to rotate their external 
audit companies every five years. Also mandatory for banks are audit committees consisting of non-
executive members, of which majority have to be independent.390  
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The shift towards a disclosure-based regime has also been matched by the SGX’s exercise 
of its powers to halt trading of a company’s shares, suspend trading or de-list a company’s shares. 
Under Article 14 of the Corporate Governance Code, companies have an obligation to provide 
accounting information and disclosure. Paragraph 1303 (3) (c) permits the SGX to suspend trading 
when there is an audit qualification or emphasis of a matter in respect of the issuer (or significant 
subsidiary) that raises a going concern issue. Paragraph 1303 (4) encompasses an even wider basis 
for suspension, when the listed company is unable or unwilling to comply with, or contravenes a 
listing rule. 
A disclosure-based regime cannot function properly without an effective market 
enforcement regime. Therefore, the SFA contains provisions aiming to improve market 
enforcement. Tan Wee Liang391 summarises them as follows:  
 
‘New laws on insider trading now can capture a wider pool of persons who seek to take 
advantage of inside information. The civil penalty regime, which allows the MAS to bring an 
action in Court against a defendant, now embraces all forms of abusive market behavior. Such 
civil penalty action must be complemented, however, by enhanced investigative powers for 
the MAS’ enforcement officers.’ 
 
 As Farr392  informs, ‘[t]he MAS stresses that the burden is not so much on it to keep eye on 
companies; rather it is on the companies to bring out the benefit of better disclosure.’ 
 The afore-mentioned changes contributed immensely to the strengthening of the 
disclosure system in Singapore. As a consequence, Singaporean corporate practices have been 
highly valued since they were implemented. According to the most recent available ranking –  the 
2010 corporate governance rankings in eleven markets in Asia conducted by the Asian Corporate 
Governance Association and Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia-Pacific Markets – Singapore is ranked 
first – up from second in the previous rankings in 2007393. It had previously been considered the 
best in Asia by the Asian Corporate Governance Association394 in its annual rankings of Asian 
countries from 2000 to 2004. In addition, the World Competitiveness Report, in the same five-year 
period, placed Singapore in the top ten position for the effectiveness of its corporate boards in 
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supervising the management of a company395. In 2005, Singapore was ranked 11th396.  
For Tan Wee Liang397 part of the success is Singapore’s migration to a disclosure-based 
regime. Teh Hooi Ling398 argues that there has to be a set of basic mandatory standards, and, in 
addition to that, companies should be ‘encouraged, in a voluntary way, to adopt a set of best 
practices, as spelt out in the Code of Corporate Governance.’ 
The agency concept suggests that shareholders have less knowledge of the company and 
its functioning than the managers do399. As a result, companies have begun to install corporate 
governance that will better align shareholders’ and managers’ interests. Simultaneously, company 
managers have started conveying sensitive information, which was formerly given to a certain 
group of managers and business analysts exclusively, to their shareholders.400  
Yet, these practices come at a high price. In order to enjoy any incremental benefits, the 
growth in value should be greater than the cost of installing the governance and disclosure 
practices401.   
 The OECD402 highlights that the key idea that should be utilised in disclosures is materiality. 
Material information can be defined as ‘information whose omission or misstatement could 
influence the economic decisions taken by its users’403.    
 An observer404 points out as the following:  
 
‘The decision of the regulators to introduce Sarbanes-Oxley types interventions in the 
financial reporting processes and controls, executive certification of financial statements and 
the processes that generate them, while welcome, is not to be taken lightly as compliance 
may drive up the cost of doing business. Too much intervention may also dilute the 
attractiveness of Singapore to foreign investors, and its cost may far exceed the benefits of 
reining in only a few rogues.’  
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According to Banerjee405, Singapore has fairly high standards of corporate disclosure 
compared to its neighbours in the Asian region as well as the US and European countries, but the 
sought – after middle ground between a compulsory and driven by the market powers system of 
disclosure has not been accomplished yet.  
There are a number of different proposals on how to completely move to the disclosure-
based regime.   
 
 
2. The way forward 
 
Teh Hooi Ling406 refers to the Brazilian disclosure system, where the Bovespa stock market is 
stratified along corporate governance lines.  
Due to the fact that companies in Brazil issue a high number of non-voting shares, dominant 
shareholders can legally exercise control over listed companies that own only a 17% of shares. 
However, companies can voluntarily choose to list on Bovespa’s ‘Level 1’ by implementing 
additional disclosures or by listing on ‘Level 2’ by granting limited voting rights to non-voting 
shareholders. Thus, as Teh Hooi Ling407 states, companies have two choices: ‘attract investors and 
raise capital more cheaply by giving up some control or adhere to standards that are more stringent 
than is required by law.’408  
Teh Hooi Ling409 argues that Singaporean companies could be divided based on their level 
of corporate governance and disclosure standards, instead of being segregated into the main board 
and the second board based on size. In this scenario, those that decided to be listed on ‘Level 1 or 
Tier 1’ would have to fulfil all the best practices of good corporate governance, such as 
‘transparency and timeliness of accounts, compliance with the spirit of applicable codes, etc.’ As a 
result, the risk premium would likely lower: ‘their share price would command higher valuations 
and they could obtain loans at a cheaper rate.’410  
According to Anandarajah411, ‘corporations in Singapore are not on a level-playing field, 
which makes it difficult to sustain a regime of self-enforcement and disclosure.’ She stresses the 
need for better enforcement and supervision, in particular with respect to smaller companies, 
which can be achieved through more intense examination of their corporate governance practices 
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and internal control tools. 
It is clear that introducing more rules and regulations does not necessarily improve 
corporate disclosure. For that reason Banerjee412 recommends a holistic approach in evaluating 
newly listed smaller companies by focusing enforcement on the following aspects:  
 
‘- corporate/organizational codes of conduct, 
 - compliance and ethics awareness and training, 
 - properly documented policies and procedures that are adhered to, and  
 - demonstrating expected behaviour [-] particularly by directors and senior management.’ 
 
 Wee Liang Tan and Teck Meng Tan413 report that the applicability of disclosure and 
transparency with regard to small companies might be questionable, because: 
 
‘[c]orporate governance is largely tied in with larger companies, which are confounded by 
the agency problem. The agency problem comes about when members of an organization 
have conflicts of interests, which in turn arises within a firm when there is no separation 
between ownership and management. At first glance, corporate governance would not apply 
to SMEs [small enterprises] since the agency issues are less likely to subsist. SMEs are not 
accountable to the public since they have not accessed the investing public for funding.’414 
 
Another essential step to improve disclosure practices is also training. Banerjee415 argues 
that mandating training might not be the ideal solution. However, efforts must be made to ensure 
that companies execute effectual training for their directors and key officers, and not just pay lip 
service to it. In particular, newly listed companies should be required to organise training 
programmes for directors before (rather than after) the initial public offering process. 
The disclosure-based regulation does require surveillance and strong enforcement to 
discourage and penalise those who would bend or break the rules, according to DeSilva416. She 
proposes maximum penalties under the SFA for those who breach disclosure requirements:  ‘On 
this score, the MAS has to continue to build up its enforcement capabilities to undertake 
investigation and civil penalty action. To support its enforcement activities, the MAS has acquired 
a market surveillance system to enhance its capability in detecting irregular trading activities’417. 
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The maximum fine is $250,000 and/or up to seven years’ imprisonment, and a civil 
penalty―payable to the MAS―at up to three times the gain made or loss avoided418.  
Whistle-blowers are not paid informants, and the least that could be done is to protect 
them from reprisals, points out Teen419. According to Wan420, A 2004 survey done by the Association 
for Certified Fraud Examiners in the US showed that almost 40% of frauds are uncovered thanks to 
a tip-off. A KPMG study on fraud in Singapore found that almost 53% of fraud cases are discovered 
due to notification by external parties, informants or anonymous letters. This definitely makes a 
whistle-blowing programme a most powerful instrument in identifying management fraud.421  
Nevertheless, top management might not be motivated enough to install a whistle-blowing 
programme, since it is a cost item. Therefore, Wan422 declares that an idea worthy of consideration 
is passing a law that would require listed companies to have a whistle-blowing agenda. This has 
already been implemented in the US through the SOX act. The law would have to be coupled with 
very strong commitment from management to support whistle-blowing and trust in the people who 
utilise the system, suggests Teen423.    
 
 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter is a review of literature on hybrid corporate governance in selected countries. The 
definition of a literature review is presented in Section A. 
In Section B, I explain the notion of hybrid corporate governance as well as such issues as: 
• legal transplant; 
• enlightened shareholder; and 
• stakeholder inclusivity values. 
as well as: 
• the ‘comply or else’; 
• the ‘comply or explain’; and 
• the ‘apply or explain’ principles. 
They are then developed in further parts of this thesis.  
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 Section C is an analysis of corporate literature concerning hybrid corporate governance in 
Poland. For example, I briefly describe the attempt to implement a one-tier board system in Poland 
in the early 1990s.  
Finally, in Sections D-F, I elaborate on several hybrid solutions within corporate governance 
worldwide. Accordingly, I analyse the implementation of stakeholder inclusivity in South Africa, the 
alternative board system in Japan, the mandatory programme of training for directors in Malaysia 
and the new disclosure-based system in Singapore.  
The next chapter is dedicated to corporate governance in the US and the UK, as they 
created the legal foundation for hybrid corporate solutions in the afore-mentioned countries. 
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IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
As I have already shown in the previous chapter, a combination of American and British solutions 
in the area of corporate governance, with certain local factors/solutions in South Africa and several 
Asian countries, created hybrid corporate governance. As a matter of fact, all corporate systems 
analysed in chapter III, except for the Japanese system, are traditionally rooted in the Anglo-
American corporate governance system. Therefore, it was only natural to write a chapter that 
would be focused on corporate governance in the United States and the United Kingdom.  
Before commencing this chapter, it was necessary to decide whether or not to compare 
both systems with the Polish system of corporate governance in the same chapter. However, I 
eventually split my analysis of those systems into two separate chapters, a chapter dedicated to 
Polish corporate governance and a chapter that elaborates on the main aspects of corporate 
governance in the US and the UK. I assumed that a comparative analysis of the Polish system and 
the Anglo-American approach to corporate governance would not be appropriate in the same 
chapter for the following reasons:  
• The research topic concerns the possibility of implementation of hybrid corporate 
governance in Poland, and therefore, in this thesis, there should be a separate chapter on 
the Polish corporate governance system.  
• Significant differences do not only exist between the Polish and the Anglo-American 
approaches to corporate governance. There are also certain dissimilarities between 
corporate governance in the US and the UK. Therefore, presenting them in a clear manner 
as well as, simultaneously, analysing American, British and Polish corporate governance in 
a comprehensive way could be difficult. 
 
The main goal of this chapter is to show the merits and drawbacks of the American and 
British corporate governance systems. Moreover, this chapter aims to reinforce my discussion on 
corporate hybridisation in the previous chapter. Accordingly, in this chapter, I go back to the issue 
of a compliance framework, shareholder value and a board of directors. I analyse how they are 
regulated in the US and the UK, how they are linked to those hybrid solutions in chapter III, and, 
briefly, how those regulations differentiate from each other and their Polish equivalents.  
 In this chapter, I also raise the issue of directors’ remuneration and its disclosure, which is 
not directly connected with hybridisation of corporate governance. However, it was important to 
include this issue within my research due to the fact that it was raised by my research participants 
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during interviews. Presented from the Anglo-American perspective, it better exposes the 
weaknesses of the Polish approach with regard to this issue. 
 The next subsection is dedicated to the ‘comply or else’ and ‘comply or explain’ principles, 
whose application created the most significant difference between the American and British 
approaches to corporate governance.  
 
 
B. ‘COMPLY OR ELSE’ VS ‘COMPLY OR EXPLAIN’ 
 
While the British system of corporate governance is based on the ‘comply or explain’ basis, the 
American system is to a certain extent regulated by a statute, which is called the ‘comply or else’ 
approach. One could say that the fundamentals of British corporate governance are also regulated 
by an act, or rather, a statute, the Companies Act of 2006. However, while the American SOX act 
(2002) imposes on companies the obligation to comply with certain provisions, mainly concerning 
annual financial reporting and accounting, their application in the UK is optional.  
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has mainly been criticised for the costs of involved with complying 
with it. According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)424, during 2004, companies with 
revenues exceeding $5 billion spent 0.06% of revenue on SOX compliance, while companies with 
less than $100 million in revenue spent 2.55%. Paul425 argue that this places US companies at a 
competitive disadvantage with foreign firms, taking businesses out of the United States. In line with 
the Wharton Business School426, the number of companies deregistering from public stock 
exchanges nearly tripled during the year after SOX came into force, while the New York Stock 
Exchange noted only 10 new foreign listings in 2004. As Piotroski and Srinivasan427 declare, in 2008, 
smaller international companies were more likely to list on stock exchanges in the UK rather than 
US stock exchanges.    
Critics also blamed SOX for the small number of Initial Public Offerings on US stock 
exchanges in 2008428, but there is no consistency in survey results in this matter. The National 
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Venture Capital Association’s429 survey shows that, in all of 2008, there were only six companies 
that went public. According to Hoover’s IPO Scorecard430, however, 31, not six companies went 
public on the main US stock exchanges in 2008.  
Hoover’s431 review from 2001 also proves that, before SOX was adopted, the number of 
IPOs declined to 87 in 2001, well down from previous highs. In 2004, IPOs raised up 195% from the 
previous year to 233432. There were 196 IPOs in 2005, 205 in 2006 (with a sevenfold increase in deals 
over $1 billion) and 209 in 2007433.  
 In addition, according to the annual survey of the Finance Executives International (FEI)434, 
the costs of SOX Section 404 have continued to decline relative to revenues since 2004. The 2007 
study shows that, for 168 companies with regular revenues of $4.7 billion, the regular compliance 
costs were $1.7 million (0.036% of revenue)435. The 2006 study indicates that, for 200 companies 
with regular revenues of $6.8 billion, the regular compliance costs were $2.9 million (0.043% of 
revenue), down 23% from 2005. Costs for decentralised companies (those with multiple segments 
or divisions) were significantly more than those for centralised companies. Survey scores related to 
the positive effect of SOX on investor confidence, reliability of financial statements, and fraud 
preclusion continued to rise. However, when participants were asked in 2006 whether the benefits 
of compliance with Section 404 surpassed costs in 2006, only 22% agreed436.   
The Lord & Benoit Report437 shows that ‘(…) those [companies] with no material 
weaknesses in their internal controls, or companies that corrected them in a timely manner, 
experienced much greater growths in share prices than companies that did not.’ In addition, the 
benefits to a compliant company in share price (10% above Russell 300 index) were larger than their 
SOX Section 404 costs.  
Skaife et al.438 proves that borrowing costs are lower for companies that improved their 
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internal control by between 50 and 150 basis points (0.5 to 1.5% points). Arping and Sautner439 
declare the following: ‘(…) [R]elative to a control sample of comparable firms that are not subject 
to SOX, cross-listed firms became considerably more transparent following SOX.’ The 2007 FEI440 
survey, as well as the Institute of Internal Auditors’ study (IIA)441, also point out that SOX enhanced 
investor confidence in financial reporting. Moreover, the IIA study shows improvements in board, 
audit committee, and senior management engagement in financial reporting as well as 
improvements in financial controls.  
Interestingly, we can notice an opposite occurrence in the British ‘comply or explain’ 
approach, which has received less criticism in various business arenas.   
According to Arcot et al.442, British companies do not provide satisfactory explanations on 
why they do not comply with the Code provisions. In almost one in five cases, firms do not provide 
any explanations for their non-compliance at all. Even when an explanation is provided, most of the 
time it fails to identify specific settings that could justify why the company rejected compliance or 
deviated from the rule (see Appendix 2). Furthermore, companies that do not comply, tend to stick 
with the same (poor) explanation until they suddenly begin to comply. Once compliant, a company 
either remains so or, if it stops complying, does not provide convincing explanations as to why this 
is the case.443  
 For Arcot et al.444, shareholders, especially of widely-held companies, are actually those 
who turn out to encourage such behaviour by not paying too much attention to the quality of 
explanations provided. On the other hand, they have limited monitoring capabilities, largely 
because of coordination problems, monitoring costs and different incentives, and their intervention 
often occurs after bad performance. In fact, the market also seems not to respond to explanations 
on compliance.445 
By 2012, the FRC446 proposed to set out the characteristics of an informative explanation in 
the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2012. As a result, the Code of 2012447 states that, among 
other things, a company’s explanation should: 
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‘(…) set out the background, provide a clear rationale for the action it is taking, and describe 
any mitigating actions taken to address any additional risk and maintain conformity with the 
relevant principle. Where deviation from a particular provision is intended to be limited in 
time, the explanation should indicate when the company expects to conform with the 
provision.’  
 
Importantly, almost half of listed companies, questioned by the FRC448, were concerned that they 
would be required to unveil commercially sensitive information or expected to make long and 
unimportant disclosures449. 
Despite the alarming survey outcomes with respect to quality of annual reporting,  Arcot et 
al.450 explain that ‘a more statutory regime would lead to a ‘box-ticking’ approach that would fail 
to allow for sound deviations from the rule and would not foster investors’ trust’451. Indeed, more 
than half of the non-financial companies of the FTSE350 fully followed all provisions of the Code at 
the end of 2004452. A survey conducted in 2007 shows that more companies had begun to comply 
with the Code in the areas not covered by the Cadbury Code (1992)453. The annual survey of Grant 
Thornton454 reveals that, in 2010, 50% of FTSE350 companies claimed full compliance with the 
Code. Of the reminder, 80% complied with all but one or two of the Code’s 48 provisions. Of the 
most recent surveys, the Grant Thornton455 survey shows that companies are continuing to respond 
in a positive manner to the provisions introduced in September 2012 (new corporate governance 
code). Compliance with the Code remains high, with – for the first time – over 90% of FTSE350 
companies reporting that they were either complying with all, or all but one or two, of its 
provisions456. 
Still, the question remains as to whether it is an enough percentage to protect 
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companies/economies from sudden collapses like those in the period 2007-2010, when the largest 
and key for economies companies went bankrupt from, practically, day to day. The question is also 
what percentage of companies from outside of the FTSE350 comply with the Code provisions. Their 
overall impact on the economy performance is as significant as the largest companies. 
 
 
C. SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
 
Another important issue, which, in this case, brings both corporate governance systems closer to 
each other, is the so-called ‘enlightened shareholder value’. In this regard, the question remains as 
to whether enlightened shareholder value is not the same as stakeholder value457 (see ‘Hybrid 
Corporate Governance in South Africa’ – ‘The Stakeholder Inclusive Model’ in chapter III), according 
to which a company is responsible and accountable to a wider set of actors beyond its owners 
(suppliers, customers, employees, government, local communities, etc) who are influenced by the 
behaviour and performance of a company (see section ’The Andreasson Definition of Hybrid 
Corporate Governance’ in chapter III)458.  
As I have already explained, the theory of shareholder value assumes that companies are 
an extension of their owners (the shareholders), for whose benefit they are obligated to provide 
goods or services to customers. Therefore, they are required to be accountable and responsible 
towards their owners459. This also means that those who are responsible for the governance of the 
company have no responsibility to anyone other than shareholders460.  
The shareholder model is often replaced by the ‘shareholder enlightened’ model, according 
to which the board of directors should also have regard for the legitimate interests and expectations 
of non-shareholder stakeholders (see section ’Stakeholder Inclusive Model’ in chapter III). As 
Loderer et al.461 point out, ‘[n]o country (…), not even the apparently shareholder-friendly United 
States or United Kingdom, has a legal requirement that managers [should] act solely in 
shareholders’ interests.’ At the international level, pressures come from such organisations as the 
UN and the OECD, which promote values-based corporate practices concerning human rights, 
labour, and the environment462.  
 In the US, communities and state governments have become more aware that companies 
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should have a long-term commitment to their investment in a particular locale. Too often, 
companies – probably for economic reasons – had abandoned the locale, leaving such problems as 
increased unemployment and an eroding tax base in the wake of their departure463. Many states 
have adopted statutes that give boards of directors the right to consider the interests of non-
shareholder stakeholders464. More than 100,000 federal, state, and local rules and regulations on 
environmental protection have been issued465. 
Luoma and Goodstein466 observe that, compared to 20 years ago, corporations are much 
more likely to include such stakeholders as suppliers, customers, employees, and members of the 
public on their boards of directors.  
Luoma and Goodstein467 also indicate the size and complexity of today’s modern companies 
as one of reasons why it became necessary to adopt shareholder enlightened value in the US. They 
enable large companies to become more visible ‘(…) and hence subject to greater attention from 
such constituencies as the state, the media, professional groups, and the general public.’468 
The UK Parliament included the enlightened shareholder concept in the Companies of Act 
2006. Accordingly, UK directors are now obliged to have regard (amongst other matters) to:  
 
a. ‘the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
b. the interest of the company’s employees’ 
c.  the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and 
others, 
d. the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment, 
e. the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct, and 
f. the need to act fairly as between members of the company.’469 
 
The Act also requires listed companies to recognise and report on stakeholder matters as part of 
comprehensive disclosures to investors. Specifically, the mandatory director’s report must contain 
a business review of the company’s business and a description of the principal risks, and 
uncertainties facing the company470. 
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According to the UK government, ‘(…) this approach (…) is most likely to drive long-term 
company performance and maximise overall competitiveness and wealth and welfare for all.’471 
Indeed, various studies472 have found a positive relationship between corporate social 
performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). Roman et al.473 (1999) reviewed 52 
such studies and found 33 reporting a positive relationship between CSP and CFP, only 14 reporting 
a negative relationship, and five reporting no relationship. Frooman474 (1997) found a relationship 
between CSP and CFP in his analysis of 27 ‘event’ studies, which focused on the response of the 
stock market to a single important event (eg a product recall). In particular, he established ‘(…) that, 
for firms engaging in socially irresponsible and illicit behaviour, the effect on shareholder wealth is 
negative and substantial in size’475. Most recently, Verschoor and Murphy476 (2002) found ‘(…) 
unbiased and rather conclusive empirical evidence that [companies] committed to social and 
environmental issues that are important to their stakeholders also have superior financial 
performance (…).’ 
 
 
D. THE BOARD STRUCTURE 
 
In light of considerations on the one-tier board system in Japan and the possibility of the 
implementation such a board in Poland, an issue that must be raised in this chapter is board 
structure in the US and the UK.  
 The common feature for both countries is the unitary character of the board of directors, 
which means one single board comprising either directors and officers (US), or executive and non-
executive directors (UK). Directors in both countries are elected to the board at the company’s 
annual general meeting, and are members of board committees (usually audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees). In the UK, they are often commanded by the chairman and the chief 
executive director. Whilst the chairman is responsible for the running of the board, the CEO is 
responsible for the running of the business. The American board of directors is responsible for 
                                                          
471 Mallin (n 27) 76, who refers to the Department of Trade and Industry consultative Company Law Reform (2005) document which 
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monitoring the management of the company and an executing role is delegated to (executive) 
officers, usually elected by the board of directors477.  
 The board of directors leads and controls a company and hence an effective board is 
fundamental to the success of the company. The board is the link between managers and investors, 
and is essential to good corporate governance and investor relations.478  
 
 
1. Chief executive officer vs chairman 
 
The separation of the roles of CEO and chairman has been broadly discussed in both countries. This 
issue is particularly important in view of the weak flow of information between the management 
and the supervisory boards in Poland (see section ‘Other Board Issues in chapter V). Research 
proves that the absence of separation fosters this flow in countries that adhere to the one-tier 
board system479. Thus, this issue should be taken into account while choosing a one-tier board 
system for Polish companies. 
In the UK system, it is desirable that the roles of CEO and chairman be split because there 
may otherwise be too much power vested in one individual. The UK Code of 2012 states that ‘[t]he 
roles of chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same individual’480. A similar 
requirement is not stated in the US equivalent of the UK Code, the Model Business Corporate Act 
(MBCA). On the other hand, the Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise (2003) 
recommends that careful thought should be given to the concept of separating these two roles481. 
As of February 2010, Securities Exchange Commission rules also require listed companies to disclose 
their board leadership structure, and explain why they have determined that such a leadership 
structure is appropriate, given their specific characteristics or circumstances482.  
Interestingly, statistics from before 2010 reveal that the so-called duality (the corporate 
                                                          
477 This is the traditional form of corporate governance in the US but it need not be the exclusive form. Patterns of management may 
also be tailored to specific needs in connection with family controlled enterprises, wholly or partially owned subsidiaries, or corporate 
joint ventures through a shareholder agreement under section 7.32 of the Model Business Corporate Act (MBCA). Under this section, an 
agreement among all shareholders can provide for a non-traditional form of corporate governance until the corporation becomes a 
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478 Mallin (n 27) 168. 
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leadership structure where one individual holds both the CEO and chair positions483) has been a 
dominant occurrence in both countries, in particular in the US. Tonello484, for example, found that 
despite the larger numbers of separate chair positions in large American companies (7% of the S&P 
500 in 2009 – 184 companies; a decrease from 39% in 2008 – 186 companies) only 81 companies 
of the S&P 500 (or 16% in total) had a ‘truly independent chair’. In the UK, this number was around 
25%485.486 More detailed statistics have been provided by Vo487.   
A board Chair who is at the same time the Chief Executive Officer is likely to spend more 
time at the company, and therefore have more complete knowledge on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the company488. This reduces the cost of information transfer between company 
leaders, and improves the ability of the individual to carry out management duties, as information 
transfer might be costly, untimely or incomplete489.  
On the other hand, a CEO who is at the same time a chairman might lack the scepticism 
necessary to scrutinise information that is screened and filtered by a CEO who does not hold the 
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Case for Independent Leadership in Corporate North America’ (2009) <www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/Millstein%20Center%20Rpt%20-
%20Chairing%20the%20Board%203-15-09.pdf> accessed 19 December 2014, explaining that Germany and Holland’s requirement of a 
two-tier board structure by definition separates the CEO and Chair positions, and South Africa’s Johannesburg Stock Exchange requires 
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position of Chair prior to that information being provided to the board490. Moreover, the 
information costs of splitting those two positions can be lessened by appointing non-executive 
Chairs with large experience and extensive knowledge, based on their long-time membership on 
the company’s board491. There might also be an unwritten policy in a company that all 
communication of information from inside the company to the directors must first be approved by 
the CEO, which might produce information costs492.  
Another expansive argument supporting duality is that a CEO-Chair can apply greater 
authority and speed in making and executing critical decisions for the company493. As a 
consequence, decisions made by a chief executive who is also the chairman of the company might 
be clearer, timelier, and more consistent than decisions made by a chief executive who has to 
negotiate and consult with a board that is directed by a separate chairman494. There is, however, 
an opinion that those two leadership position vested in one person might restrict board adoption 
of appropriate strategies that adapt to changing business environments495. Boyd496, for example, 
explains that duality has been blamed for poor performance and slow response to change in firms 
such as General Motors, Digital Equipment Corporation, and Goodyear Tire and Rubber. Vo497 
clarifies the view as follows: ‘What appear to be clear and consistent decisions on the part of the 
CEO-Chair may turn out to be manifestations of the executive’s fixation on a set course of action or 
unwillingness to adopt new business strategies to meet pressing competitive conditions.’ 
Some researchers498 also argue that a combined CEO-Chair in US companies may enhance 
the board’s performance of its management responsibilities by facilitating collaboration between 
board directors and company executives:  
 
‘The CEO is the leader of the company’s executive group, and several members of that 
executive group are also likely to serve as directors on the board. Where the CEO is also the 
leader of the board of directors, the joint leadership may prompt more cooperation between 
the two groups. By enhancing collegiality and collaboration between board directors and 
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company executives, a CEO-Chair may thus facilitate consensus that leads to smooth and 
efficient decision making.’499  
 
Yet, separation of the CEO and chairman roles also enhances the board’s performance of 
its management responsibilities by improving both the quality and the appropriateness of board 
decision making500. Clark’s501 survey proves that a board Chair who is not an executive of the 
company may provide unique perspectives that encourage the board to discuss and make strategic 
and fundamental business decisions. 
A non-executive Chair might also facilitate the board’s management function by enabling 
the board to speedily make decisions and adopt new strategies to meet changing business 
environments502. A good example is Compaq Computer, where having a separate Chair enabled the 
company – over the strong objection of the company’s CEO – to adopt a lower-priced product line 
to remain competitive in the industry503.  
Finally, supporters of splitting the CEO-Chair position argue that the board performs its 
monitoring role better when there is a non-executive chairman. The monitoring role requires 
directors to keep an eye on corporate managers in order to detect and punish managerial 
incompetence and wrongdoing.504 Thus, duality might cause failure by the board to effectively 
monitor and control executive management.  
 
 
2. The independence of non-executive directors 
 
Objectivity in board decisions is an issue to which considerable attention is paid in the Anglo-Saxon 
models of corporate governance. In particular, great emphasis is put on the issue of directors’ 
independence, which is also important from the perspective of research on Polish corporate 
governance. In chapter III (see section ‘Hybrid Corporate Governance in Poland’), I refer to Oplustil 
and Radawan’s505 opinion, according to which, imposing on companies the obligation to appoint 
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the majority of independent supervisors in 2002 was an attempt to transplant the Anglo-Saxon 
concept of independent directors in Poland. In chapters V-VI, I develop the issue of supervisors’ 
independence in Poland. In particular, I explain the meaning that it has for the higher protection of 
minority shareholders in Polish companies with a highly consolidated ownership structure.  
 In the UK, the idea of independence has been emphasised again and again in various official 
documents for the last 20 years. The Cadbury Code506 (1992) first recommended that non-executive 
directors ‘(…) should be independent of management and free from any business or other 
relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgement.’ 
The idea was then reinforced by the Higgs Review507 (2003), according to which nonexecutive 
directors ‘(…) bring a dispassionate objectivity that directors with a closer relationship to the 
company cannot provide.’ 
 According to the American MBCA508, ‘(…) [i]n the case of a public corporation, the board’s 
oversight responsibilities include attention to: [amongst others] (…) the composition of the board 
and its committees, taking into account the important role of independent directors.’ 
At the international level, in 1999, the OCED509 announced the following: ‘Board 
independence usually requires that a sufficient number of board members not be employed by the 
company and not be closely related to the company or its management through significant 
economic, family or other ties. This does not prevent shareholders from being board members.’ 
Afterwards, the OCED510 (2004) stated that ‘board independence (…) usually requires that a 
sufficient number of board members will need to be independent of management.’  
 In the UK, ‘[t]he board should include an appropriate combination of executive and non-
executive directors (and, in particular, independent non-executive directors) such that no individual 
or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision taking’511. The Company Code 
2012512 also requires the board to: 
• identify in the annual report each non-executive director it considers to be independent; 
determine whether the executive director it considers to be independent; 
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• determine whether the director is independent in character and judgement and whether 
there are relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, 
the director’s judgement. 
 
Independence is generally defined as a state when there are no relationships or 
circumstances that might affect the director’s judgement513. The Code 2012514 states the following: 
 
‘The board should state its reasons if it determines that a director is independent 
notwithstanding the existence of relationships or circumstances which may appear relevant 
to its determination, including if the director: 
• has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; 
• has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the 
company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a 
body that has such a relationship with the company;  
• has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a 
director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance-related pay 
scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension scheme; 
• has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior employees; 
• holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies; 
• represents a significant shareholder; or 
• has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first election.’ 
 
These are, thus, situations where a non-executive director’s independence would be called into 
question. 
In American Official Comment to Section 8.01515, we can read that the listing standards of 
most public securities markets have requirements for independent directors to serve on boards. In 
many cases, they must constitute a majority of the board, and certain board committees must be 
composed entirely of independent directors. The listing standards have differing rules as to what 
constitutes an independent director. The Act516 does not provide a definition of an ‘independent 
director’, but according to a commentary attached to it: 
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‘[o]rdinarily an independent director may not be a present or recent member of senior 
management. Also, to be considered independent, the individual usually must be free of 
significant professional, financial or similar relationships – and the director and members of 
the director’s immediate family must be free of similar relationships with the corporation’s 
senior management.’ 
 
Judgment is required to determine independence in light of the particular circumstances, subject 
to any specific requirements of a listing standard. The attitude of disinterestedness required of 
directors under the Act517 for specific purposes are similar but not necessarily identical.  
 There is some discussion as to whether the number of non-executive directorships that any 
one individual can hold should be defined. Mallin518 explains the problem as follows:  
 
‘Of course, if an individual were to hold many non-executive directorships, for example ten 
or more, then it is arguable whether that individual could devote enough time and 
consideration to each of the directorships. One the other hand, it may be perfectly feasible 
for an individual to hold, for example, five non-executive directorships. It really depends on 
the time that an individual has available, on the level of commitment, and whether any of 
the multiple non-executive directorships might lead to the problem of interlocking 
directorships whereby the independence of their role is compromised. An interlocking might 
occur through any of a number of circumstances, including family relationship, business 
relationship, or a previous advisory role (such as auditor), which would endanger the 
fundamental aspect of independence.’  
 
Mallin519 notes that, in the UK, the independence of non-executive directors is usually carefully 
screened by institutional investors and their representative groups, and that disclosure of 
biographical information and growing use of databases of director information help shareholders 
to notice probable problems in the area. In addition, ‘non-executive directors should undertake 
that they will have sufficient time to meet what is expected of them’ and ‘their other significant 
commitments should be disclosed to the board before appointment, with a board indication of the 
time involved and the board should be informed of subsequent changes’520. It is recommended that 
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a full-time executive director should not take on ‘more than one non-executive directorship in a 
FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of such a company’521.   
 In chapter III, I draw attention to differentiating outcomes of surveys concerning the 
influence of directors’ independence on company performance in Japan. Surveys conducted in the 
US and the UK produced similar outcomes. For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) show that 
outside directors are associated with poorer performance522. Similar results are reported in 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and Klein (1998)523. Bhagat and Black (2002) do not find any 
relationship between the presence of independent directors on the board and 
company’s performance524. On the other hand, Weisbach (1988) finds that boards with a higher 
proportion of outside directors are more likely to replace a CEO in cases of poor corporate 
performance525. A positive relationship between board independence and firm performance is 
reported in Rosenstein and Wyatt526 (1990) and Andres and Vallelado527 (2008). Yeh et al.528 (2011), 
using the data of the 20 largest financial institutions from G8 countries (Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US), of which four are common law countries and four civil law 
countries, find that:  
 
‘[the] performance during the crisis period is higher for financial institutions with more 
independent directors on auditing and risk committees. The influence of committee 
independence on the performance is particularly stronger for civil law countries. In addition, 
the independence-performance relationships are more significant in financial institutions 
with excessive risk-taking behaviours.’ 
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3. Board diversity 
 
Another issue that should be mentioned in the section ‘The Board Structure’ is diversity amongst 
board members. As the issue was raised by two of my research participants529 during interviews, I 
decided to include it with chapters V and VI, and briefly present the American and British approach 
to it.  
 As I have written in the previous subsection, typically, state and federal laws in the United 
States define directors’ independence as the absence of a significant financial interest or familial 
tie between a board member and the company or between a board member and the firm's senior 
executives. However, as Colaco et al.530 declare, this definition of independence may not be enough 
‘to create boards that are truly independent of management’, as: 
 
‘(…) a well-developed stream of social network research on the origins and effects of 
interlocking directorates, where individual directors sit on each other's boards, and on back 
door ties between directors, where individual directors serve on two or more boards which 
have overlapping sets of directors, suggests that such a purely economic definition of 
independence may not be adequate to create boards that are truly independent of 
management (…). Social relationships with senior executives and other directors can be 
antithetical to independence and thus impede the ability of directors to provide effective 
oversight.’ 
 
Rodrigues531 suggests that to promote independent oversight, companies should look beyond the 
‘narrow’ economic view of independence in electing board members. He states that an essential 
‘precursor to independence of thought’ is diversity, and advises that increasing the amount of 
heterogeneity among board members would have a positive impact on the quality of board 
oversight. This idea is sustained by Dallas532, who claims that people with diverse backgrounds have 
alternative viewpoints and thus may be more likely to express dissenting opinions. 
A way to achieve more heterogeneous and independent boards is to seek out more women 
for board positions. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the proportion of women in leadership roles 
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is growing, women are still far behind men in board elections.533 Colaco et. al534 report that only 
13% of board members on Fortune 1000 companies are women. Erhardt et al.535 and Carter et al.536 
present analogous outcomes. 
 In the UK, in May 2011, the FRC began consulting on potential changes to the Corporate 
Governance Code ‘that would require companies to publish their policy on boardroom diversity 
and report it annually, as recommended by the Davis Report537 (2011) and to consider the 
board’s diversity amongst other factors, when assessing its effectiveness’538. In October 2011, 
the FRC said that these amendments would be implemented in a reviewed version of the Code, 
which will apply to financial years beginning on or after 1 October 2012.  
 The changes affect two sections of the Code. With respect to Section B.2.4, where it is 
proposed that ‘the work of the nomination committee should be described in a separate section 
of the annual report, including the process used in relation to board appointments. This section 
should contain a description of ‘the board’s policy on diversity, including gender, any 
measurable objectives that it has set for implementing the policy, and progress on achieving the 
objectives. An explanation should be given if neither an external search consultancy nor open 
advertising has been used in the appointment of a chairman or a non-executive director.’ 
Moreover, in relation to Section B6 where ‘the evaluation of the board should consider the 
balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the company on the board, its 
diversity, including gender, how he board works together as a unit, and other factors relevant 
to its effectiveness.’ 
In the middle of 2011, the European Parliament called on EU states to reserve 30% of seats 
on boards for women until 2015, 40% until 2020539. Furthermore, the European Commission is 
considering legislation to improve the gender balance on the boards of listed companies540.  
A number of countries in the EU – France, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium – enacted 
legislative measures in 2011 aimed to improve gender balance in company boards, and that other 
countries (eg Spain since 2007 and Norway since 2003) already had quota systems in place at 
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Corporate Governance: An International Review 102. 
536 David A. Carter, Betty J. Simkins and W. Gary Simpson, ‘Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value’ (2003) 38 (1) Financial 
Review 33. 
537 This report is available on <www.gov.uk/government/news/women-on-boards> accessed 18 March 2013. 
538 Mallin (n 27) 185. 
539 PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘Rady Nadzorcze 2013. Skuteczność Rad Nadzorczych w Spółkach Publicznych Notowanch na GPW’ (2012) 
<www.pwc.pl/pl_PL/pl/publikacje/pwc_rady_nadzorcze_2013.pdf> accessed 26 May 2014. 
540 European Commission, ‘Gender Balance in Decision-Making Positions’ (27 June 2014) <www.ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/gender-decision-making/index_en.htm> accessed 25 May 2014. 
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40%541.  
Still, the Parliament’s recommendation seems to be a real challenge when looking at 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, where the participation of women in FTSE 100 
companies amounts to 15%, and in FTSE 350 companies – 9%542.  
In January 2012, the average number of female board members in the largest companies 
listed in the EU was only 13.7% compared to 11.8% in 2010. Moreover, only 3.2% of chairpersons 
were women in January 2012 compared to 3.4% in 2010.543  
What does the academic evidence have to say about board diversity? Erkut et al.544 report 
that a critical mass of three or more women directors can fundamentally change the boardroom 
and improve corporate governance. The programme of boardroom discussion is more likely to 
concern the perspectives of multiple stakeholders; challenging issues and problems are less likely 
to be ignored or brushed aside; and boardroom dynamics are more open and cooperative. Erkut et 
al.545 based their research on interviews with 50 women directors, twelve CEOs, and seven 
corporate secretaries from Fortune 1000 companies. 
Carter et al.546 examined both the diversity of the board and of important board 
committees in all companies listed on the Fortune 500 over the period 1998-2002. Their results 
sustain the opinion that board diversity has a positive impact on financial performance. The 
evidence on board committees shows that gender diversity is positive for financial performance 
principally through the audit function of the board while ethnic diversity influences financial 
performance through all three functions of the board, namely audit, executive compensation, and 
director nomination.  
Grosvold and Brammer547 report that ‘as much as half the variation in the presence of 
women on corporate boards across countries is attributable to national institutional systems and 
that culturally and legally-orientated institutional systems appear to play the most significant role 
in shaping board diversity.’ 
Ferreira548 analyses the possible costs and benefits of board diversity that can be inferred 
                                                          
541 European Commission, ‘Women in Economic Decision-Making in the EU: Progress Raport. A Europe 2020 Initiative’ (European Union, 
2012) <www.ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf> accessed 28 June 2014. 
542 PwC, ‘Rady Nadzorcze 2013. Skuteczność (…)’ (n 539).  
543 Mallin (n 27) 186. 
544 Sumru Erkut, Vicki W. Kramer and Alison M. Konrad, ‘Critical Mass: Does the Number of Women on a Corporate Board Make a 
Difference?’ in Susan Vinnicombe, Val Singh, Ronald J. Burke, Diana Bilimoria and Morten Huse (eds), Women on Corporate Boards of 
Directors: International Research and Practice (Edward Elgar 2008). 
545 ibid. 
546 Carter et al. (n 536). See also Appendix 9. 
547 Johanne Grosvold and Stephen Brammer, ‘National Institutional Systems as Antecedents of Female Board Representation: An 
Empirical Study’ (2011) 19 (2) Corporate Governance: An International Review 116. 
548 Daniel Ferreira, ‘Board Diversity’ in H. Kent Baker and Ronald Anderson (eds), Corporate Governance, A Synthesis of Theory, Research 
and Practice (The Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance, John Wiley & Sons Inc. 2011). 
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from the academic literature. Among the costs are conflict, lack of co-operation, and insufficient 
communication; choosing directors with little experience, inadequate qualifications, or who are 
overused; and conflicts of interests and agenda pushing. The benefits include creativity and 
different perspectives; access to resources and connections; career incentives through signalling 
and mentoring; and public relations, investor relations and legitimacy. From his analysis of board 
diversity literature, he comes to the conclusion that ‘making a business case for women in the 
boardroom on the basis of statistical evidence linking women to profits obviously creates possibility 
of a business case against women if the evidence turns out to suggest that women reduce profits 
(…) the research on board diversity is best used as a means to understand the costs and benefits of 
diversity in the workplace and to study corporate governance issues.’  
 
 
E. DIRECTORS’ PERFORMANCE AND REMUNERATIONS 
 
The issue of directors’ performance and remuneration has been hotly debated on both sides of the 
Atlantic. It is not directly associated with the issue of corporate hybridisation, on which I elaborate 
in chapter III, but it has a strong link with my further discussion on corporate governance in Poland. 
My research participants during interviews (see chapter VI) found the relationship between 
directors’ performance and remuneration, as well as the disclosure of remuneration, one of the 
most serious weaknesses of Polish orporate governance (first research question; see chapter I), and 
therefore it was only natural to include this issue with the chapter on American and British corporate 
governance.  
 The directors’ remuneration debate clearly refers to the principal-agent concept. In this 
regard, Conyon and Mallin549 explain that ‘shareholders are viewed as the ‘principal’ and managers 
as their ‘agents’, and that the economics literature, in particular, demonstrates that the 
compensation received by senior management should be linked to company performance for 
incentive reasons.’ Meanwhile, in research published in 2004, Bebchuk and Fried550 observed that 
the pay level for directors in the UK tends to increase, despite the bad performance of the company 
in question, and this dilutes and distorts managers’ incentives, and hurts the shareholders.  
The 2011 UK Department for Business, Innovation & Skills’551 paper on executive 
                                                          
549 Martin J. Conyon and Christine Mallin, Directors’ Share Options, Performance Criteria and Disclosure Compliance with the Greenbury 
Report (ICAEW Research Board, London 1997). 
550 Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University 
Press 2004).  
551 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, ‘Executive Remuneration: Discussion Paper’ (September 2011) 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31660/11-1287-executive-remuneration-discussion-
paper.pdf> accessed 16 December 2013. 
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remuneration highlights the increasing disparity between the pay of CEOs and employees in the 
largest companies, and cites evidence to suggest that executive pay (in particular at CEO level in 
FTSE 100 companies) is not strongly related to company performance or shareholder returns.  
The most recent crises highlighted the inequalities that exist between executive directors’ 
generous remuneration and the underperformance of the company that they direct. They also 
revealed consequences that might arise from badly designed compensation contracts. Shareholders 
lost vast sums of money, sometimes their life savings, and employees found themselves on shorter 
working weeks, lower incomes, or being made redundant.  
The International Labour Organization552 reports the following:  
 
‘the gap in income inequality is also widening – at an increasing pace – between top 
executives and the average employee. For example, in the United States in 2007, the chief 
executive officers (CEOs) of the 15 largest companies earned 520 times more than the 
average worker. This is up from 360 times more in 2003. Similar patterns, though from lower 
levels of executive pay, have been registered in Australia, Germany, Hong Kong (China), the 
Netherlands and South Africa.’ 
 
The High Pay Commission553 – an independent inquiry into high pay and boardroom pay 
across the public and private sectors in the UK – observes: ‘In BP, in 2011 the lead executive earned 
63 times the amount of the average employee. In 1979 the multiple was 16.5 In Barclays, top pay 
is now 75 times that of the average worker. In 1979 it was 14.5. Over that period, the lead 
executive’s pay in Barclays has risen by 4,899.4% - from £87,323 to a staggering of £4,365,636.’    
In the context of the global banking crisis, the House of Commons Treasury Committee554 
reported in May 2009 that (among other things) bonus-driven remuneration structures in the City 
of London, as well as in other financial centres (especially in investment banking), led to reckless 
and excessive risk taking. On top of that, in too many cases the bonus schemes in the banking sector 
were not aligned with the interest of shareholders and the long-term sustainability of the banks555. 
                                                          
552 International Labour Organization, ‘World of Work 2008: Income Inequalities in the Age of Financial Globalization (International 
Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva 2008) <www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_099413.pdf> accessed 15 January 2014. 
553 High Pay Commission, ‘Cheques with Balances: Why tackling high pay is in the national interest’ 
<www.highpaycentre.org/files/Cheques_with_Balances.pdf> accessed 27 April 2014. 
554 House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Banking Crisis: reforming corporate governance and pay in the city’ (12 May 2009) 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/519/519.pdf> accessed 14 November 2013. 
555 ibid. 
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According to the High Pay Commission’s556 report, published in 2011, alongside an average increase 
in FTSE 350 salaries of 63.9% between 2002 and 2010, average bonuses increased from 48% to 90% 
of salary in the same period.  
Comparing company performance to stock and balance sheet performance, the same 
report557 suggests that ‘salary growth bears no relation to either market capitalisation, earnings per 
share (EPS) or pre-tax profit’ and that ‘there is no or little relation between the total earnings trends 
and market capitalisation.’ 
In 2010, the High Pay Commission558 found ‘evidence that excessive high pay damages 
companies, is bad for (…) economy and has negative impacts on society as a whole. At its worst, 
excessive pay bears little relation to company success and is rewarding failure.’ Four causes of the 
dramatic growth in top pay were found: attempts to link pay to performance, company structures 
fail to exert proper control over top earnings, the labour market contributes to increasing pay at 
the top, and the rise in individualism559.  
The ILO560 states that developments in corporate governance significantly contributed to 
excessive income inequality, in particular the use of so-called ‘performance pay systems’ for chief 
executive managers and directors. Meanwhile, empirical research proves that there is little 
relationship between these systems and company performance. Furthermore, some countries 
show practically no relationship between performance-pay and company returns. Altogether, 
‘evidence suggests that developments in executive pay may have been both inequality-enhancing 
and economically inefficient’561.   
 
 
F. THE DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
 
In order to improve the relationship between directors’ performance and their remuneration, 
several legislative initiatives have been undertaken in the US and the UK. In this respect, the 
Greenbury Report (1995) and the Turnbull Committee recommendations (1999, revised in 2005) 
                                                          
556 High Pay Commission, ‘What are we paying for? Exploring executive pay and performance’ 
<www.mbsportal.bl.uk/secure/subjareas/accfinecon/highpaycommission/126842whatarewepayingfor11.pdf> accessed 28 January 
2013. 
557 ibid. 
558 High Pay Commission, ‘More for Less: what has happened to pay at the top and does it matter?’ (May 2011) 
<www.highpaycentre.org/img/High_Pay_Commission_More_for_Less.pdf> 29 January 2014. 
559 ibid. 
560 International Labour Organisation (n 552). 
561 ibid.  
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have had the most significant influence on them562.  
 The Greenbury Report aimed mainly to strengthen the accountability of and enhance the 
performance of directors563. This was to be achieved by (1) establishing remuneration committees 
composed of independent non-executive directors, who would report about the company’s 
executive remuneration policy fully to the shareholders each year; and (2) adopting performance 
measures, which would link rewards to the performance of both the company and individual 
directors, so that the interests of directors and shareholders were more closely aligned564.  
 Among other things, the Turnbull Committee recommended ‘that boards should consider 
whether business objectives and the risk management/control systems of a business are supported 
by the performance-related reward system in operation in a company’565. As part of the 
accountability/transparency process, the remuneration committee membership should be 
disclosed in the company’s annual report, and the chairman of the remuneration committee should 
attend the company’s annual general meeting to answer any questions that shareholders may have 
about the directors’ remuneration566.  
 The result of the Greenbury and Turnbull recommendations is the publication, by the 
Department of Transport & Industry, of the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002567. 
This regulation requires, inter alia, that: 
• quoted companies must publish a detailed report on director’ pay as part of their annual 
reporting cycle, and this report must be approved by the board of directors; 
• a graph of the company’s total shareholder returns over five years, against a comparator 
group, must be published in the remuneration committee report; 
• the names of any consultants to the remuneration committee must be disclosed, 
including whether they were appointed independently, along with the cost of any other 
services provided to the company; 
• companies must hold a shareholder vote on the directors’ remuneration report at each 
general meeting. 
 
It should, however, be emphasised that this is only an advisory shareholder vote. Still, it should 
serve a useful purpose of ensuring that the shareholders can vote specifically on directors’ 
                                                          
562 Mallin (n 27) 210.  
563 Richard Greenbury, ‘Directors’ Remuneration. Report of a Study Group Chaired by Richard Greenbury’ (17 July 1995) 
<www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/greenbury.pdf> accessed 28 January 2014; see also Mallin (27) 210. 
564 ibid. 
565 Financial Reporting Council, ‘Internal control: Revised guide for directors on the Combined Code’ (October 2005) 
<www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/frc_ic.pdf> accessed 7 February 2014; see also Mallin (27) 210.  
566 ibid.  
567 This report is available on <www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/1986/contents/made> accessed 20 March 2013. 
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remuneration568. The other provisions might help to ‘strengthen the role of the remuneration 
committee and enhance both the accountability and transparency of the directors’ 
remuneration-setting process’569.  
 With respect to ‘say on pay’, the US Congress took it one step further, and decided in the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) to make it obligatory for US 
companies. Accordingly, the Act requires a shareholder advisory vote for approving a company’s 
executive compensation to take place at least once every three years. The ‘say on frequency’ 
provision requires companies to hold a shareholder advisory vote every six years on whether the 
‘say on pay’ resolution should occur every one, two, or three years.  
 On the other hand, Conyon and Sadler570 (2010), in a study of shareholder voting behaviour 
in the UK from 2002- 2007, find that there is ‘little evidence of widespread and deep shareholder 
voting against CEO pay’. Both authors admit that their study was carried out on pre-financial crisis 
data and that there might be a higher opposition on the shareholders’ part after the crisis, especially 
in companies that have received financial support from governments or where executive pay is 
perceived to be excessively high. A recent study does indeed not show that institutional investors 
are voting with much higher levels of opposition571.  
  In 2008, the US Congress passed the Emergency Economic Act. It authorised the US 
Treasury Secretary to establish a Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) so that the US government 
could purchase up to US$700 billion of mortgage-backed and other troubled assets from financial 
institutions. Those financial institutions involved in TARP are required to meet the following 
corporate governance standards: the requirement for companies to eliminate compensation 
structures that encourage unnecessary and excessive risk being taken by executives; a provision for 
claw-back of any bonus or incentive-based compensation paid to senior executive officers where it 
is subsequently proven that the criteria, for example statement of earnings, were inaccurate; and 
a prohibition of certain types of ‘golden parachute’ payments (also known as ‘golden goodbyes’). 
Thus, there is no doubt that the level of the remuneration transparency has increased in some US 
companies.  
At the supranational level, the European Commission has been very active on the issue of 
remuneration disclosure. In 2010, The Commission issued a Green Paper on Corporate governance 
                                                          
568 ibid. 
569 ibid. 
570 Martin Conyon and Graham Sadler, ‘Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK’ (2010) 
18 (4) Corporate Governance: An International Review 296. 
571 Fabrizio Ferri and David A. Maber, ‘Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK’ (2011) 
<www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420394> accessed 3 August 214. 
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in financial institutions and remuneration policies572, which inter alia consulted on the 
recommendation of a binding or advisory shareholder vote on remuneration policy, and greater 
independence for non-executive directors involved in determining remuneration policy. In 2011 
another Green Paper, The EU corporate governance framework573, was passed, with responses 
invited to various consultation questions. These included whether disclosure of remuneration 
policy, the annual remuneration report (a report on how the remuneration policy was implemented 
in the past year), and individual remuneration of executive and non-executive directors should be 
mandatory; and also whether shareholders should have a mandatory right to vote on the 
remuneration policy and the remuneration report. In 2014, the European Commission574 adopted 
Regulatory Technical Standards on criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional 
activities have a material impact on an institution's risk profile (so-called ‘material risk takers’). 
These standards identify risk takers in banks and investment firms. Internal Market and Services 
Commissioner Barnier575 said the following:  
 
‘Some banks are doing their utmost to circumvent remuneration rules. The adoption of these 
technical standards is an important step towards ensuring that the capital requirement rules 
on remuneration are applied consistently across the EU. These standards will provide clarity 
on who new EU rules on bonuses actually apply to, which is key to preventing circumvention. 
In addition, the European Banking Authority has a mandate to ensure consistent supervisory 
practices on remuneration rules among competent authorities. The Commission will remain 
vigilant to ensure that new rules are applied in full.’ 
 
 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main goal of this chapter is to show the merits and drawbacks of the American and British 
corporate governance system. Moreover, this chapter aims to reinforce my discussion on corporate 
hybridisation in chapter III. 
                                                          
572 European Commission, ‘Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies’ (2 June 2010) <www.eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0284:FIN:EN:PDF> 6 February 2014. 
573 European Commission, ‘The EU corporate governance framework’ (5 April 2011) <www.eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0164:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 6 February 2014. 
574 European Commission, ‘New Initiatives in Response to the Financial Crisis’ (11 July 2014) 
www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/directors-remun/index_en.htm accessed 24 July 2014. 
575 Michael Barnier in European Commission, ‘Commission adopts new standards to increase transparency over bankers' pay and risk 
profiles’ (Brussels, 4 march 2014) <www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-210_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 12 August 2014. 
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 Accordingly, in sections B-D, I go back to the issue of a compliance framework, shareholder 
value and a board of directors. I analyse how they are regulated in the US and the UK, how they are 
linked to those hybrid solutions in chapter III, and, briefly, how those regulations differentiate from 
each other and their Polish equivalents. With respect to the latter, I dedicate subsections 1-3 in 
section D to such issues as a better information flow between board members, board members’ 
independence and board diversity, as they are found problematic in Polish corporate governance. 
 In this chapter, in sections F and G, I also raise the issue of directors’ remuneration and its 
disclosure, which is not directly connected with hybridisation of corporate governance. However, 
it was important to include this issue within my research due to the fact that it was raised by my 
research participants during interviews. Presented from the Anglo-American perspective, it better 
exposes, in the subsequent chapters, the weakness of the Polish approach as to this issue.  
The following chapter is an analysis of corporate governance in Poland.   
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V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN POLAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
The main theme of this chapter is corporate governance in Poland. Its main purpose is to answer 
my two first research questions, namely:  
 
• What are the weaknesses of the Polish corporate governance system? 
• What changes should be made to corporate governance in Poland? 
 
This chapter deals with such issues as the consolidated ownership structure in Polish 
companies, the board structure, remuneration policy and corporate disclosure. In order to show 
corporate governance in Poland in a broader scope, I also refer to American and British corporate 
practices.   
I based the analysis of this chapter mainly on the Act of 15 September 2000 on Commercial 
Partnerships and Companies (the Company Code of 2000) and the Warsaw Stock Exchange’s Best 
Practices Code of 2010. These two acts are the main regulators of corporate governance in Poland.  
This chapter is an introduction to a qualitative analysis of data collected during interviews 
in Poland. Thus, it raises issues that are developed in the subsequent chapter.  
 
 
B. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OUTLINE 
 
With some exceptions (see Appendix 3), we can talk about corporate governance in Poland in 
relation to a limited liability company and a joint-stock company. These two business forms are 
required by the Company Code of 2000 to operate through authorities.  
Polish corporate governance is predominantly a two-tier board system embracing a 
supervisory board and a management board. As is usual, the supervisory board supervises the 
management board and oversees the company’s financial statements, it also reports to the 
shareholders on the actions of the company. The management board conducts the day-to-day 
business of the company and is responsible for issues that are not the area of the supervisory board 
or the shareholders’ meeting. The company’s articles of association/statutes576 often expands on 
the areas to be covered by the management board. 
                                                          
576 Articles of association, together with the memorandum of association, are the constitution of a limited liability company. Statutes 
perform the same function in a joint-stock company. 
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SHEREHOLDERS' MEETING 
- Obligatory in every company; 
- Appoints and removes members of the supervisory board in a JSC, and members of the management board in an LLC; 
- In any case and regardless of the manner of appointment, the general shareholders’ meeting may remove or suspend 
the members of the management board. 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL CONTROL 
- Only in an LLC; 
- Shall be conferred upon each 
shareholder. 
- At any time, the shareholder may 
inspect the books and documents of 
the company, prepare a balance 
sheet for his or her personal use or 
request the management board to 
provide explanations; 
- It can be restricted if there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that 
the shareholder will use it for 
purposes contrary to the company’s 
interest, thus causing material 
damage to the company; 
- When restricted, the shareholder 
may appeal to the registry court. 
 
 
MANAGEMENT BOARD 
- Obligatory in every company; 
- Composed of executive directors 
only; 
- Directors can be appointed from 
amongst the shareholders; 
- In a JSC, directors are appointed and 
removed by the supervisory board, 
unless the statutes provide 
otherwise; 
- The shareholders’ meeting and the 
supervisory board may not give 
binding instructions to the 
management board concerning the 
management of the company’s 
affairs; 
- The articles of association/statutes 
may provide for the obligation of the 
management board to obtain the 
consent of the supervisory board 
prior to undertaking actions set forth 
in the articles of association/statutes; 
- No committees on the management 
board. 
 
SUPERVISORY BOARD 
- Obligatory in a JSC; 
- Voluntary in an LLC in which share 
capital does not exceed PLN 500,000, 
and the number of shareholders does 
not exceed 25; 
- There is no requirement to appoint 
independent supervisors; 
- Appointed and removed by the 
shareholders’ meeting; 
- An AUDITORS’ COMMITTEE can also 
be established in an LLC, together with 
or without the supervisory board. It is 
appointed and removed by the 
shareholders’ meeting. 
  
 
 
Table 4. Corporate governance in Poland577 
 
This is a general picture of corporate governance in Poland. When we take a closer look at 
exactly how it works, it turns out that the governance is far less coherent. A supervisory board might 
only be a supervisory organ in theory and not a management organ. In reality, ‘it cannot be excluded 
from participation in the firm’s influence structure’578. Oplustil and Radwan579 aptly describe the 
main feature of the Polish corporate governance system as being ‘the prevalence of consolidated 
                                                          
577 Prepared on the basis of the Company Code of 2000.  
578 Kozarzewski & Woodward (n 4).  
579 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 490. 
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ownership where controlling shareholders extend their influence via the supervisory board.’ 
 
 
C. THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
 
Indeed, empirical evidence clearly points out that ownership of Polish public companies remains in 
the hands of the largest shareholders580: ‘Voting control in listed companies shows a median 
concentration rate of 39.5%, with a sustainable trend visible over the last decade. Anglo-Saxon style 
companies, with dispersed ownership and control exercised by managers (“Berle-Means-
corporations”) do not exist in Poland’581. According to Morck and Steier582, in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, in particular the US and the UK, great companies are owned by millions of middle class 
shareholders, each owning a few hundred or a few thousand shares. Only a handful of institutional 
investors accumulate large stakes – 3 or even 5% of an occasional large firm’s stock.  
The most recent survey on ownership structure in Poland, the Federation of European Stock 
Exchanges survey583, was done in 2008. According to it, in 2007, foreign investors owned the largest 
number of shares in Polish companies (42% of the total number of listed shares), followed by 
private financial enterprises (26%), with the public sector (14%), individual investors (12%), and 
private non-financial companies and organisations (6%) holding the remainder (see Appendix 4, in 
which I summarise the main categories of share ownership in the UK in the years 1963-2010).  
Oplustil and Radwan584, in their Company Law in Poland (…), refer to the same survey 
conducted before 2006, according to which the ownership structure of Polish companies in 2005 
was similar to the structure in 2007, namely, foreign investors held 38% of the total amount of listed 
shares, the public sector – 20%, individual investors – 17%, private financial enterprises – 17% and 
private non-financial companies and organisations – 8%. The date of the publication, 2010, suggests 
that there had not been a significant change in the ownership structure in Poland since the early 
1990s. Importantly, the ownership of the public sector had increased from 14% to 20% between 
2005 and 2007. The State Treasury’s585 website clearly points out that, despite the progress of 
privatisation, the State Treasury remains a major shareholder in numerous companies, particularly 
                                                          
580 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8); see also Maria Aluchna, ‘Does Good Corporate Governance Matter? Best Practice in Poland’ (2009) 
32 (2) Management Research News 185. 
581 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 453.  
582 Morck & Steier (n 25).  
583 Federation of European Stock Exchanges, ‘Share Ownership Structure in Europe’ (December 2008) < 
www.webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:mGXByYUH1EoJ:www.fese.eu/en/%3Finc%3Dart%26id%3D8+&cd=1&hl=en
&ct=clnk&gl=pl /> accessed 28 March 2014. 
584 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 453-454. 
585 See www.msp.gov.pl/en - Ministry of Treasury (Republic of Poland).  
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those considered vital for national security or the economy, eg oil, gas, mining, but also some banks 
(see Appendix 5).  
Oplustil and Radwan586 note that, in 2005, controlling or majority shareholders tended to 
be either other companies active in the same industry (creating a corporate group), or the founders 
of a company together with their family members. Moreover, in line with Dzierżanowski and 
Tamowicz587, many joint-stock companies are family businesses controlled by their founders. This 
frequently leads to a combination of three roles for one person (or group of connected entities) – 
that of founder, shareholder and manager. Financial investors (most often banks, investment funds 
and pension funds) are the typically second and third biggest shareholders588.589 
Polish corporate practice suggests that the size of shareholding in a given company might 
actually be larger than the figure declared in the annual report. It has been revealed that some 
investors hold a larger number of shares in companies that are connected with them. A good 
example is the scandal involving PKN Orlen (the largest Polish company) in 2004. One of Orlen’s 
shareholders, Kulczyk Holding, might have owned 10% instead of 5.6% of notified shares in 
companies controlled by its owner Jan Kulczyk. However, resulting investigations failed to prove 
any wrongdoing on the part of Mr Kulczyk.590 One possible clue as to why Mr Kulczyk might have 
hidden the facts is provided by the Company Code voting restrictions. The Code of 2000 states that 
the statutes of a JSC may restrict the voting rights of shareholders holding over one-tenth of the 
aggregate number of votes in the company. The number of a shareholder’s votes is increased by 
                                                          
586 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 454. 
587 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8); see also Stroiński (n 11).  
588 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 454. 
589 In light of this, in 2006, two chambers combining Polish investment funds and pension funds adopted the Code of Best Practices of 
Institutional Investors, with the aim of promoting institutional investor activism. The Code is ‘based upon a concept of the institutional 
investor as an active and responsible minority shareholder who exercises shareholders’ rights (particularly voting rights) in matters 
significant for the company as well as in all corporate decisions relevant for the institutional investor’s clients’; Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 
454. Furthermore, institutional investors are supposed to play a monitoring role and pursue the observance of high corporate 
governance standards by the company. In particular, institutional investors should participate in any general meeting of companies in 
which, on their own behalf or on behalf of their clients, they administer a shareholding equal to or greater than 5% of votes (sec. 7.1). In 
cases where this threshold is not met, institutional investors should participate in a general meeting, if the issues debated during the 
session are of significant importance for the company, and the omission to execute the right to vote could increase the risk of a significant 
decrease in the value of the owned shareholding (sec. 8.1). Institutional investors should disclose their voting behaviour and policies for 
the purposes of transparency (sec 5.3). The text of the Code is available on: <www.izfa.pl/en/index.php?id=10024> accessed 13 April 
2014. 
590 PAP, ‘Jan Kulczyk świadkiem w sprawie PKN Orlen’ (WP.PL wiadomości, 10 August 2004) <www.wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Jan-
Kulczyk-swiadkiem-w-sprawie-PKN-Orlen,wid,5570794,wiadomosc.html> accessed 18 March 2014; PAP, ‘Kulczyk pozbywa się akcji 
Orlenu’ Wprost (29 October 2004) <www.wprost.pl/ar/69658/Kulczyk-pozbywa-sie-akcji-Orlenu/>  accessed 27 March 2014; Dariusz 
Jaworski, ‘Kim pan jest, panie Kulczyk – sylwetka najbogatszego Polaka’ Gazeta.pl Wiadomości (15 July 2011) 
<www.wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,2162394.html> accessed 17 April 2014; See also, for example, ‘BOMI: Przekroczenie 
progu 10% ogólnej liczby głosów w skutek udzielenia pełnomocnictwa’ (Bankier.pl, 7 April 2013) <www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/BOMI-
Przekroczenie-progu-10-ogolnej-liczby-glosow-w-wyniku-udzielonego-pelnomocnictwa-2882126.html> accessed 10 March 2014. 
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the number of votes that the shareholder has as a pledgee or usufructuary or under another legal 
title.591  
The ownership structure in Poland results in a number of problems, such as conflicts 
between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, private benefits of control at the 
expense of the minority (eg tunnelling of assets and profits to majority shareholders, payment of 
hidden dividends), and the inequality in the treatment of minority shareholders by company 
authorities592. There are also cases of abuse of shareholders rights by individual investors, especially 
challenging central resolutions of the shareholders’ meeting in order to intimidate the company or 
its majority shareholders, resulting in the adoption of legislation aimed at curbing abuse by small 
shareholders (eg Art. 423§1 and 2 of the Company Code of 2000)593. 
 
 
D. THE CONCENTRATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL 
1. Reasons for the high concentration of corporate control 
 
What are the motives for the high concentration of corporate control? According to La Porta et 
al.594, ownership concentration is ‘the investors reply to poor protection of shareholder rights’. 
Dzierżanowski and Tamowicz595 observe that there have been several cases of expropriation of 
minority shareholders in Poland – ranging from opportunistic manager behaviour, tunnelling and 
self-dealing by strategic investors, failures to provide the public with vital information about the 
company, insider trading and paying the minority shareholders significantly lower dividends than 
the ones paid for controlling shares. Both authors argue that investors’ awareness of protection 
and especially enforcement of minorities’ rights is rather poor in Poland. 
For Shleifer and Vishy596, poor enforcement of minority shareholder rights makes the 
concentration of ownership and control inevitable, as it addresses the problem of unaccountable 
managers. Dierżanowski and Tamowicz597 argue that ‘part of the process was caused by changes in 
privatisation strategies – combining flotation with a sale to the so-called strategic investor.’ Their 
consequences are explained as follows: 
 
                                                          
591 Art. 411§3CCC. See also the official translation of the Company Code of 2000; Ewa Kucharska (ed) Kodeks spółek handlowych. Code 
of commercial companies (4th edn, Wolters Kluwer Polska 2011). 
592 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). 
593 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 455. 
594 La Porta et al. (n 22).  
595 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). 
596 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’ (1986) 94 Journal of Political Economy 461. 
597 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). 
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‘Poor enforcement allowed strategic investors and other (…) [shareholders] to extract private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Additionally, very often the prices offered 
to minorities by strategic investors were very unfair. The liquidity of these companies was 
also affected. On the other hand, new family companies entering the market were not able 
to attract new institutional investors – partly because of their size (low liquidity) and partly 
because of their unwillingness to transfer control to the market, and poor management. (…) 
[T]he State Treasury’s willingness to cash and capture premiums for control engendered the 
preference to sell large stakes to strategic investors, rather than to disperse the ownership 
on the market (through IPO [indirect privatization; the procedures of privatisation in Poland 
are explained in chapter VI]).’598 
 
The weak shareholder protection argument might have been somewhat justified by the 
difference in the number of shares owned by domestic and foreign investors in the first decade 
after the economic turnabout in Poland in 1989599. On average the largest number of shares owned 
by foreign strategic investors was much higher (67%) than those owned by domestic companies or 
individuals (43.5% and 40.6% respectively)600. As Dzierżanowski and Tamowicz601 point out, 
foreigners with limited knowledge and access to courts and judges preferred to acquire a bigger 
number of shares to execute their rights than domestic investors usually more familiar with the 
local legal system. 
One reason for the concentration trend is partially the opportunism of Polish managers. 
There were many examples of empire building and high executive remuneration contracts in the 
early 1990s. Over the next few years, many of them were changed into ‘over-diversified 
conglomerates’602. Then, all of these companies were heavily restructured (this included firing ‘old’ 
managers603) as a result of pressure from foreign strategic or institutional investors.604  
 Two factors allowed for managerial opportunism to develop in the early 1990s. The first 
cause was privatisation strategies employed by the state combined with the unfledged capital 
market (a shortage of domestic institutional shareholders). Many state enterprises were privatised 
through indirect privatisation (occasionally with significant assets left in the State Treasury’s hands), 
                                                          
598 ibid. 
599 ibid. 
600 ibid. 
601 ibid.  
602 ibid. 
603 Many of them were directors of these enterprises before privatisation. 
604 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). 
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during which directors and employees obtained a privileged position due to political reasons605. 
Many enterprises, which later offered their shares to the public, were privatised through 
management and employee buy-outs. This is one reason why the position of company directors 
became very strong. The second cause was weak competition in the market606, as:  
 
‘[d]omestic rivalry was non-existent and inflow of FDI quite thin due to an unstable and 
discouraging economic environment. (…) [This] competition was thus unable to force 
corporations to [make] market adjustments in a short time, especially if they inherited a 
monopolistic position. This situation created room for managers of public, formerly state-
owned corporations (which constituted the largest fraction of public corporations) to engage 
in ineffective expansion projects.’607 
 
 
2. Reasons for the high concentration of corporate control maintenance 
 
In addition to privatisation misuses and managerial opportunism, Polish corporate law provides the 
following legal devices to leverage control over cash flow assets:  
a) preferred shares (a share may carry more than one vote; forbidden in public companies)608; 
b) voting cap (supermajorities and high quorum requirements for voting at a shareholders’ 
meeting)609; and 
c) non-voting shares610 (introduced since 2001).611 
 
Control can also be leveraged through hierarchical structures (pyramids), cross shareholdings, 
acquisitions through subsidiaries and dependent entities. The following devices might be employed 
to defend against hostile take-overs, except for the above: 
a) authorised capital (introduced since the beginning of 2001)612; and 
                                                          
605 ibid; Piotr Kozarzewski, ‘Corporate Governance and Secondary Privatisation in Poland: Legal Framework and Changes in Ownership 
Structure’ (Centre for Social and Economic Research, Studies & Analyses CASE No. 263, Warsaw 2003) <www.case-
research.eu/en/node/56038> accessed 16 April 2014. 
606 At the beginning of the 1990s many product markets, although formally liberalised, were still protected by monopolies and (declining) 
tariffs; see Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8).  
607 ibid, Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz. 
608 See Art. 242, 351 and 352CCC. 
609 See, for example, Art. 415§3CCC. 
610 Art. 353CCC. 
611 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). 
612 Art. 444CCC. 
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b) own share purchase (only up to 20% of shares)613.614 
 
Empirical research615 proves that in particular, preferred shares with multiple voting rights 
are the most common device to leverage control over cash flow rights. Out of 220 surveyed 
companies, 79 issued preferred shares, mainly smaller companies founded by individuals or 
companies privatised through management and employee buy-outs. In the majority of cases (81%) 
five votes were attached to one share, which was the maximum number of votes that is allowed to 
be attached to one share.616  
‘Pyramids’ seem to be much less popular than preferred shares617. A good example of such 
hierarchical structure could be Ryszard Krauze who controlled (through Prokom Investment 
(private) and Prokom Software (public)) a large range of other companies, including: Wirtualna 
Polska (Wirtual Poland – the largest portal) and Softbank (a public corporation providing 
sophisticated software for banks). The Company Code of 2000 lowered the number of votes per 
share from five to two, additionally forbidding issues of preferred shares by public companies618. 
This amendment might force shareholders to shift to pyramids and search for new control 
devices.619 
One method of fuelling control is own-share purchase executed by subsidiaries620. It was 
implemented in 20 companies out of 210 surveyed. In eight corporations the block owned by a 
subsidiary was the largest one with an average size of 22%; in five cases, it was the second largest 
(regular size 13%). The leverage action undertaken through subsidiaries could be additionally 
supported through the purchase of own shares by the corporation in question.621 Since January 
2001 any company is allowed purchase up to 20% of its own shares in order to prevent substantial 
damage directly threatening the company622.  
 In some company statues, a voting cap has been utilised as a device enhancing control, and 
a handy solution to defend against a take-over threat623. For example, Agora (media group) forbade 
individual shareholders to execute more than 20% of votes (except holders of preferred shares), 
                                                          
613 Art. 362-365CCC. 
614 Dierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). 
615 ibid. 
616 ibid. 
617 ibid. 
618 Art. 351§2CCC. 
619 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). 
620 ibid. 
621 ibid. 
622 Art. 362§2 (2) CCC 
623 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). 
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unless they have at least 75% as a result of a mandatory bid for all outstanding shares624.  
At the beginning of 2001, authorised capital was introduced by way of a new company law. 
It provides for the management board (upon the decision of the shareholders’ meeting) to issue – 
within three years – new shares of a total value not exceeding three-fourth of existing share 
capital625. This measure was included with the Company Code of 2000 ‘to improve company ability 
to tap the market at the right time’. Nevertheless, it may also be used as an anti-take-over device, 
specifically if the management permission allows the issue of shares without preventive rights.626 
 
 
E. THE INSIDE STRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
 
Another factor that definitely has a negative influence on the ownership structure in Poland is the 
allocation of power in corporate governance. While it is a good practice to keep a certain balance 
of power between corporate organs, the Company Code of 2000 significantly extends the 
competencies of the supervisory board over the management board. 
 
 
1. The management board 
 
The management board of JSCs in Poland shall be composed of one or more members, who are 
appointed and removed by the supervisory board unless the statutes provide otherwise627. Above 
all, the statutes may grant the shareholders’ meeting (called the general meeting in a JSC) the 
power to appoint or suspend members of the management board628. Furthermore, the right to 
appoint an indicated number of executive directors may be given to a specific shareholder as a 
personal right629 or even to a third party630. Members of the management board may be appointed 
from among the shareholders or other persons631. 
                                                          
624 Agora, ‘Statut Agory Spółki Akcyjnej’ <www.agora.pl/agora/1,110747,10427459,Statut_Agory_Spolki_Akcyjnej.html#TRNavSST> 
accessed 25 July 2014. 
625 Art. 444CCC. 
626 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). 
627 Art. 368§2 and 4 CCC (for a JSC), and Art. 201§2CCC (for an LLC). 
628 Art. 368§4CCC. In an LLC, members of the management board shall be appointed and removed by a shareholders’ resolution – unless 
the articles of association provide otherwise. 
629 Art. 354§1CCC. 
630 See, for example, Andrzej Kidyba, Kodeks Spółek Handlowych. Komentarz, vol 2 (7th edn, Wolters Kluwer Polska 2010) 292. With 
respect to an LLC – see Andrzej Kidyba, Kodeks Spółek Handlowych. Komentarz, vol 1 (7th edn, Wolters Kluwer Polska 2010) 841. 
631 Art. 368§3CCC; for an LLC – Art. 201§3CCC. 
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A member of the management board shall not hold his office for more than five years. 
Reappointment as a member of the management board (in a JSC) is permitted for terms of office 
not exceeding five years.632 A partial replacement of board members may be provided for in the 
company’s statutes633. In any case and regardless of the manner of appointment, the members of 
the management board may be removed or suspended directly by the general shareholders’ 
meeting634. Thus, the shareholders ultimately decide the personal composition of the management 
board. Due to the fact that any member may in principle be removed at any time and without cause, 
the position of members of the management board remains weak vis-à-vis the shareholders635. 
However, this may be strengthened by shareholders in the statutes by limiting the possibility of 
their removal to important reasons636. JSCs commonly implement these provisions637. 
The management board is responsible for the managing company’s affairs and representing 
the company outside638. Where the management board is composed of more than one person, all 
of its members have the right and duty to jointly conduct the company’s affairs unless the statutes 
provide otherwise639. This means that all company matters are decided by the entire board by way 
of a resolution (by an absolute majority of votes unless the statutes provide otherwise)640. 
Exceptions to the collegiality principle are allowed, but only in the statutes of the company and not 
in the internal rules of the board. The statutes may provide for an inside division of directors’ duties 
and responsibilities in relation to different fields of the company’s activity that may be based either 
on functional or geographical criteria.641 The right of a member of the management board to 
represent the company shall cover all court and out-of-court actions undertaken by the company642. 
                                                          
632 Art. 369§1CCC. The reappointment of a given member of the management board shall be made no earlier than one year prior to the 
expiration of his current term of office; Art 369§1. With respect to an LLC – see Kidyba, vol 1 (n 630) 850; a member of the management 
board in an LLC can be even appointed for an unlimited period of time.  
633 Art. 369§1CCC (for a JSC). 
634 Art. 368§4CCC; for an LLC – Art. 203§1. 
635 Art. 370§1CCC. This shall not deprive the dismissed member of the right to raise claims related to his or her employment or any other 
legal relationship concerning the performance of the function of a management board; Art. 370§1. For an LLC – Art. 203§1CCC.  
636 Art. 370§2CCC (for a JSC) and 203§2CCC (for an LLC). 
637 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 474. 
638 Art. 368§1CCC (for a JSC) and 201§1CCC (for an LLC).  
639 Art. 371§1CCC. 
640 Art. 371§2CCC. With respect to an LLC, where the management board is composed of more than one member and the articles of 
association do not provide otherwise, each member of the management board shall have the right and duty to conduct the company's 
affairs; §1 and 2 of Art. 208CCC. Each member of the management board may, without a prior resolution of the management board, 
conduct the company's affairs within the ordinary course of the company's business; §3 of Art. 208. If, before handling any matter 
referred to in §3 (above), any other member of the management board objects to the handling thereof or if such matter is beyond the 
ordinary course of the company's business, a prior resolution of the management board shall be required; §4 of Art. 208. Resolutions of 
the management board shall be adopted by an absolute majority of votes; §5 of Art. 208. 
641 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 474. 
642 Art. 372§1CCC. The right of a member of the management board to represent the company may not be restricted by a legal effect 
with respect to third parties; §2 of Art. 372. For an LLC – Art. 204§1 and 2CCCC. 
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Where the management board is composed of more than one member, the manner in which the 
company is represented shall be set forth in the statutes. Where the statutes do not contain any 
provisions in the above respect, the joint action of two members of the management board or one 
member and a holder of a commercial power, shall be required to make statements on behalf of 
the company.643  
The management board remains independent of other governing bodies in the company, 
and members of the management board are bound to act in the best interest of the company. A 
controversy concerning the degree of directors’ autonomy arose on the ground of regulation of Art. 
375 of the Company Code of 2000, which provides that members of the management board shall 
be subject to the restrictions set forth in the law, the statutes, the by-laws of the management 
board and resolutions of the supervisory board and the general meeting. For that reason, a new 
Art. 375¹ was implemented in 2003. It clearly states that the general meeting (shareholders’ 
meeting in LLCs) and the supervisory board may not give binding instructions to the management 
board concerning the management of the company’s affairs644. Yet, it needs to be underscored, 
that the corporate practice of many Polish JSCs (including listed companies) departs from this 
statutory pattern. Due to the common concentrated ownership structure for companies in Poland, 
company directors are in reality strongly contingent on the majority shareholder (usually another 
legal entity, mostly controlling company or a ‘head’ of a corporate group). Eventually the directors 
might only be responsible for implementing a strategy defined at the parent company level (see 
chapter VI, in which my research participants confirm the state of affairs).645 This actual reliance is 
strengthened by the liberal rules on directors’ removal646 mentioned above.  
 
 
2. Directors’ duties 
 
The Company Code of 2000 provides that corporate officers (members of management board, 
supervisory board, auditors’ committee and liquidators) shall be liable towards the company for 
any damage inflicted through an action or omission contrary to the law or the provisions of the 
statutes (or the articles of association – with respect to an LLC) unless they are not at fault. They 
                                                          
643 Art. 373§1CCC. Statements towards the company and delivery of letters to the company may be made towards one member of the 
management board or holder of a commercial power of attorney; §2 of Art. 373. The provisions of §§1 and 2 (above) shall not exclude 
the establishment of individual or joint commercial representation and shall not restrict the rights of holders of a commercial power of 
attorney resulting from the provisions on commercial representation; §3 of Art. 373. For an LLC – Art. 205§1, 2 and 3CCC. 
644 Art. 219§2CCC provides that in an LLC the supervisory board shall not have the right to issue any binding instructions to the 
management board in respect of managing the company’s affairs.   
645 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 474. 
646 Art. 370§1CCC. 
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shall also, while performing their duties, act with due care resulting from professional integrity.647 
The provision recaps the normative contents of Art. 355§2 of the Civil Code of 1964, setting a higher 
standard against which the behaviour of a company’s director is measured648. Therefore, directors 
are expected to possess knowledge and experience, and also care about the company’s affairs as 
determined by the size and profile of the company649. For example, a relatively higher degree of 
knowledge, cautiousness and good judgment is required from directors of a large bank or insurance 
company than members of the management board of an ordinary business company. Even mere 
approval of the appointment by a person lacking qualifications required to properly execute the 
responsibilities of the director might be viewed as a violation of the standard of care by the 
acceptor.650 As the case law provides, the observance of the standard of care involves ‘the 
anticipation of the results of planned actions, the fulfilment of all current and legal measures in 
order to properly fulfil managerial duties as well as the preservation of forethought, diligence and 
prudence needed to achieve objectives that are in line with the interest of the company.’651 
Polish corporate law is silent on the duty of loyalty of corporate officers. Yet, the existence 
of this duty is commonly recognised by jurisprudence and the legal doctrine. This general rule with 
regard to directors of listed companies was clearly articulated in the Codes of Best Practices of 2002 
and 2005652:  
 
‘A management board member should display full loyalty towards the company and avoid 
actions which could lead to implementing exclusively their own material interest. If a 
management board member receives information on the possibility of making an investment 
or another advantageous transaction concerning the objects of the company, she or he 
should present such information immediately to the management board for the purpose of 
considering the possibility of the company taking advantage of it. Such information may be 
used by a management board member or be passed over to a third party only upon consent 
of the management board and only when this does not infringe the company’s interest.’653 
 
 
                                                          
647 Art. 483CCC (for a JSC) and 293CCC (for an LLC).  
648 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 481. 
649 For details, see Józef Okolski, Jerzy Modrzejewski and Łukasz Gasiński, ‘Odpowiedzialność członków zarządu w spółkach kapitałowych 
– miernik staranności’ in Prawo Prywatne Czasu Przemian. Księga Pamiątkowa Dedykowana Profesorowi Stanisławowi Sołtysińskiemu 
(Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu 2005) 496. 
650 ibid 501; Tadeusz Dziurzyński in Tadeusz Dziurzyński, Zygmunt Fenichel and Mieczysław Honzatko, Kodeks Handlowy. Komentarz 
(Grand Gamma 1995) 322. 
651 Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Katowice of 5 November 1998, I Aca 322/98. See also judgment of Supreme Court of 17 August 
1998, III CRN 77/93. 
652 Rule No. 35. 
653 Excerpt from the official translation by the Warsaw Stock Exchange. 
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Unfortunately, the Code of Best Practices of 2007 repealed this rule, reflecting the famous 
corporate opportunity doctrine from the Anglo-Saxon and German jurisprudence.  
In the line with another provision of the Code of 2005, ‘in transactions with shareholders 
and other persons whose interests have [an] impact on the interest of the company, the 
management board should act with utmost care to ensure that the transactions are at arms’ 
length.’654 
The duty of loyalty may be considered an integral constituent of the fiduciary relationship 
between the company and its officers655. The duty of loyalty is strongly connected with the business 
discretion given to them. The existence of such a duty may be inferred from a number of the 
Company Code of 2000 provisions, eg directors are subject to comprehensive statutory non-
competition obligation.656 They shall not engage in competitive entities as a partner in a partnership 
or a civil partnership, or a member of the authorities of a company, or participate in any competitive 
legal entity as a member of its authorities. The above prohibition shall also apply to participation in 
a competitive company if a member of the management board holds at least 10% of shares in such 
a company or has the right to appoint at least one member of the management board of such a 
company.657  
Unless the statutes provide otherwise, consent shall be granted by the authority that has 
the power to appoint the management board658. In the event of a conflict of interests between the 
company and a member of the management board, the member’s spouse, relatives by blood and 
second degree affinity and persons with whom he or she has a personal relationship, the member 
of the management board shall refrain from participating in the settlement of such disputes and 
may request that such fact be recorded in the minutes659. In relation to members of the supervisory 
board, a similar regulation is provided for in soft law, which is the Code of Best Practices of 2010: 
 
‘A member of the Supervisory Board should notify any conflicts of interest which have arisen 
or may arise to the Supervisory Board and should refrain from taking part in the discussion 
and from voting on the adoption of a resolution on the issue which gives rise to such a conflict 
of interest.’660  
 
                                                          
654 Rule No. 34. 
655 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 482. 
656 ibid. 
657 Art. 380§1CCC (for a JSC) and 211§1CCC (for an LLC). 
658 Art. 380§2CCC (for a JSC) and 211§2CCC (for an LLC).  
659 Art. 377CCC (for a JSC) and 209CCC (for an LLC).  
660 Part III, No. 4. 
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In addition, the Company Code of 2000 provides for special treatment for loans, credit, a 
surety agreement or a similar agreement concluded by the company with or for the benefit of, 
among others, a member of the management board and supervisory board661. Execution of such an 
agreement requires the consent of the shareholders’ meeting. Where execution of this agreement 
involves a dependent company and a member of the management board of the dominant company, 
the shareholders’ meeting of the dominant company is required to give consent662. 
 Corporate law in Poland does not codify the business judgement rule663. This rule, as 
developed by US courts, is an assumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
company acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interests of the company664. 
In the absence of legal framework, it cannot be assumed that the director, while conducting 
the company’s affairs, met appropriate standards of due care and diligence. In contrast, each time 
a suit against the director (a supervisor) is filed, the burden of evidence in the legal proceedings lies 
with the defendant – the incriminated director or (the supervisor).665  
In compliance with a ruling passed down by the Polish Supreme Court, a reference to an 
economic risk cannot excuse the manager, when the damage inflicted upon the company was the 
result of careless management666. On the other hand, Polish legal doctrine and courts admit that 
there is a significant degree of managerial discretion, including the power to accept a certain level 
of risk integral to a given business activity, provided that they observe proper standards of care and 
loyalty towards the company667. This view was reflected in the following rule of the Best Practices 
Code of 2002 and 2005:  
 
‘While making decisions on corporate issues, members of the management board should act 
within the limits of justified economic risk, i.e. after consideration of all information, analyses 
and opinions, which, in the reasonable opinion of the management board, should be taken 
into account in a given case in view of the company’s interest.’668 
                                                          
661 Art. 15§1CCC (common for both an LLC and a JSC). 
662 Art. 15§2CCC (common for both an LLC and a JSC). 
663 cf German Aktiengesetz [German Stock Corporation Act] (sec. 93(1)), introduced with the UMAG-reform of 2005 (available on 
<www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/59658/german-stock-corporation-act-2010> accessed 18 January 2014. 
Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 483. 
664 See, for example, Aronson v Lewis, 473A.2d, 805 (at 812) (Del. 1984). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics 
(Foundation Press 2002) 269. 
665 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 483. 
666 Judgment of 9 May 2000, IV CKN 117/00. 
667 Judgment of Supreme Court of 26 January 2000, I PKN 482/99; Okolski et al. (n 624) 503; Józef Okolski and Dominika Wajda, 
‘Odpowiedzialność członków zarządu spółek kapitałowych’ (2007) 2 Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 12. 
668 Rule No. 33. 
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Unfortunately, this provision has not been transferred to the new Code of Best Practices of 2010 (it 
was repealed by the Code of 2005).  
 
 
3. The shareholders’ meeting 
 
Directors are understandably responsible for their conduct before shareholders of the company.  
The situation of shareholders in companies in Poland under the Company Code of 2000 
echoes the old-style continental approach to the shareholder’s meeting, giving them the power to 
decide a long list of issues. They concern substantial corporate actions and ‘organic’ changes in the 
structure of the company – changes to the company’s statutes, mergers, divisions, transformation 
into another legal form of company or partnership and voluntary termination. Furthermore, the 
shareholders’ meeting also approves minority squeeze-out from a non-listed company669, exclusion 
of shareholders’ pre-emptive rights670 and delisting671. The ordinary shareholders’ meeting is 
authorised, among other things, to approve the annual report of the management board and to 
dispose of the financial resources of the company, ie the report into the distribution of profit or 
coverage the losses672. Any instructions by the management board or supervisory board regarding 
profit dissemination are not binding on the shareholders.673 
Additional statutory powers of the shareholder’s meeting are listed in Art. 393, the wording 
of which reads as follows:  
 
‘Apart from other matters specified in this Section or in the statutes, a resolution of the 
general meeting shall be required for:  
1) examination and approval of the management board report on the company’s 
operations, financial statements for the previous financial year and acknowledgment of 
the fulfilment of duties by members of the company’s authorities; 
2) decisions concerning claims for redressing damage inflicted upon formation of the 
company or exercising management or supervision; 
                                                          
669 Art. 418CCC; qualified majority of 95% required. In an LLC, at the request of all other shareholders, the court may, due to important 
reasons concerning a given shareholder, decide to exclude that shareholder from the company; see Art. 266CCC. 
670 Art. 431§1CCC and 432§2CCC; qualified majority of 80% required. Art. 246§1CCC – for an LLC; a majority of two-thirds of the votes. 
See also Art. 257CCC. 
671 Art. 91 (4) of the Act of 29 July 2005 on Act on Public Offering, Conditions Governing the Introduction of Financial Instruments to 
Organised Trading, and Public Companies; qualified majority of 80% required.  
672 Art. 395§2CCC (for a JSC) and Art. 231§2CCC (for an LLC). 
673 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 475. 
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3) disposal or lease of the business enterprise or an organised part thereof, or 
establishment of a property right thereon;  
4) acquisition and disposal of real property, perpetual usufruct, or of an interest therein 
unless the statutes provide otherwise; 
5) issue of convertible bonds or senior bonds with priority of conversion into shares and 
issue of the subscription warrants referred to in Article 453§2;  
6) acquisition of own shares in the circumstances set forth in Article 362§1 (2) and 
authorisation to acquire the same under the circumstances set forth in Article 362§1;  
7) execution of the agreement referred to in Article 7.’ 
 
 
The attention of the corporate lawyer should also be drawn to the provisions empowering 
shareholders with respect to decisions about the business enterprise meaning the entirety of 
organized corporate assets or their part (Art. 393 (3))674. The Polish Supreme Court has interpreted 
it narrowly, excluding share deals (meaning disposal of shares of a subsidiary through which 
business activity was effectively conducted) outside its scope of application675.  
As I have suggested above, a company’s statutes may embrace other items in the list of 
matters requiring shareholders’ approval so as to allow shareholders to adopt a set of tailor-made 
provisions fitting the needs of a particular company and to further reduce managerial discretion. 
However, if the management board violates an internal restriction regulated by the provisions, the 
transaction remains valid towards third parties. The infringement on the provisions by the board 
entails civil liability of board members to the company676. 
 
 
4. The supervisory board 
 
The body through which shareholders control the activity of directors is the supervisory board. 
The supervisory board is a mandatory body for all JSCs and optional for LLCs. In LLCs whose 
share capital exceeds PLN 500,000 and which have more than twenty-five shareholders, the 
supervisory board or auditors’ committee shall be established (otherwise companies may also 
establish the auditors’ committee)677. The board shall be composed of at least three members, and 
                                                          
674 This resolution shall be adopted by a qualified majority of three-fourths of votes; Art. 415§1CCC. Art. 246§1CCC for an LLC. 
675 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 23 October 2003 (V CK 411/02, OSNC 2004/12 item 197) – the ruling came out with respect to a 
limited liability company, but may be equally applied to a joint-stock company, where the powers of general meeting as laid down in the 
Company Code of 2000 are nearly identical to those conferred upon the shareholders of a limited company. 
676 Art. 17§3CCC (applied to both types of companies). 
677 Art. 213§1 and 2 CCC. 
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in listed companies, of at least five members to be appointed and removed by the shareholders’ 
meeting678. The company’s statutes may provide for a different manner for appointing and 
removing members of the supervisory board679. The right to appoint or remove a specified number 
of the members of the supervisory board may be conferred upon an individual shareholder680, upon 
a holder of a specified class of registered shares (preference shares681) or even upon a third party. 
The statutory right of employees (and suppliers) to select a specified number of supervisory board 
members (workers’ codetermination) is laid down in Polish law to a limited extent. This right exists 
only in relation to companies subject to indirect privatisation682 and allows the workers to elect 
two-fifths of the supervisory board members directly (I develop this issue in chapter VI – ‘Employees 
and Bank Representatives on Supervisory Boards in Poland’). 
As Polish corporate law, as a rule, does not provide for employees’ participation, minority 
shareholders’ interests in the supervisory board can be accommodated. The Company Code of 2000 
provides minority shareholders with a right to appoint their representatives to the board by way of 
the ‘group vote’683. With regard to its function, the ‘group vote’ bears a resemblance to what is 
known as ‘cumulative voting’ provided for in jurisdictions of some US states684. At the request of 
shareholders representing at least one-fifth685 of share capital, members of the supervisory board 
shall be elected at the next shareholders’ meeting by a vote in separate groups, even if the statutes 
of the company provide otherwise686. However, holding one-fifth of the share capital might prove 
unsatisfactory to effectuate the appointment of a given shareholder’s representative in the 
board687. The amount of shares allowing for this kind of electing group are determined by dividing 
the total number of shares represented at a given shareholders’ meeting by the total number of 
supervisory board members688 of that company689. Shareholders electing their representatives by 
                                                          
678 Art. 385§1CCC (for a JSC) and 215§1CCC (for an LLC). The auditors' committee in an LLC shall be composed of at least three members 
appointed and removed according to the same principles as members of the supervisory board; Art. 217CCC. 
679 Art. 385§2CCC (for a JSC) and 215§2CCC (for an LLC). For further explanation see, for example, Kidyba, vol 1 (n 630) 931-933 and vol 
2, 436-438; or Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 477. 
680 Art. 354§1CCC (for a JSC) and Art. 215§2CCC (for a LLC).  
681 Art. 351CCC. See Art 174§1 – with respect to an LLC. 
682 See Art. 12–16 of the Act of 30 August 1996 on the Privatisation Act. 
683 Art. 385§3-9CCC (applied to JSCs exclusively). 
684 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 477. 
685 The fraction of share capital which is necessary to trigger the whole procedure (20%) is high in comparison to fractions required by 
law with regard to other minority rights (5% or 10%, see, for example, Art. 223, 400, 401CCC). 
686 Art. 385§3CCC. However, where a person appointed by persons (eg employees of the company) or an entity specified in a separate 
Act sits on the supervisory board, only the remaining members thereof shall be subject to election (Art. 385§4CCC). 
687 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 478.  
688 Where the company’s statutes determine only the minimum or the minimum and maximum number of board members, the 
shareholders’ meeting should first adopt a resolution determining the precise amount of board members to be elected; ibid.  
689 For example if the total number of board members under the statutes is three persons, the minimum threshold enabling the group 
to elect a board member amounts to 33%. In a board composed of four members, the threshold is 25%, where the aforementioned 
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means of a group vote are automatically excluded from the election process outside that group690. 
Thus, the minimum amount of shares required to form an election group is dependent on two 
variables: the amount of shares represented at a given shareholders’ meeting, and the total number 
of board members. The higher the number of supervisors, the fewer shares are needed to form a 
voting group. The number of groups does not need to match the number of board members to be 
elected; only one group need be formed691. Vacancies on the board not filled by an electing group 
shall be filled by way of voting with the participation of all shareholders who did not cast their votes 
in a separate group692. Upon the election of at least one supervisory board member by group vote, 
the mandates of all existing members of the supervisory board expire before the end of their terms 
of office693. Moreover, the Company Code of 2000 gives each electing group an additional right to 
delegate one of the board members elected by that group to individually and permanently perform 
supervisory tasks694. Members so delegated have the right to attend meetings of the management 
board and provide advice thereat. Opalski695 argues that the presence of minority shareholders in 
the supervisory board may have a destructive impact on the corporate governance of the company, 
jeopardising the internal consistency of the board and initiating conflicts amongst its members. The 
minority is also ‘capable of disrupting the operational capacity of management and discouraging 
executive directors from discussing openly company’s affairs’696.  
 The supervisory board is mainly responsible for exercising permanent supervision over the 
company’s affairs in all aspects of its business697. In reality, the supervisory board acts periodically 
through meetings, which are convened when the need arises, but not less than three times in a 
financial year. Special duties of the supervisory board include evaluation of management board 
annual reports (reports on the company’s operation and financial statements for the previous 
financial year) to assess compliance with the financial data, documents and the facts. Supervisory 
boards should also give an opinion on management board motions concerning distribution of 
profits or coverage of losses.698 In order to perform its duties, the supervisory board may inspect all 
                                                          
percentages refer not to the whole share capital but to the share capital present or represented at the shareholders’ meeting. For details, 
see Józef Frąckowiak in Kazimierz Kruczalak (ed), Kodeks Spółek Handlowych. Komentarz (LexisNexis 2001) 626. 
690 Art. 385§5CCC.  
691 Art. 385§7CCC. 
692 Art. 385§6CCC. 
693 Art. 385§8CCC. 
694 Art. 390§2CCC. 
695 Adam Opalski, Rada Nadzorcza w Spółce Akcyjnej (C.H. Beck 2006) 91. 
696 ibid.  
697 Art. 382§1CCC (for a JSC) and 219§1CCC (for an LLC).  
698 Art. 382§3CCC, and 389§3CCC (for a JSC), and Art. 219§3CCC (for an LLC). The duties of the auditors’ committee shall include 
evaluation of management board annual reports (financial reports and reports on the operations of the company) and of motions of the 
management board concerning distribution of profit or coverage of losses. Furthermore, the duties of the auditors’ committee shall 
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company documents, request reports and explanations from the management board and 
employees as well as review assets and liabilities of the company699. In principle, the supervisory 
board shall perform its duties collectively; it may nevertheless delegate its members to 
independently perform specific supervisory tasks700. The statutes may extend the powers of the 
supervisory board, and, in particular, provide for the obligation of the management board to obtain 
the consent of the supervisory board prior to undertaking the actions specified in the statutes701. 
Where the supervisory board refuses its consent to a specific corporate action, the management 
board may request the shareholders’ meeting to adopt a resolution permitting the performance of 
such action702. The supervisory board itself is not entitled to determine a list of corporate actions 
that should require its prior consent. However, the Code of Best Practices of 2010 obliges the 
management board to request prior approval of significant corporate transactions (agreements) 
pursued with a related entity from the supervisory board703.  
 According to the Company Code of 2000704, the powers of the supervisory board shall also 
include the right to suspend all or individual members of the management board for important 
reasons (eg a lack of co-operation with the other directors, inappropriate co-operation with 
members of the supervisory board, hiding documents, etc705) and to delegate members of the 
supervisory board, for a period of no longer than three months, to temporarily perform the duties 
of members of the management board who have resigned, been removed, or who, for other 
reasons, are incapable of performing their duties. 
 
 
5. The independence of supervisors 
 
Another vital issue concerning the supervisory board is the independence of supervisors. This can 
undeniably be considered one of reasons for the high consolidation of share ownership in Polish 
companies.  
The Company Code of 2000 does not impose an obligation of appointing independent 
members of the supervisory board. It does not state that explicitly, but it is silent about the 
                                                          
include submitting to the shareholders’ meeting annual reports in writing presenting the outcome of the above evaluation in a manner 
and scope as set forth for such acts when performed by the supervisory board; Art. 221§1CCC. 
699 Art. 382§4CCC (for a JSC) and 219§1CCC (for an LLC). 
700 Art. 390§1CCC. 
701 Art. 384§1CCC (for a JSC) and 220CCC (for an LLC). 
702 Art. 384§2CCC. 
703 Part II, point 3. 
704 Art. 383§1CCC (for a JSC) and 220CCC (for an LLC). 
705 See, for example, Kidyba (n 630) 423. 
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obligation of appointing independent board members. However, the Code provides that a 
supervisor shall not at the same time perform a function of a member of the management board, 
holder of a commercial power of attorney, liquidator, head of a branch or a plant, chief accountant, 
attorney-at-law or advocate employed at the company. This provision applies to the audit 
committee, when it is appointed in an LLC.706 The legal rule does not, however, guarantee that 
members of the supervisory board will remain objective towards the company’s interests. They 
might have strong business or personal ties with the company, eg a significant shareholder in the 
company, some family connections with members of the management board, or long term 
employment in the company. In consequence, the notion of exclusion, rather than independence, 
comes into play here. 
The issue of independence of supervisory board members in Poland has been regulated by 
a soft-law instrument, the Code of Best Practices, since 2002. Best Practices of 2002 required at 
least half of supervisory board members to be independent members707. Nonetheless, this 
overarching rule was not in agreement with the dominance of consolidated ownership where 
controlling shareholders influence the company’s affairs via the supervisory board708. Therefore, an 
overwhelming majority of Polish companies declared non-compliance with that rule. As a 
consequence, an attempt to implement the Anglo-Saxon concept of independent directors in 
Poland was a partial failure.709 Thus, the revised version of the Code of 2005 provided for a more 
flexible rule, according to which in companies where the majority shareholder holds more than 50% 
of the total votes, the supervisory board shall consist of at least two independent members710. 
Moreover, both versions of the code gave independent members special veto rights in relation to 
some resolutions of the supervisory board (eg resolutions approving related party transactions). As 
a matter of fact, this change had only a limited impact on the recognition of the rule by the 
companies. The current Code of Best Practices requires the participation of at least two 
independent members in the supervisory board regardless of the ownership structure of a 
company711.  
As to the independence criteria, Best Practices clearly refer to Annex II of the Commission 
Recommendation of 15 February 2005 on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of 
listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board. Over and above the criteria 
regulated by Annex II, the Code of Best Practices of 2007 introduced two additional requirements. 
A person who is an employee of the company or an associated company cannot be deemed to meet 
                                                          
706 Art. 214§1CCC (for a JSC) and 387§1CCC (for an LLC). 
707 Detailed criteria of what constitutes independence were to be laid down in company’s articles/statutes; Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 490. 
708 Oplustil & Radwan, ibid. 
709 ibid. 
710 Point 20. 
711 Part III, point 6. 
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the independence criteria described in the Annex. In addition, an actual and significant relationship 
with any shareholder who has the right to exercise at least 5% of all votes shall be seen as precluding 
the independence of that member.712 
In contrast to their predecessors, neither Code grants independent board members a veto 
right with respect to specific activities. This questions the significance of the independence rule 
within the supervisory board. Having the same capabilities might make independent supervisors in 
Polish companies a lot less powerful in relation to the controlling shareholders. This might also 
deprive them of the opportunity to secure the company’s interests.713   
Another issue that should be taken into consideration is the ‘comply and explain’ character 
of the independence principle. Including that in the Company Code of 2000 might facilitate the 
functioning of corporate governance in all companies, not just those that decide to appoint 
independent supervisory board members. On the other hand, a more statutory regime doubtlessly 
leads to a ‘box-ticking’ approach that fails to allow for sound deviations from the rule and does not 
foster investors’ trust714.  
 
 
6. Other board issues 
 
In chapter IV – ‘Corporate Governance in the United States and the United Kingdom’ – ‘Chief 
Executive Officer Vs. Chairman’, I mentioned that there is a weak flow of information and weak co-
operation between directors (and officers – in case of American companies) in Anglo-Saxon 
companies. Similar problems exist within the Polish model of corporate governance with respect to 
the relationships between the management board and the supervisory board. As Oplustil and 
Radwan715 declare, the problems and limitations of the Polish two-tier governance system are 
similar to general findings and assessments made with respect to this model in other legal orders. 
For both authors, the list of limitations include: 
• information asymmetry to the disadvantage of the supervisory board and weak 
information flow between the management board and the supervisory board; 
• insufficient commitment on the part of the supervisory board members with respect 
to performing their supervisory duties, as well as inadequate knowledge and 
experience needed to assure effective monitoring; and 
                                                          
712 ibid; see also Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 490-491. 
713 ibid. 
714 See, for example, Arcot, Bruno & Faure-Grimaud (n 31). See also section ’Comply or Else’ Vs. ‘Comply or Explain’ in chapter III.  
715 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 480, referring to Klaus J. Hopt, ‘The German Two-Tier Board: Experience, Theories, Reforms’ in Klaus J. Hopt, 
Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.) Comparative Corporate Governance (Oxford Univeristy Press 1998) 227.  
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• weak communication and insufficient co-operation between the supervisory board 
and external auditors. 
 
Members of the supervisory board have limited access to information and need to depend on the 
management board as a source716. This escalates the risk of manipulation and filtering of 
information by the directors. In addition to that, the Company Code of 2000 lacks any provision 
that would oblige the management to periodically inform the supervisory board about 
entrepreneurial plans and their implementation.717 In many cases, this means that the management 
board decides when and what information shall be given to the supervisory board. Furthermore, 
stringent devotion to the collegiality principle might have a negative impact on the efficiency of 
supervision, as it might limit the board’s (re)actions and responses to destructive developments in 
the company’s business.718 The Company Code of 2000 does not provide individual supervisors with 
the right to request that directors present certain information or that reports be presented to the 
supervisory board at its next meeting719. As a final point, the Company Code is silent on board 
committees and co-operation between the supervisory board and external auditors. Article 86 of 
the Act of 29 May 2009 on Statutory Auditors provides for an obligation to create an audit 
committee in the supervisory board of companies – being the so called ‘public-interest entities’ – 
as well as regulates the tasks of this committee. However, if the supervisory board is composed of 
no more than five members (which is the minimum number of supervisory board members in a 
public company720) formation of an audit committee is not necessary and its tasks may be vested 
with the board as a whole. 
 According to PricewaterhouseCoopers721, the participation of women on supervisory 
boards of listed companies in Poland may need to be reviewed, as it is not high, amounting to only 
14%.   
 
                                                          
716 Oplustil & Radwan, ibid.   
717 cf, for example, sec. 90 (1) German Aktiengesetz. 
718 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 480. 
719 cf, for example, sec. 90 (3) German Aktiengesetz.  
720 Art. 385§1CCC. The regulation of Art. 86 of the Act of 29 May 2009 constitutes implementation of Art. 41 of Directive 2006/43/EC as 
amended by Directive 2014/56/EU on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts. 
721 PwC, ‘Rady Nadzorcze 2013. Skuteczność (...)’ (n 539).  
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Chart 1. Participation of women on supervisory boards* in Poland722 
 
* Research was conducted amongst all companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in March – April 
2012. 
 
Interestingly, the participation of women in supervisory boards is lower in companies with 
a foreign strategic investor than in companies with Polish capital. This difference is quite significant. 
In the first case, women constitute 11% of the board, in the latter – 15%.723  
Women are also appointed as presidents of supervisory boards relatively less often than 
men724. Amongst all women who are members of supervisory boards only 8% hold the position of 
presidents, while the same proportion amongst men amounts to 16%. A slightly smaller 
disproportion in this area exists in companies that have the State Treasury as a dominant 
shareholder, where the number of presidents among women is 13%, and amongst men – 15%.725 
 
 
F. REMUNERATION POLICY 
 
Similarly to the Anglo-American systems, the remuneration policy in Poland also needs to be 
reviewed. As I have mentioned in chapter IV (the section ‘Directors’ Performance and 
                                                          
722 Deloitte Poland, ‘Raport „Współczesna Rada Nadzorcza 2012”. Praktyka Ładu Korporacyjnego’ (2012) <www.gpw.pl/biblioteka-
gpwwiecej?gpwl_id=84&title=Raport+%E2%80%9EWsp%C3%B3%C5%82czesna+Rada+Nadzorcza+2012%E2%80%9D+Praktyka+%C5%8
2adu+korporacyjnego+w+Polsce.> accessed 16 June 2014. 
723 PwC, ‘Rady Nadzorcze 2013. Skuteczność (…)’ (n 539).  
724 ibid. 
725 ibid. 
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Remunerations’), some of my research participants found this issue to be a weakness of Polish 
corporate governance. 
 The Company Code of 2000 draws little attention to the issue of remuneration of board 
members. It provides that the supervisory board shall firstly set the remuneration of members of 
the management board employed under employment contacts or other contracts unless the 
statutes provide otherwise. Secondly, the shareholders’ meeting may authorise the supervisory 
board to establish that the remuneration of members of the management board shall also include 
the right to participate, in a specified manner, in the company’s annual profit allocated for 
distributions among the shareholders pursuant to Article 347§1726.727 Thirdly, members of the 
supervisory board may receive remuneration. The amount of such remuneration shall be set forth 
in the statutes or a resolution of the shareholders’ meeting. The remuneration in the form of a right 
to participate in the company’s profit for a given financial year allocated for distribution among the 
shareholders in accordance with Article 347§1, shall only be granted by way of a resolution of the 
shareholders’ meeting. Members of the supervisory board shall be entitled to reimbursement of 
costs incurred in connection with conducting the supervisory board’s activities.728  
All this refers to a JSC only. The Code does not regulate the issue of receiving remuneration 
by members of the management board, the supervisory board and the auditors’ committee in an 
LLC. Legal doctrine is unanimous that a decision in this regard belongs to the shareholders of a 
company. They might decide that members of these organs work for free or receive remuneration. 
In fact, their appointment usually takes place on the strength of an employment contract, a contract 
of service or another obligation relationship, eg a managerial contract.729 It is also possible to grant 
members of the supervisory board and the auditors’ committee reimbursement of costs resulting 
from conducting the supervisory board’s activities (eg transport or hotel costs)730. 
 The Company Code also neglects the issue of a remuneration committee within the 
supervisory board. A plausible explanation for this might be seen in the relatively small size of 
supervisory boards in Polish JSCs731. Taking into account that the Code does not provide for 
shareholders in most cases to participate in the process of remuneration, this might work to the 
detriment of companies. On the other hand, the weak separation of ownership and control in Polish 
companies creates the risk that actually the controlling shareholders will decide about 
                                                          
726 Shareholders shall be entitled to participate in profit disclosed in the financial statements verified by a certified auditor and allocated 
by the shareholders’ meeting for distribution to the shareholders.  
727 Art. 378CCC. 
728 Art. 392§1, 2 and 3CCC. 
729 See, for example, Kidyba, vol 1 (n 630) 932 – 933; Jacek Bieniak and others, Kodeks Spółek Handlowych. Komentarz (C.H. Beck 2011) 
755, 815-816, 824, 1171. 
730 Kidyba, ibid; Bieniak, ibid 815-816, 824.  
731 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 491. 
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remuneration.  
The Best Practices Code of 2010 draws even less attention to the issue of remuneration. 
The Code only requires that each listed company should have a remuneration policy and rules of 
defining the policy. The remuneration policy should in particular determine the form, structure, and 
level of remuneration of members of supervisory and management bodies. For details, it refers to 
Commission Recommendation of 14 December 2004 fostering an appropriate regime for the 
remuneration of directors of listed companies (2004/913/EC), and Commission Recommendation 
of 30 April 2009 complementing that Recommendation (2009/385/EC) fostering an appropriate 
regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies. The absence of any material 
regulation on directors’ remuneration in the Best Practices Code clearly deserves criticism.  
 Another alarming issue is a significant disproportion between the level of managerial 
remuneration and employee remuneration. On average, a person employed by a company earns 
annually PLN 48,213 million (GBP 8,586.52732) annually733, while an average salary of an executive 
director was PLN 1,75 million (GBP 311,667.24) annually in 2012 in WIG20 (this is 1,5 times more 
than in mWIG40 and almost twice as much as companies classified as sWIG80734 (see Appendix 6)). 
Amongst the ten best paid presidents of management boards, annual pay in 2012 was between 
about PLN 3,4 million (GBP 534,999.07)735 and about PLN 11,9 million (GBP 1,960.654.06)736.737  
The disproportion in pay might have been a reason why companies did not inform the 
public about the size of remuneration. A significant step towards a change was the Commission 
Recommendation 2004/913/EC, instructing that shareholders should be provided with a clear and 
comprehensive overview of the company's remuneration policy738. It was adopted in the Regulation 
of the Minister of Finance of 19 February 2009 on the current and periodic disclosures to be made 
by issuers of securities (…), which imposed on listed companies the obligation to disclose 
information on directors’ remuneration (for members of both the management and the supervisory 
boards). They are published yearly, together with the annual financial statements.739 The law 
                                                          
732 All amounts expressed in Polish złoty on this page were converted to British pounds according to the currency exchange rate on 25 
March 2015.  
733 Główny Urząd Statystyczny [Central Statistical Office], ‘Przeciętne zatrudnienie i wynagrodzenie w sektorze przedsiębiorstw w marcu 
2014 r.’ <www.stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/praca-wynagrodzenia/zatrudnienie-wynagrodzenie/przecietne-zatrudnienie-i-
wynagrodzenie-w-sektorze-przedsiebiorstw-w-marcu-2014-r-,3,24.html> accessed 12 May 2014. 
734 PricewwaterhouseCoopers Poland, ‘Wynagrodzenie prezesów według PwC’ <http://www.pwc.pl/pl/biuro-prasowe/wynagrodzenia-
prezesow-wedlug-pwc.jhtml> accessed 2 May 2014. 
735 Luigi Lovagio – bank Pekao S.A. 
736 Janusz Filipiak – IT company COMARCH S.A. 
737 PwC, ‘Wynagrodzenie prezesów (…)’ (n 734).  
738 Point 5 of 2004/913/EC. 
739 Regulation of the Minister of Finance of 19 February 2009 on the current and periodic disclosures to be made by issuers of securities 
and conditions for recognition as equivalent of information where disclosure is required under the laws of a non-member state; §95, 
sec. 6, point 17. 
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however, does not concern all companies, which might be reluctant to reveal such information.   
 
 
G. THE DISCLOSURE SYSTEM 
 
In general, the disclosure system is a problematic aspect of Polish corporate law.  
 The Best Practices Code of 2010 for management boards of listed companies provides that 
a company should pursue a transparent and effective information policy using both traditional 
methods and modern technologies, as well as the latest communication tools to ensure fast, secure 
and effective access to information740. The Code opens with an extensive list of information and 
documents to be made available on the company’s website which (as of 1 January 2009 shall also 
be published in English)741. This includes basic corporate regulations, in particular the statutes and 
internal regulations of its governing bodies; professional CVs of the members of its governing 
bodies; information about the participation of women and men respectively in the management 
board and in the supervisory board of the company, current and periodic reports, etc.   
   In the Company Code of 2000 the issue of transparency is regulated superficially. Copies of 
the management board report on the company’s operations, the financial statements, the 
supervisory board report and the opinion of a certified auditor shall be issued to the shareholders 
at their request, no later than fifteen days prior to the date of the shareholders’ meeting742. 
Shareholders may inspect the minutes’ book (an excerpt from the minutes including evidence of 
convening the shareholders’ meeting and powers of attorney granted by shareholders) and request 
the issue of copies of resolutions certified by the management board (this also includes a resolution 
of the shareholders’ meeting approving the company’s operations and financial statements for the 
previous financial year)743.  
 On the other hand, the Company Code of 2000 gives to each shareholder of an LLC a unique 
right to individual control. For the purpose of exercising it, a shareholder or a shareholder acting 
jointly with a person authorised by him or her may, at any time, inspect the books and documents 
of the company, prepare a balance sheet for his or her personal use or request the management 
board to provide explanations.744 This right is not given to JSCs. In return shareholders and third 
persons may exercise control over these documents through their websites. The Code foists an 
                                                          
740 Part I, point 1.   
741 Part II, point 1. 
742 Art. 395§2 and 4 CCC, and Art. 421§1 and 3 CCC; with respect to LLCs – Art. 248§1 and 4 CCC. 
743 Art. 421§1 and 3 CCC.  
744 Art. 212§1 and 4 CCC. According to Art. 248§1CCC, resolutions of the shareholders’ meeting shall be recorded in the minutes’ book 
and signed by all persons present or at least by the chairman and the minutes clerk. Where the minutes are taken by a notary, the 
management board shall file an excerpt from the minutes’ book.  
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obligation of having a website on public companies (listed JSCs). They shall place there inter alia 
documentation that is to be presented to the shareholders’ meeting and draft resolutions.745  
The generally weak disclosure of information might significantly influence the ownership 
structure of companies. Thus, the question remains as to whether some of those issues should or 
should not be included within the universally binding Company Code of 2000. 
 
 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The theme of this chapter is corporate governance in Poland. I analyse its main aspects, referring 
to the equivalents from the American and British corporate governance system. The goal of this 
chapter is to answer my two first research questions:  
 
• What are the weaknesses of the Polish corporate governance system? 
• What changes should be made to corporate governance in Poland? 
 
In sections B and C, I present the outline of Polish corporate governance and the 
consolidated ownership structure of Polish companies, which is considered the greatest weakness 
of the Polish corporate system. Therefore, in section D, I continue this topic, analysing the reasons 
for the concentration of control and its maintenance in Polish companies.   
Section E of this chapter is dedicated to the internal system and distribution of power in 
Polish companies. It is split into the following subsections: the management board, directors’ 
duties, the shareholders’ meeting, the supervisory board, the independence of supervisors and the 
other board issues. In the latter one, I elaborate on such issues as, inter alia, the information flow 
between corporate authorities in Poland and board committees in Polish companies.  
In sections F and G, I deal with the issue of remuneration for corporate officials, the 
disclosure thereof in annual reports and other matters pertaining to Polish corporate governance. 
All above-mentioned issues are developed in greater detail in chapter VI. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
745 Art. 402³§1 CCC. 
  
126 
 
VI. ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is an analysis of interviews conducted in Poland with representatives of the business 
environment (see chapter II, in which I explain the process of conducting these interviews). It deals 
with such problematic issues of corporate governance in Poland as, for example, the high 
concentration of share ownership and control, the extended power of the supervisory board or the 
poor remuneration policy, which have already been discussed in the previous chapter. The goal of 
this chapter is to develop the discussion and present the views of business practitioners on 
corporate governance in Poland, their proposals of changes to the way in which companies are 
managed in Poland, as well as their opinion on the possible hybridisation of Polish corporate 
governance, eg the implementation of the one-tier board system in Poland. Thus, this chapter aims 
to answer all my three research questions:  
 
• What are the weaknesses of the Polish corporate governance system?  
• What changes should be made to corporate governance in Poland? 
 
and above all: 
 
• Is hybrid corporate governance a realistic choice for Poland? 
 
This chapter is mainly based on the talks conducted with interviewees, but I also refer to 
relevant literature and legislation to contextualise the comments made and to develop my 
discussion on hybrid corporate governance. However, contrary to the previous chapter, I elaborate 
on certain issues in greater detail, eg employees’ participation in corporate governance in Poland. 
The reason for this elaboration is that I did not want to place too much information in one chapter. 
I also italicised text that concerns the most essential findings collected during the interviews.  
 In keeping with the previous chapters, I refer to the foreign systems of corporate 
governance. However, this chapter includes a significant amount of calculable data, collected during 
interviews. I converted this data into graph/chart form, the aim being to give an approximate 
illustration of certain tendencies in thinking within Polish corporate governance. This data is 
presented in percentages, which, I believe, facilitates a better understanding of those tendencies. 
This chapter also contains several graphs/charts copied from business reports. They perform a 
similar role as the other figures, namely, they illustrate certain occurrences within corporate 
governance in Poland.   
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 With respect to the data analysis of interviews and the presentation of that data, instead of 
analysing each interview separately, I organised this chapter into specific sections that group 
relevant subject matter together. Whilst at the same time presenting and analysing the most valued 
interviewee opinions for this research project.   
 As each unstructured interview started with questions concerning the consolidated 
ownership and control of Polish companies, the subsequent subsection is also dedicated to this 
issue.  
 
 
B. CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN POLAND 
 
I began the interviews with questions regarding the highly concentrated ownership and control in 
companies in Poland, as the literature identifies this as a significant problem of Polish corporate 
governance (see chapter V). However, in order not to impose my viewpoint on participants, I asked 
the following questions:  
 
• What do you think of the ownership structure of limited companies in Poland? The 
ownership structure of companies in some countries is more dispersed than in Poland. 
For example, the number of shares held by one shareholder in the US and the UK amounts 
to below 2%746, while in Poland, on average, it is about 40%747 (as I assumed that 
participants’ knowledge on foreign corporate systems might be low, the question was 
followed by a brief explanation).  
• What are reasons for the high concentration of corporate ownership in Poland? 
 
Out of 37 participants, 14 did not answer this question. They received a questionnaire to 
complete, and left this question blank748.  
23 participants (nine of whom participated in the interviews by responding to a 
questionnaire and 14 by taking part in unstructured interviews; see chapter II – ‘Research 
Methodology’ , where I explain in detail the process of collecting data during interviews) also believe 
that consolidated ownership in Poland works to the detriment of a company. In their opinion, it 
results in the expropriation of returns by controlling shareholders, and, as a consequence, creates 
conflicts between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders in Polish companies. 
                                                          
746 Morck & Steier (n 25). 
747 See section ‘The Ownership Structure’ in chapter V.  
748 In general, 23 participants took part in my structured interviews. They received a questionnaire and were asked to justify their 
answers. For further explanation see section ‘Data Collection’ in chapter II – ‘Research Methodology’. 
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According to participants, some of the main reasons for the consolidated ownership structure 
include: cross-shareholding, takeovers and privatisation procedures and promoting the insider type 
of ownership.  
Privatisation as a factor of the highly consolidated ownership was mentioned by 18 
participants, out of whom eight run a small business (five sole entrepreneurships and three 
professional partnerships), and the remaining ten were either presidents of management boards or 
presidents of supervisory boards (six in total; out of whom two were former presidents of 
management boards in companies subject to privatisation), or shareholders of limited companies 
(two out of whom hold shares in a formerly privatised company). One reason why privatisation was 
often mentioned by participants might be the fact that it has been subject to several scandals in 
Poland749.  
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been privatised since the early 1990s. This process 
has embraced 8,453 Polish enterprises750. It should be added that in the early 1990s, the state 
sector was mainly made of these enterprises, which produced 80% of national output, were 
technologically out-of-date, and excessively large; only 300 of the largest enterprises accounted for 
59% of the net income of Poland’s 3,177 state industrial enterprises751.  
The Act of 30 August 1996 on Commercialisation and Privatisation of State-Owned 
Enterprises came into effect in April 1997 (the Privatisation Act)752. The law distinguishes two basic 
privatisation methods: indirect and direct753. 
 The indirect method consists of two stages. First of all, an SOE is commercialised – it 
changes its legal form and is transformed into a company, where 100% of shares belong to the State 
Treasury754. From this moment on, an SOE (the so-called sole-shareholder company of the State 
Treasury) begins to operate under provisions of the Company Code755. At the second stage, the sale 
of the shares takes place in a number of ways: public offering, sale to a strategic investor (or 
                                                          
749 See for example Krzysztof Losz, ‘Historia Prywatyzacji Polskiego Przemysłu’ Nasz Dziennik (15-16 września 2012) 
<www.naszdziennik.pl/wp/9986,historia-prywatyzacji-polskiego-przemyslu.html> accessed 17 April 2014; Jacek Tittenbrum, Z Deszczu 
pod Rynnę. Meandry Polskiej Prywatyzacji, vol 1-4 (Zysk I S-KA 2007).  
750 Ministry of Treasury Republic of Poland, ‘Statistics. Ownership Transformation’ (18 February 2013) 
<www.msp.gov.pl/en/privatisation/statistics/3967,Ownership-transformation.html> accessed 25 May 2014. 
751 Rondinelli & Yurkiewicz (n 12).  
752 Prior to that, the Act of 13 July 1990 on Privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises had been in force. 
753 Another method of privatisation was provided by Art. 19 of the Act of 25 September 1981 on State-Owned Enterprises. It applies to 
SOEs in financial distress — the enterprise is liquidated and its assets are sold out. Some enterprises in agricultural sector are privatised 
according to the principles provided by the Act of 19 October 1991 on Management of Agriculture Property of the Treasury. There are 
also separate acts devoted to ownership transformation of certain enterprises and sectors of the economy. 
754 Art. 1 sec. 1 of the Privatisation Act. 
755 Art. 5 sec. 1 of the Privatisation Act. The operation under the Company Code of 2000 is common to all limited companies and 
partnerships, except a civil partnership. The other entities, including SOEs, are governed by other legal acts; see Appendix 3. 
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combination of these two) and inclusion to the National Investment Fund programme756. 
The Act on National Investment Funds (NIF) was adopted on 30 April 1993, introducing a 
kind of mass privatisation programme. NIFs received blocks of shares of 512 companies undergoing 
mass privatisation, and Polish citizens received a kind of voucher that they could invest in the 
NIFs757. The NIF programme was supposed to accelerate the pace of privatisation, at the same time 
providing for restructuring of companies, facilitated by the experience of professional management 
companies employed by the NIFs758.  
The direct method consists of liquidation of an SOE in a legal sense; then, the assets of the 
enterprise (in totality or divided into separated organised parts) are privatised in one of the three 
possible ways: 
• sale; 
• entering as a contribution in kind into a company established by the Treasury and a 
private investor; 
• leasing (employee buy-out)759.760 
 
According to Kozarzewski761, ‘Polish privatisation law is much diversified, if not to say 
eclectic.’ It represents a certain compromise between two main options: ‘liberal conceptions 
patterned after solutions adopted in developed Capitalist countries, and a participatory approach 
originating from the Polish labour self-management movement and tending towards a kind of ‘third 
road’ of development through building of the so-called ‘social market economy’’762. A former 
president of a management board763 (see section ‘Ethics in Research on Corporate Governance’ in 
chapter II, in which I explain that, under Anglia Ruskin University research policy, I was obliged to 
assure anonymity and confidentiality to my research participants) said that provisions of the law 
                                                          
756 Art. 1 sec. 2 and Art. 33 sec. 1 of the Privatisation Act. 
757 Barbara Błaszczyk, Iraj Hoshi and Richard Woodward (eds), Secondary Privatisation in Transition Economies: The Evolution of 
Enterprise Ownership in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) 123. 
758 ibid. 
759 Art. 1 sec. 2 and Art. 39 sec. 1 of the Privatisation Act.  
760 For details see, for example, Rondinelli & Yurkiewicz (n 12). 
761 Kozarzewski (n 14).   
762 The emergence of the Solidarity trade union and mass protest actions, and deep economic crisis in the early 1980s made possible a 
deeper reform of SOEs through their decentralisation. As a consequence, the Act on State-Owned Enterprises and the Act on Employee 
Self-Management in State-Owned Enterprises, both passed on 25 September 1981 (still valid for state-owned enterprises) made 
employees accountable for supervision over the entire activity of SOEs (Art. 28 of the Employee Self-Management Act) and dealing with 
strategic decisions. For further explanation see Piotr Kozarzewski, ‘Corporate Governance: Formation in Poland, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and 
Ukraine’ (Centre for Social and Economic Research, Studies & Analyses CASE 347, Warsaw 2007) 
<www.case.com.pl/upload/publikacja_plik/20444565_sa347.pdf> accessed 3 July 2011; Piotr Kozarzewski, ‘Corporate Governance in 
State-Controlled Enterprises in Poland’ (2007) <www.politologia.wsb-nlu.edu.pl/uploadedFiles/file/P%20Kozarzewski%20-
%20CORPORATE%20GOVERNANCE%20IN%20STATE-CONTROLLED.pdf> accessed 10 July 2011. 
763 Text to n 529; this is a president of a JSC that was formerly privatised through the indirect method. 
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were also intended to overcome the assumed resistance of insiders.  
Until 1997, the leasing path of direct privatisation preferred extremely insiderised patterns 
of ownership structure: the new company should have been founded by the majority of employees, 
no institutional outsiders were permitted (unless accepted by the Ministry of Ownership 
Transformation)764. According to the 1990 Act, in indirect (capital) privatisation employees had a 
right to acquire 10% of shares at reduced price765; these preferences were increased by the 1996 
Act which granted insiders a right to acquire 15% of shares for free. Another 15% can be received 
for free by farmers and fishermen if they were suppliers of the former SOE (with restrictions 
regarding the volume of supplies).766  
In addition, the new Act lifted the requirement that sole-shareholder companies of the 
Treasury should be privatised within two years of commercialisation767. It introduced a legal 
background for impeding ownership transformation in this group of companies768.  
Finally, preventing further ownership transformation became beneficial for governmental 
officials. A president of a management board769 said that such economic favours as undervaluation 
of capital assets, credit preferences or concessions for certain activities might have been traded for 
positions on management boards or even ownership interests in privatised companies, which 
became common practice.  
Other than privatisation, often mentioned by the participants, additional reasons for the 
high consolidation of ownership and control in companies in Poland were cross-shareholding (12 
participants) and takeovers (nine participants). Only one participant – a minority shareholder770 
drew attention to non-voting and preferred shares, which – in the participant’s opinion – are going 
to replace the application of Art. 354 of the Company Code of 2000 (golden shares771). ‘The politics 
                                                          
764 The Act of 1996 imposes certain limits on the use of direct privatisation paths and the role of insiders in ownership transformation. 
Limits have been set on the size of enterprises (in terms of employment level, assets and turnover); outsiders gained a right to take the 
initiative in privatisation without the prior consent of insiders; in leasing path, at least 20% of shares in the new company must be in the 
hands of outsiders; possibilities of participation of legal persons have been increased. 
765 Text to n 752. 
766 Art. 36 sec. 1 and Art. 37 sec 1 of the Privatisation Act. 
767 Text to n 752.  
768 Kozarzewski, ‘Corporate Governance in State-Controlled Enterprises in Poland’ (n 762).  
769 Text to n 763. Similarly Kazimierz Z. Poznanski, ‘Privatisation of the Polish Economy: Problems of Transition’ (1992) 44 (4) Soviet 
Studies <http://www.jstor.org/stable/152201> accessed 2 July 2011. 
770 Employed by a JSC, and interviewed in August 2013.   
771 In the EU, golden shares have been ruled illegal; see, for example, European Commission, ‘Selected Jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union on the Free Movement of Capital’ 
<www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/framework/court/index_en.htm> accessed 24 July 2014. The Polish Company Code of 
2000, which must comply with the EU jurisprudence, contains a provision that creates a ban on golden shares. According to Art. 20, 
shareholders should be treated equally in the same circumstances. Nevertheless, some personal rights may be conferred upon an 
individual shareholder in a JSC in Poland, in particular the authorisation to appoint or remove members of the board of directors or the 
supervisory board, or entitle such a shareholder to receive specific distributions from the company (Art. 354CCC). The statutes of a 
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of their distribution will allow, amongst other things, the Treasury to retain its dominant position in 
companies subject to privatisation’ – added the participant. 
Another board member772 said: ‘Non-voting shares are so destructive yet so rewarding for 
a company. They give governors a greater flexibility in the process of decision-making, which 
facilitates costly and long-term investments. But, they might also be used as a tool that leverages 
control in a company – exactly like takeovers, super majorities, ‘squeeze out’[773], etc.’774  
 A survey, carried out by Dzierżanowski and Tamowicz775, provides that only up to 20% of 
public companies could be threatened by hostile takeovers, a fact which stems from the 
concentration of ownership and control776. Moreover, the WSE has not been the scene of large 
takeover battles so far777. A president of a management board778 noted that takeovers and mergers 
in most cases had had an amicable character.   
 
 
C. THE SUPERVISORY BOARD IN POLAND 
 
The literature review I carried out (see section ’The Inside Structure and Distribution of Powers’ in 
chapter V – ‘Corporate Governance in Poland’), as well as the two pilot interviews779 (see section 
’Data Collection’ in chapter II – ‘Research Methodology’), drew my attention to the issue of 
distribution of power between corporate bodies in Poland. I asked my research participants to 
                                                          
company in which the State Treasury is a shareholder may also stipulate special rights attached to the shares held by the State Treasury 
in terms of votes (more than two, no more than five votes; Art. 625CCC). Furthermore, the Act of 3 June 2005 on Special Rights of the 
State Treasury and on Their Execution in Capital Companies of Material Significance for the Public Order and the Public Safety provides 
the State Treasury with special rights over a number of companies that are considered materially significant for public order and security. 
These rights include, inter alia, the right to oppose the shareholders’ meeting resolution or an action of the management board in specific 
matters that are essential for the existence and functioning of the company, such as winding-up the company, transferring the company’s 
seat abroad, a change in the company’s operations (the scope or object of business activity) as laid down in the statutes, as well as 
disposing, leasing, pledging and creating usufruct on its organised assets. Before 2010, the State Treasury, in companies in which the 
Treasury is a shareholder, was given the right to oppose resolutions of the shareholders in the most strategic for a company’s operation 
cases. 
772 A member of the management board of a JSC, interviewed in November 2013. 
773 Under Art. 418CCC, the general meeting may adopt a resolution on the compulsory buyout of shares held by shareholders 
representing no more than 5% of the share capital (minority shareholders) by no more than five shareholders holding, in aggregate, no 
less than 95% of the share capital, each of whom holds no less than 5% of the share capital. The adoption of such resolution shall require 
a majority of 95% of votes cast. The statutes may provide more stringent conditions for adopting such resolution.  
774 Non-voting shares also entitle their holder to a higher dividend (Art. 353CCC). 
775 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). The estimation, however, does not take into account voting caps or other statutory provisions. 
776 For more information on takeovers see, for example, Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 458-460. 
777 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). 
778 Text to n 763. 
779 Text to n 529. 
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express their opinion about the scope of power of supervisory boards in Poland. 
 
 
1. The scope of power 
 
I asked the following question: 
 
Does the supervisory board in Poland hold more power than the management board? Please 
justify your answer. 
 
17 participants (out of 37 who took part in this research project) answered my question. 
The other 20 participants, responding by my questionnaire, left the question blank780.  
Those participants who answered my question were either, participated in my research by 
e-mail, Skype or face to face, board members (three presidents and two vice-presidents of 
management boards, four presidents of supervisory boards, three members of management 
boards and two members of supervisory boards) or minority shareholders (three shareholders of a 
JSC), who took part in my structured interviews (responding by a questionnaire; for further 
explanation see chapter II – ‘Research Methodology’ – ‘Data Collection’, in which I explain the 
process of interviewing). 
 For the majority of the board members (13 out of 14), the power between corporate organs 
is well-balanced, and the supervisory board does not have a supreme position over the management 
board. In general, they justified their answers as follows: 
• Law prohibits supervisors from giving binding instructions to the management board 
concerning the management of the company’s affairs.  
• The statutes may provide for the obligation to obtain the consent of the supervisory board 
to perform a specific action, but only for important reasons.  
• Where the supervisory board refuses to give consent, the management board may request 
the general meeting to adopt a resolution permitting the performance of such action.  
• Members of the supervisory board can be brought to justice for any damage inflicted 
through negligence or an action that is contrary to the provisions of law or the statutes 
unless no fault is attributable to them. 
 
Filing a suit against the officers requires prior approval by the shareholders’ meeting, but 
                                                          
780 Text to n 748.  
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the legislator rejected the use of quorum and thresholds781. In practice however, the significance of 
the shareholders’ remedy in Polish corporate practice is rather minimal. One shareholder782 stated 
that:  
 
‘[i]t relies heavily on access to information. In this context there seems to be an apparent 
deficit in the regulatory framework on shareholder’s information rights in an LLC, namely a 
shareholder’s individual right to control company’s affairs[783] may be excluded if the 
company establishes a supervisory board or auditors committee[784]. This might lead to the 
establishment of ‘pseudo’ board solely to frustrate shareholder access to information.’ 
 
In this respect, Oplustil and Radwan785 suggest that the minority in an LLC could file a 
motion to appoint a special purpose auditor786. For this motion to be effective, a quorum 
requirement of one-tenth of the share capital needs to be met. A corresponding right is provided 
for shareholders of public (listed) companies whenever they reach a threshold of 5% of total 
votes787. ‘It follows (…) that [,] for a joint-stock, non-listed company there is no such minority right 
protection, which comes [as a] surprise and might be seen as a regulatory gap’ – they conclude.788 
 Finally, a few participants (three shareholders and one board member) said that the 
relations between the supervisory board and the management board in Polish companies may 
actually depart from the pattern provided by law. One of them789 expressed an opinion that 
members of the management board perform de facto instructions of the majority shareholder. ‘An 
organ that kind of coordinates the dependence is the supervisory board, which is usually appointed 
by the controlling shareholders’ – the shareholder790 added. Another participant791 said that it might 
result in outside investors never receiving returns on their investments, because the controlling 
shareholders, alongside the supervisors and directors, would expropriate them. According to this 
participant, this happens in a number of ways:  
• ‘the insiders simply steal the profits; 
• the insiders sell the output, the assets, or the additional securities in the company that they 
                                                          
781 Art. 393 (2)CCCC (for a JSC) and 228 (2)CCC (for an LLC).  
782 A minority shareholder of a JSC, interviewed in January 2014.  
783 See Art. 212CCC. 
784 Art. 213§3CCC. 
785 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 486.  
786 See Art. 223CCC. 
787 See Art. 84–85 of the Act on Public Offering (...) and Public Companies. 
788 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 487.  
789 Text to n 770. 
790 ibid. 
791 A member of the management board of a JSC, interviewed in November 2013.  
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control to another company that they own at below market prices  (transfer pricing, asset 
stripping, and investor dilution, though often legal, have largely the same effect as theft); 
• expropriation takes the form of diversion of corporate opportunities from the company, 
overpaying executives, or installing themselves or possibly unqualified family members in 
managerial positions.’ 
 
‘Again, the Company Code of 2000 provides us with a legal basis to take a legal action against those 
who act dishonestly, but this needs to be proved. These are usually well-covered frauds’ – another 
participant declared792. 
 One board member793 said the following: ‘There is a strong connection between the Code 
provisions and the ownership structure of Polish companies. The owners keep it consolidated 
because it provides them with additional benefits.’  
In other countries, a similar problem is being resolved by means of independent 
directors794. In Poland, the institution of independent supervisors was introduced in 2002 (see 
chapter V). I asked my interviewees whether the appointment of independent supervisors has had 
any impact on the performance of corporate boards in Poland. 
 
 
2. The independence of supervisors 
 
The issue of independence drew a lot of participants’ attention, as 39 participants answered my 
questions concerning it. This number includes persons who resigned from participating in this 
research, but partially filled my questionnaire (see chapter II – ‘Research Methodology’, where I 
analyse the process of collecting data during this research).   
My questions were as follows: 
 
• Has the appointment of independent supervisors made any difference to corporate 
governance in Poland?  
• How many independent supervisors should supervisory boards be composed of?  
• What do you think of regulating this issue statutorily rather than leaving it as an optional 
best practice? 
Please justify your answers. 
 
                                                          
792 One minority shareholder – text to n 782.  
793 One management board member – text to n 791.  
794 See, for example, Mallin (n 27) 26-66. 
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All the interviewees795 unanimously answered that the independence of supervisors had 
provided objective criticism to supervisory boards. One management board president796 gave the 
following detailed description on the role of independent supervisors in Poland:   
 
‘Independent supervisors are capable of seeing company and business issues in a broad 
perspective. Nonetheless, they are usually appointed because they have a breadth of 
experience, are of an appropriate calibre and have particular personal qualities. Additionally, 
they might have some specialist knowledge that will help provide the company with valuable 
insights or perhaps, key contacts in related industries. Of the utmost importance is their 
independence of the management of the company and any of its ‘interested parties’. This 
means that they can bring a degree of objectivity to the board's deliberations, and play a 
valuable role in monitoring executive management.’ 
 
However, the appointment of independent supervisors also requires the attention of shareholders. 
In one shareholder’s797 opinion, ‘they need to be constantly looking ahead to ensure that supervisors 
have the required skills and experience to drive best performance.’ 
Another shareholder798 believes that ‘the involvement of independent supervisors in setting 
remuneration for members of the management board will eliminate the excessive remuneration 
contracts for directors.’ 
 Despite the consensus regarding the institution of independent supervisors, there was 
some disagreement among participants about the quantity of independent supervisors that should 
be appointed to the supervisory board.  
Over half of the interviewees acknowledged that the current regulation of the Best 
Practices Code was satisfactory for them (see Chart 2 below). The current Code requires the 
participation of at least two independent members of the supervisory board regardless of the 
ownership structure of a company (an empirical study799 from 2012 reveals that almost 56% of 
companies examined are composed of no more than six members). According to one supervisory 
board president800, persons who maintain business relationships with a company should also 
perform the function of a supervisor. ‘We always care more about a business in which we are 
                                                          
795 All 14 board members and two shareholders justified their answers with respect to the first question.  
796 Employed by a JSC, and interviewed in November 2013. cf Roberto Mura, ‘Firm Performance: Do Non-executive Directors Have Minds 
of Their Own? Evidence from UK Panel Data’ (2007) 36 (3) Financial Management 81, in which Mura analyses the outcome of various 
surveys on the relationship between the presence of independent directors in management and company performance.  
797 A minority shareholder of an LLC, interviewed in May 2014.   
798 A minority shareholder of a JSC, interviewed in May 2014.  
799 Deloitte Poland, ‘Raport „Współczesna Rada Nadzorcza 2012” (...)’ (n 722).  
800 Employed by a JSC, and interviewed in March 2014.  
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invested’ – the board president said.  
A significant number of the participants (mainly shareholders and employees) were of the 
opinion that at least half the supervisors should be required to be independent (see Chart 2 below). 
This however, might have partially been caused by the fact that I attached a brief description to my 
question, in which I referred to the requirements of the UK Corporate Governance concerning non-
executive directors.  
As a matter of fact, there has been a deficit of persons on the market who could be 
appointed as independent supervisors. This is an opinion expressed by one participant801. 
Finally, three sole entrepreneurs stated that all members of the supervisory board should 
be independent. Out of the 39 participants, two (employees) were not sure how many independent 
supervisors should be involved in the works of the supervisory board, and one participant (one sole 
entrepreneur) did not have any opinion about the issue.  
 
 
Chart 2. Opinions on the independence of supervisory board members in Poland  
 
 Out of 39 participants, only four (the same participants turned out to be the supporters of 
implementing the one-tier board system in Poland; see section below) declared that some thought 
should be given to the possibility of including the independence principle in the Company Code. 13 
board members justified their opinion by arguing that companies should decide about their internal 
matters by themselves, and that the liberalisation of corporate law works towards further 
development of Polish market. Nine other participants gave the same explanation. The others left 
their question forms blank.  
In fact, the Code of Best Practices of 2002 required at least half of the supervisory board 
                                                          
801 A vice-president of the management board of an LLC, interviewed in January 2014.   
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members to be independent members802. It was described as an ‘attempt to transplant the Anglo-
Saxon concept of independent directors into the Polish system’803.  
As I have already pointed out, the Polish legislative body has also taken into account the 
possibility of implementation of a one-tier board system in Poland, although eventually the idea 
collapsed (see section ’Hybrid Corporate Governance in Poland’ in chapter III – ‘Literature Review’). 
A unitary model is available to European Companies (Societas Europaea; SE) with a registered office 
in Poland, but it is not suitable for all business participants in Poland. This business form is designed 
for large companies (the minimum subscribed capital of the SE is EUR 120,000), which are already 
operating in more than one Member State804. All this led to the development of my next question. 
 
 
D. THE ONE-TIER BOARD SYSTEM IN POLAND 
 
I asked the participants what they thought of implementing a one-tier board system as an 
alternative model of corporate governance in Poland: 
 
What do you think of including the right to opt for a one-tier or a two-tier corporate governance 
model in the Company Code? Please justify your answer.  
 
The two-tier board model has operated in Poland since the end of the 19th century (except 
the period 1945-1989, when it was not practically in use) as the only eligible system805. Thus, for 
the majority806 of my interviewees, this is the only well-known and therefore credible mechanism 
that Polish business people can use to conduct their affairs.  
Out of 37 participants, 13 participants were pessimistic about the possibility of the 
implementation of a new corporate governance model, even if the law should allow for choice in 
corporate self-governance. However, it should be emphasised that only four participants were 
definitely against the concept of an alternative corporate governance system in Poland. Four 
                                                          
802 Detailed criteria of what constitutes independence were to be laid down in a company’s articles/statutes. 
803 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 490. 
804 Companies indicated the following reasons for a limited interest in an European Company: the absence of a truly unified legal regime 
for an SE, a lack of harmonisation in many areas of law with respect to an SE (eg specific requirements in the banking or insurance sectors, 
tax legislation), the complex and long negotiation process for employee participation, a lack of tax incentives; Commission of the 
European Communities, ‘Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment on the Directive on the Cross-Border Transfer of 
Registered Office’ (Brussels, 2007) 
<www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/ia_transfer_122007_part1_en.pdf> accessed 23 July 2014; see also 
the Statute for a European Company (SE).   
805 For further explanation see, for example, Poznanski (n 769).  
806 Two of the participants have worked in corporate governance in the US. 
  
138 
 
participants were enthusiastic about this concept.    
 In total, 19 participants (out of the 37 who were interviewed) answered my question 
concerning a one-tier board model in Poland, of whom, two had no opinion about this issue. The 
remaining 18 participants, who did not respond to my question, participated in the interviews by 
responding to my questionnaire. They left this question blank.   
 
 
Chart 3. Opinions on the possibility of implementing an alternative board system in Poland  
 
The following participants were the advocates of the idea of an alternative board model in 
Poland: one management board member, one employee of a legal firm (a corporate lawyer), with 
whom I discussed particular issues by e-mail, Skype or face to face, and two shareholders, who took 
part in my research by responding my questionnaire (for more information about the process of 
data collection during the interviews, see chapter III – ‘Research Methodology’). They all justified 
their answers. 
One of the shareholders807 said that a one-tier system is more efficient in cases where the 
company has a majority or prevailing shareholder (insider system): ‘The combination of supervisory 
and management function suggests the advantage of no real conflict between the shareholders and 
the board. With a unitary system, the goals and objectives of such companies are largely defined by 
the majority shareholder, and thus bring about more efficient and faster decision-making’808. So, the 
unitary board might result in a closer relation and better information flow between the supervisory 
and managerial bodies. ‘With fewer organisational layers, the one-tier model might create fewer 
information asymmetries and alleviate bureaucratic hurdles that might hamper the decision-making 
                                                          
807 Text to n 770. 
808 ibid. 
21%
68%
11%
Alternative system Two-tier board system Did not have an opinion
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process of non-executive directors on two-tier boards’ – the shareholder declared809. 
I repeated this opinion to all board members. In response, one board member810 stated the 
following: ‘It works on condition that the board is not composed of the controlling shareholder or 
that its members are not dependent on the controlling shareholder, which can happen in Poland. 
However, I have to admit that the board model speeds up the decision-making process 
considerably.’ 
It is worth noting that both participants have some international work experience in 
company management, including work for companies set up in Anglo-Saxon countries811.  
The majority of the other participants did not agree with them on the issue of implementing 
a one-tier board system in Poland. One shareholder812 believes that the fact that executive and non-
executive directors operating on one board may jeopardise the board’s ability to monitor executive 
directors and provide independent advice to management. On the other hand, according to the 
shareholder, members of the supervisory board in Poland may also experience difficulties in 
supervising directors due to the fact that they do not work at the company on a day to day basis and 
only have periodic involvements with the management of the company (see also section ’Other 
Board Issues’ in chapter V ‘Corporate Governance in Poland’). Individual members may be delegated 
to perform supervisory tasks on a permanent basis (members so delegated have the right to attend 
meetings of the management board and provide advice thereat).813 
One problem of a two tier-board system might be the absence of trust in the working 
relationships between the supervisory board and the management board. However, this issue may 
also occur in the one-tier board model, where executive directors might be reluctant to co-operate 
with all or some non-executive directors.  
All participants who answered my question (and justified their answer) agreed that a two 
tier-board system might produce certain advantages for companies with a dispersed share structure 
(outside system). This concerns entities where ‘shareholders may be unable to express their 
expected goals of the company as their interests differ, though they all expect a yield in the forms 
of dividends and growth in the company’s share price’814. ‘This can be sorted out by the separation 
of the supervision and management functions as characterised by the two-tier system. The 
supervisory board will be responsible for supervising and ensuring the management board to 
establish the company’s goals on behalf of the shareholders and to identify the common interest of 
                                                          
809 ibid.  
810 One management board member – text to n 791. 
811 Text to n 806.  
812 A minority shareholder of a JSC, interviewed in April 2014.  
813 Art. 390§2CCC. 
814 According to one management board member – text to n 791. 
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shareholders’ – one of shareholders815 said. 
Significantly, a company lawyer816 raised the point that, in British unitary board structures, 
all directors (executive or non-executive directors) have equal legal status and equal responsibility 
in law. ‘By holding all directors equally accountable, board accountability is enhanced’ – the 
participant concluded817. 
This point of view was challenged by another participant. A president of a management 
board818 declared that the two-tier model has a system of safeguards that protect against directors’ 
malpractice. This includes, among other things, individual control of LLCs, or the so-called derivation 
action, which shields shareholders against dishonest directors.   
The derivation action gives every single shareholder irrespective of share ownership the 
possibility to bring a suit on behalf of a company, where the company fails to bring an action for 
redressing damage within one year from the disclosure of the injurious act819. It should however be 
noted that the significance of derivative action in Polish corporate practice is rather minimal820. The 
payoff for a suing shareholder is likely to be negative in the majority of cases, not mention the fact 
that information asymmetry makes it difficult for the shareholder to effectively bear the burden of 
proof. There is no favourable cost regime in place to facilitate the use of derivative action nor is 
there a system of presumptions to mitigate the aforementioned information asymmetry.821 
There are two other reasons for which a one-tier board model might turn out to be a failure 
in Poland. One shareholder822 suggested that the legislative project might not be easy to 
implement, which is typical for provisions in the area of corporate governance in Poland:  
 
‘This is not fully adequate legislation. It is, at the same time, overregulated, underregulated 
and misregulated. Some provisions of the law have political character and are intended to 
gain support of various actors. Sometimes, provisions of law are too general and are not 
instructive enough.’ 
 
Almost all participants pointed out the cost of implementation of a new project and 
bureaucracy, which might make registration of a new governance system very complicated. 
Ultimately, entrepreneurs might decide to go for the well-known and verified model of corporate 
                                                          
815 Text to n 770.  
816 An employee of a legal firm, interviewed in November 2014.  
817 ibid.  
818 Text to n 796.  
819 Art. 295CCC (for an LLC) and Art. 486CCC (for a JSC). 
820 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 486. 
821 ibid. 
822 A minority shareholder of a LLC, interviewed in December 2013.   
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governance.  
Finally, one participant823 was surprised with my idea of implementing a one-tier board 
model in Poland, which, I believe, was as a consequence of the prevailing cultural preference for 
the two-tier board system in Poland. ‘Would it be possible to transplant the British model to 
Poland?’ – the shareholder824 asked me. I based my next question on this participant’s answer. It 
was addressed to board members and shareholders only. 
 
 
E. LEGAL TRANSPLANT IN POLISH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Legal transplant in Polish corporate law is not a new occurrence. As a matter of fact, Polish 
corporate law has been almost entirely borrowed from foreign legal systems over the last century.  
The primary source of inspiration was German corporate law825. However, it would be too 
simplistic to claim that Polish corporate law resulted from a slavish imitation of German laws. The 
legislative inspirations also include the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Hungary and Slovenia826. 
The statutory laws have been to some extent overlapped by legal practice (including forms 
and covenants) applied by large law companies, the majority of whom are either part of a 
multinational chain or have borrowed Anglo-Saxon modus operandi and know-how827.  
 Finally, the WSE fleshed out the statutory (not particularly instructive) laws by borrowing 
from various codes of best practices, mainly British corporate governance codes, in particular 
Cadbury and Hampel828.  
Literature829 on the subject provides the following information: 
 
‘Given limited resources, such as human capital and efficient institutions (courts and 
academia) on the one hand, and growing demand from the business environment for an 
adequate legal framework – on the other, the import of legal concepts and institutions 
proved to be the most cost-effective and sometimes the only affordable way of reducing 
existing discrepancies in legal sophistication in order to address the needs of the 
transforming economy.’ 
                                                          
823 A minority shareholder of a JSC, interviewed in November 2014. 
824 ibid. 
825 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 467. 
826 ibid. 
827 ibid 469. 
828 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8). 
829 Arkadiusz Radwan, ‘Non ex regula ius sumatur or about a few endangered truths’ (2007) 3 Quarterly for the Entire Commercial, 
Insolvency and Capital Market Law 6. 
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 In addition, the overwhelming majority of the EC company law directives have been 
implemented in Polish corporate law830.831 It must, however, be stressed that the implementation 
did not require fundamental changes to Polish law. This is explained by the fact that early directives 
bore a strong German influence, which in turn was, to a significant extent, ‘directly’ (without 
European intermediation) reflected in the Polish pre-war legislation (the Commercial Code of 1934, 
which was a prototype for the Company Code of 2000; see chapter I)832. Thus, pieces of European 
legislation had been transplanted into a legal system characterised by cultural affinity to the 
‘donor’. Oplustil and Radwan833 call the transplanted rules ‘new rules in a pre-digested form’.  
This occurrence throws a different light onto the dispute about the possibility of 
transplanting without taking into account social and economic changes in the recipient legal culture 
(see section ’Legal Transplant’ in chapter III – ‘Literature Review’). It actually proves that ‘rules of 
private law can survive without any close connection to any particular people, any particular period 
of time or any particular place’834. It should be added, at this point, that four distinct systems of 
commercial law were applied in Poland prior to 1934: the German Commercial Code of 1861 
(Southern Poland), the revised German Commercial Code of 1897 (Western Poland), the Russian 
Commercial Code (the North-Eastern territory) and the French Code de Commerce (central 
Poland)835.  
Having reached such a conclusion, I decided to ask participants what they think of ‘direct’ 
transplant from Anglo-Saxon law. I asked the following question: 
 
Do you think that it is possible to transplant any of the Anglo-Saxon models of corporate 
governance to Poland directly – without any structural adjustments, eg employing a larger 
number of independent directors or increasing the amount of time they have to be present at the 
company? Please justify your answer. 
                                                          
830 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 463. 
831 The influence of the primary EU legislation on Polish corporate law has been a lot weaker. In other EU Member States, the ECJ case-
law based on the freedom of establishment and capital movement contributed to a dramatic change in the corporate landscape in 
Europe, giving rise to the phenomenon of companies’ mobility and dismantling protectionist measures against foreign investors (golden 
shares). In consequence, a number of ‘pseudo-foreign companies’ appeared rapidly in member states adhering to strict capital regimes, 
such as Germany, the Netherlands or Denmark. Taking into account the relative cost of incorporating a company in Poland (among the 
highest in Europe) one could reasonably have expected a similar explosion of imported “ltds” in this part of Europe – but, this did not 
happen. Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 465-466.  
832 For more information on legal transplant in Polish commercial law see, for example, Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 448-452 and 463-469. 
833 ibid 464. 
834 Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’ (1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review 79. 
835 For further explanation see, for example, Norman Davies, Heart of Europe. The Past in Poland’s Present (Oxford University Press 2001); 
HC Gutteridge, ‘Review: Polish Commercial Law: Polish Science and Learning’ (1942) 24 (2) Journal of Comparative Legislation and 
International Law  <www.jstor.org/stable/754988 > accessed 7 July 2011. 
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Out of the 25 participants (14 corporate officers and 11 shareholders) who were asked this 
question, nine responded to it. One board member had no opinion about the issue. Seven 
participants, who participated in structured interviews (all shareholders), left this question blank. I 
contacted the remaining board members (nine participants; all interviewed by e-mail) in order to 
put this question to them again, but they have not responded yet (see chapter II – ‘Research 
Methodology’ – ‘Data Collection’, where I elaborate on the process of interviewing business people 
in Poland). 
For two board members836 Polish companies practically operate the same way as the Anglo-
Saxon companies, and only the board structure differentiates them. For two other corporate 
directors, direct transplant is currently possible, as Poland has a prosperous free-market 
economy837. One management board president838 declared:  
 
‘20 years ago the influence of external control (in the form of commodity, financial, take-over 
and other markets) did not exist or was not sufficiently effective. In such conditions, the 
efficient functioning of internal supervision was of fundamental importance. The investment 
potential of the Polish population was weak, therefore the main sources of capital had to be 
looked for elsewhere. The traditional model assumed the significant role of a strategic 
investor, in Polish circumstances – most likely foreign. Both the managerial skills and technical 
assets of Polish enterprises were archaic and not adapted to the new challenges of the 
emerging market environment. Strategic investors, especially foreign ones, were able to bring 
to a company not only capital, but also a new culture of management, of company behaviour 
towards its environment, new technology etc.’  
 
He went on to add that: ‘There has been a considerable change in economic and legislative terms’839. 
According to this participant, various sources of information, eg the Polish Agency for Enterprise 
Development840, declare that the potential of Polish market has improved immensely. With respect 
to the legislative terms, the president of a management board841 drew attention to the fact that 
the Cadbury Code was the main inspiration for the Warsaw Stock Exchange’s creation of the Code 
of Best Practices of 2002. ‘The Cadbury Code provisions, alongside other Anglo-Saxon solutions 
                                                          
836 One management board member – text to n 772; one supervisory board president of an LLC, interviewed in January 2014. 
837 One management board president – text to n 763; text to n 211.  
838 One management board president, ibid. 
839 ibid.   
840 Its reports on the condition of small and medium-sized enterprise sector in Poland are available on 
<www.en.parp.gov.pl/index/more/10843> accessed 23 March 2015 
841 Text to n 763. 
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encompassed by Best Practices and corporate practice brought to Poland by foreign investors, has 
become an integral part of our corporate governance system, and has been working in favour of 
business in Poland’ – the participant842 declared.  
Four interviewees disagreed with these opinions. For one shareholder843 ‘any further move 
towards the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance is only likely to happen at the margins of 
the Polish system, as domestic elites will not allow for the reduction of their power by such changes.’ 
Another shareholder844 said that some adjustment to the Polish legal system would have to be 
made. He did not, however, specified what sort of adjustment would have to be made to Polish 
corporate governance. Two other shareholders did not justify their opinion.   
In general, my interviewees expressed minimal interest in this particular question, despite 
the fact that I selected respondents who have extensive knowledge of corporate governance in 
Poland. In this respect, one president of a supervisory board845 said: ‘This question should rather be 
addressed to members of the legislative committee. Some legal theorists might also be able to 
discuss this issue. This is probably an issue that needs to be researched further.’  
The following subsection concerns the issue of board committees. I found it necessary to 
ask all participants about board committees, as the Polish legislator has not drawn much attention 
to them (see section ‘Other Board Issues’ in chapter V ‘Corporate Governance in Poland’). 
Moreover, one participant846 said that an adoption of a one-tier board model would require a 
different approach to board committees, which business practitioners in Poland are reluctant to 
consider.  
 
F. OTHER BOARD ISSUES 
1. Board committees on the supervisory board 
 
Board committees are an essential component of the one-tier board system. They are expected to 
perform various functions, of which, according to Charkham 847: 
 
‘the main one (…) [is] to assist the dispatch of business by considering it in more detail than 
would be convenient for the whole board… the second purpose is to increase objectivity 
                                                          
842 ibid. 
843 Text to n 823. 
844 Text to n 770. 
845 Text to n 836. 
846 One minority shareholder – text to n 823.  
847 Jonathan Charkham, Keeping Better Company: Corporate Governance Ten Years On (Oxford University Press 2005). 
  
145 
 
either because of inherent conflicts of interest such as executive remuneration, or else to 
discipline personal preferences as in the exercise of patronage.’  
 
They, thus, perform a critical function in corporate governance. 
Committees are common in the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance. They are 
established within the board of directors, and mainly composed of non-executive directors.848 
In Poland, committees may be appointed to the supervisory board, which should regularly 
report about their work. According to my doctrinal research findings, they are not, however, in 
general use in Polish companies. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers849, the majority (59%) of 
examined supervisory boards are not composed of any committee, and an audit committee exists 
only in one-third of the examined boards. Risk committees are rarely created in listed companies, 
mainly in financial institutions. Risk monitoring is, thus, vested mainly into audit committees850 (see 
also Appendix 7). 
 Under the Act of 29 May 2009 on Statutory Auditors, Their Self-Governing Organisation, 
Entities Authorised to Audit Financial Statements and on Public Oversight, an audit committee is 
obligatory in companies where the supervisory board is composed of more than five members851. If 
such a committee has not been established in companies that have a smaller board, statutory duties 
are performed by all supervisors collectively. However, PwC852 reports that their performance 
deviates from the practice applied by the best audit committees. It becomes evident while 
comparing the time dedicated to performing committee duties by supervisors and members of 
audit committees, as well as the number of meetings with expert auditors and heads of the internal 
audit. 
The Code of Best Practices of 2010 provides for no regulation of board committees and, for 
the tasks and operations of the board committees, only refers generally to Annex I of the 
Commission Recommendation of 15 February 2005 on the role of non-executive or supervisory 
directors (…). A regulation requiring the establishment of at least an audit committee within the 
supervisory board was abolished, which was criticised by the legal doctrine853.   
  Taking this critique into consideration, as well as the growing use of board committees in 
other countries, eg Japan (see section ‘Hybrid Corporate Governance in Japan’ in chapter III), I 
                                                          
848 See, for example, Mallin (n 27) 173-179; see also chapter III, for example, section ’Hybrid Corporate Governance in Japan’. 
849 PricewaterhouseCoopers Poland, ‘Zmiany w Funkcjonowaniu Rad Nadzorczych Zmierzają w Dobrym Kierunku Lecz Wymagają 
Przyspieszenia’ <www.pwc.pl/pl/biuro-prasowe/2014/2014-03-20-zmiany-w-funkcjonowaniu-rad-nadzorczych-zmierzaja-w-dobrym-
kierunku-lecz wymagaja-przyspieszenia.jhtml> accessed 16 May 2014. 
850 ibid. 
851 Art. 86, point 1 of the Act, implementing Art. 41 of the 2006/43/EC Directive.  
852 PricewaterhouseCoopers Poland, ‘Komitety Audytu w Polsce w Roku 2011. Badanie Spółek Publicznych Notowanych na GPW’ 
<www.forumradnadzorczych.pl/en/czytaj/155/raport> accessed 15 May 2014. 
853 For example Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 491. 
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decided that this was an issue that should be raised during my interviews. I asked participants the 
following questions: 
 
• What do you think of having committees on supervisory boards in Poland? They are 
currently obligatory in companies where the supervisory board is composed of more than 
five members.  
• Do you think that they should be used in Poland on a wider scale?  
• Should they operate on a statutory basis? 
Please justify your answers. 
 
I interviewed 37 participants, but only 11 responded. Three board members, who were 
interviewed by e-mail, left them blank, as did the other participants who took part in structured 
interviews (for further explanation concerning data collection during the interviews, see chapter II 
– ‘Research Methodology’). I contacted these board members in order to repeat the questions, but 
they have as yet, not replied to my e-mail.   
Out of the 11 participants who answered my questions, three (two members of the 
management board and one president of a supervisory board) declared that committees should be 
present in all listed companies, and should be regulated statutorily. The remaining eight participants 
(five board members, two employees and one shareholder) found the current regulation sufficient. 
Importantly, all the participants who answered my question said that the presence of committees 
on a supervisory board is beneficial for the interests of a company.   
A head of the audit committee of a JSC854 said as follows: 
 
‘Committees are crucial for corporate governance. Despite the fact that they have only 
recently been introduced in Poland, corporate practice has proved their usefulness. They 
enable supervisors to discuss some important issues more thoroughly in a smaller team of 
professionals. This is not always possible during meetings involving all the supervisors, eg due 
to time limitations. Committees provide supervisory boards with greater control and 
knowledge of the most crucial areas of the company’s operation. Supervisors also have the 
chance to express their opinions on particular issues and propose recommendations. 
Committee statements keep the entire board’s work in order.’  
 
One supervisory board president855 expressed the following opinion about a strategy 
committee:  
                                                          
854 A member of the supervisory board of a JSC, interviewed in December 2014.   
855 Employed by a JSC, and interviewed in December 2012.  
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‘I came across strategy committees – I find them very significant, although I think it is 
important not to do the entire job for the management board, but rather insist that directors 
prepare a strategy, which can subsequently be discussed by the supervisory board. 
Meanwhile, some supervisory boards or some of their members have an inclination to create 
a strategy for the management board.’  
 
Another supervisory board president856 suggested that supervisory boards should consider 
the needs of a company while creating committees. In this president’s opinion, the existence of an 
audit committee on every board is justified, while the establishment of other committees might only 
be a waste of a company’s funds. One example of an untypical temporary solution is a restructuring 
committee created for the period of a company’s restructuring in order to monitor its progress and 
decide on its priorities857. This respondent also suggested not getting used to designated teams, and 
verifying whether their presence is still necessary in the supervisory board858.  
Only one participant859 was concerned about the effectiveness of committee boards in 
Poland. From this person’s point of view, including committees on supervisory boards has an impact 
on their dimension; boards without committees might be smaller. Meanwhile, ‘larger boards can be 
less effective than smaller boards because of coordination problems’860 (see Appendix 8). In this 
respect, Yermack, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells861 provide evidence that smaller boards are 
associated with higher company value. It should, however, be taken into consideration that a bigger 
company might require a bigger board. Otherwise, its efficiency might be questioned, as a smaller 
number of supervisors might have difficulties carrying out all their duties.  
Finally, there were also some controversies amongst the participants in relation to the 
composition of boards. This concerned the participation of employees, banks and women on the 
supervisory board. All these issues are presented below in separate subsections.  
 
 
 
                                                          
856 Text to n 800. 
857 ibid.  
858 ibid.  
859 A minority shareholder of a JSC, interviewed in May 2013.  
860 ibid. cf Jay W. Lorsch in Martin Lipton and Jay W. Lorsch, ‘A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance’ (1992) 1 Business 
Lawyer 59; and Michael C. Jensen, ‘The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems’ (1993) 48 Journal 
of Finance 831. 
861 David Larry Yermack, ‘Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors’ (1996) 40 Journal of Financial Economics 
185; Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren and Martin T. Wells, ‘Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms’ (1998) 48 
Journal of Financial Economics 35.  
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2. Employees and bank representatives on supervisory boards in 
Poland 
 
 
In general, there is no legal requirement to include employees on supervisory boards in Poland. 
Companies that have been put through indirect privatisation may only be obliged to appoint an 
employee (and a supplier) representative to the supervisory board862. Thus, they (employees) are 
mainly present in companies in which one of shareholders is the State Treasury. According to 
Deloitte863, the number of employees on boards in Poland is relatively low, and there is no 
employee representative in 80% of all companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. 
 
Chart 4. Employees on supervisory boards* in Poland864 
 
 
*Research were conducted between March and April 2012. 
 
I asked participants what they think of including employees on the supervisory board. In 
particular, I wanted to learn whether, according to my participants, the presence of employees on 
the supervisory board may contribute to the more efficient functioning of corporate governance in 
Poland. 
I asked the following question: 
 
Do you think that employees and representatives of banks (in companies where they are 
                                                          
862 See Art. 12–16 of the Act of 30 August 1996 on the Privatisation Act. See also section ‘The Supervisory Board’ in chapter V.  
863 Deloitte Poland, ‘Raport „Współczesna Rada Nadzorcza 2012” (...)’ (n 722). 
864 ibid.   
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shareholders) should be appointed to supervisory boards? Please justify your answer. 
 
I also included banks in my question, as German corporate law provides for banks’ representation 
on boards (see below). As I mentioned in Chapter I ‘Introductory Remarks’ and in section E of this 
chapter, the Polish mechanism of corporate governance was mainly based on German law in this 
area.  
 Only one participant865 declared that at least one employee should be appointed to the 
supervisory board. In this participant’s opinion, this could bring some broader perspectives to and a 
fresher insight into the company’s activity. The remaining 16 participants (out of 37) opposed the 
concept of employees’ presence on supervisory boards. This included all board members, one 
shareholder and one employee of a JSC866, who was unsure about this idea.  
My questionnaire was given to 23 participants (see chapter II – ‘Research Methodology’ – 
‘Data Collection’, where I explain the process of conducting interviews in Poland), out of whom 20 
left this question blank (three persons answered the question, but only two employees justified 
their opinion). The other 14 respondents who took part in unstructured interviews (responding by 
e-mail, Skype or face to face; for further explanation, see chapter II – ‘Research Methodology’ – 
‘Data Collection’) gave one of the following answers: ‘I am not sure’, ‘I do not think this is a good 
idea’, ‘I do not think so’, or ‘I doubt it would improve the functioning of corporate governance’. 
Only two of the 14 participants justified their answers.  
 One president of the supervisory board in a large JSC867 expressed the following opinion: 
 
‘Employees are usually a very poor representation. They are open to all kinds of pressure 
coming from various sides, including these with limited understanding of corporate 
governance and those who tend to go along with the view of the majority. They should be 
prevented from becoming board members whenever it is possible. Employee representatives 
on supervisory boards may hinder the process of making decisions. I mean decisions that are 
in the best interests of the company as a whole, but not necessarily in the best interests of 
employees as a group.’ 
 
 Another supervisory board president868 pointed out that ‘[w]hen we discuss technical issues 
during our meetings, the technical knowledge of some employees turns out to be vast, especially in 
the area of mining and metallurgy.’ 
                                                          
865 A minority shareholder of an LLC, interviewed in January 2014.    
866 One minority shareholder – text to n 823; this employee was interviewed in July 2013.  
867 Text to n 800.  
868 Text to n 836. 
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 Indeed, employee representatives defend the interests of employees that do not always 
comply with the long-term plans of companies. On the other hand, one president of a management 
board869 noticed that employees on supervisory boards ‘identify themselves more closely with the 
company’. According to one employee870, employees on boards may also facilitate communication 
and mutual understanding between corporate authorities and the workforce.  
Simultaneously, the presence of employees on boards may also cause conflicts within 
management. One employee871 declared that employees often raise some problematic issues: ‘We 
want to talk about pay rise, the excessive remunerations that directors receive, some investments 
that are necessary in our opinion, better work conditions for us, etc.’ 
In Germany, the Cromme Code 2002872 includes the possibility for bank representatives to 
sit on the supervisory board of German corporations. Banks in Germany are able to cast proxy votes 
on behalf of the many small investors they represent873. As a consequence, they assume an 
important role in controlling corporate management and protecting minority shareholders874. It is, 
however, assumed that the direct influence of banks in a company will decline over time and it will 
be more the distinction between ownership and control that encourages corporate governance 
reform875. 
Out of 37 participants, 15 answered my question concerning banks and their participation 
on supervisory boards (the same 15 who answered my question about employees).  
14 board members, who took part in unstructured interviews (see chapter II – ‘Research 
Methodology’ – ‘Data Collection’), answered that only the shareholders should decide about the 
composition of the supervisory board. The other 22 participants who received my questionnaire left 
the question blank (for further information concerning data collection during my interviews see 
chapter II – ‘Research Methodology’).  Only one of them – a shareholder of a JSC876 – answered and 
took the stance that bank representatives should be appointed to supervisory boards in Poland. It 
is, however, in the opinion of this person, superfluous for the government to regulate this by the 
Company Code, as companies have already been given the possibility of appointing bank 
                                                          
869 Text to n 763.  
870 Text to n 866. 
871 ibid.  
872 The German voluntary code of corporate governance, based on the ‘comply or explain’ principle.  
873 Andreas Hackethal, Reinhard H. Schmidt and Marcel Tyrell, ‘Banks and German Corporate Governance: On the Way to a Capital 
Market-Based System?’ (2005) 13 (3) Corporate Governance: An International Review 397. 
874 Christel Lane, ‘Changes in Corporate Governance of German Corporations: Convergence to the Anglo-American Model?’ (2003) 7 
(2/3) Competition & Change 79. 
875 Marco Becht and Colin Mayer, ‘Introduction’ in Fabrizio Barca and Marco Becht (eds), The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford 
University Press 2001). See also Gerhard Cromme, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany and the German Corporate Governance Code’ 
(2005) 13 (3) Corporate Governance: An International Review 362. The same argumentation applies for Japan; see for example Y. Yafe, 
‘Corporate Governance in Japan: Past Performance and Future Prospects’ (2000) 16 (2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 74. 
876 This shareholder was interviewed in October 2014.  
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representatives by not prohibiting shareholders to sit on supervisory boards (the same answer was 
given by those participants who were against banks’ participation in boards). This participant did 
not explain why – in his opinion – banks should have their representatives on boards.  
Słomka-Gołębiowska‘s877 empirical research on the impact of banks on companies’ dealings 
and decision-making reveals a weak influence of banks on corporate governance of public 
companies in the years 1999-2002. According to her research878, supervisory boards of almost half 
of surveyed companies have at least one bank representative – usually the major creditor of a given 
company. However, banks are rather reluctant to engage themselves in the decision making 
process in companies to whom they extend credit879. In Słomka-Gołębiowska’s880 opinion, this may 
be explained by the rational aversion to legal risk associated with a conflict of interests and the risk 
of a violation of the rules prohibiting insider dealing. 
My research participants were also unenthusiastic about the idea of mandatory 
participation of women in corporate governance.  
 
 
3. Gender diversity within corporate governance in Poland 
 
As I have mentioned in chapter IV, the issue of gender diversity on corporate boards was debated 
in the US and the UK. The opinions expressed, in this chapter, indicates that the presence of women 
on boards may lead to better company performance (see section ‘Board Diversity’ in chapter V). 
Meanwhile, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers881, the participation of women on supervisory 
boards of listed companies in Poland is not high (for details see section ‘Other Board Issues’ in 
chapter V). These two facts encouraged me to ask the following question during the interviews: 
 
Do you think that laws should oblige companies to appoint women to corporate governance 
positions? Please justify your answer. 
  
Participants who answered my question (38 in total, as one person who withdrew from 
participating in this project also answered this question882) were positive about the suggestion that 
                                                          
877 Agnieszka Słomka-Gołębiowska, ‘Czy banki wypełniają lukę w ładzie korporacyjnym w Polsce’ (2007) 1 Quarterly for the Entire 
Commercial, Insolvency and Capital Market Law.  
878 ibid. 
879 ibid. 
880 ibid. 
881 PwC, ‘Rady Nadzorcze 2013. Skuteczność (...)’ (n 539).  
882 This person withdrew from the participation in this research, but returned a partially completed form. This was a partner of a 
general partnership, who had been going to take part in structured interviews.   
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a larger number of women could sit on boards in Poland. However, none of my interviewees found 
it reasonable to create laws that would impose on companies the obligation to appoint a prescribed 
number of women to boards. The following quote from one supervisory board president883 
summarises the survey best: 
 
‘In our case the presence of women works in our favour, but I would not go as far as to state 
that 40%[884] of board members should be women. I think this is a path that leads to nowhere, 
because we would also have to say that 10% of board members should be Muslims and 15% 
– engineers. Board diversity is composed of many various features.’   
 
While conducting unstructured interviews, I referred to Rodrigues’s885 opinion, according 
which diversity is an important precursor to independence of thought, and therefore an increased 
degree of heterogeneity among board members would improve the quality of board oversight (for 
details see chapter IV). Nevertheless, none of my participants were able to state that more women 
on supervisory boards in Poland would have a positive influence on independence in the decision 
making process in Poland, in particular in companies with highly consolidated ownership and 
control. 
 
 
4. Obligatory training for board members in Poland 
 
Another issue that has to be raised in this chapter is training for board members in Poland. I have 
omitted this issue in chapter V, as Polish business literature does not deal with it practically. The 
American and British legal doctrines also do not consider training for corporate officials a 
problematic aspect within their corporate governance system. On the other hand, I dedicated 
considerable attention to this aspect of corporate governance while reviewing literature concerning 
the hybridisation of corporate governance.  
 Keeping this in mind, in particular the case of Malaysia, where an obligatory training 
programme was imposed on listed companies, I asked the following questions: 
 
• Do you think that training for board members should be obligatory?  
• Is training for board members essential for running a business? 
                                                          
883 Text to n 855. 
884 This refers to some countries that decided that 40% of board members should be women, eg Norway; see also section ‘Board Diversity’ 
in chapter IV and Appendix 9. 
885 Rodrigues (n 531).  
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Please justify your answer. 
 
34 participants responded. The remaining three people, who responded via a 
questionnaire, left the question blank. Out of the 34 participants, 17 (all board members and three 
shareholders) who were interviewed either via e-mail or Skype, face to face (board members), or 
via a questionnaire (three shareholders) provided their answers with an explanation (see chapter – 
II ‘Research Methodology’, where I explain the data collection process during my interviews).   
All 34 participants declared that a decision about training for board members should be left 
to the discretion of the company. 17 participants (out of 34) explained that obligatory training might 
either be too costly for companies or superfluous. One board member886 added that mandatory 
training is actually against business freedom: ‘This is almost like choosing business partners for 
companies.’  All 17 participants emphasised that there must be some effort made to ensure that 
companies execute effective training for their officials. They did not explain what exactly could be 
done in this respect.  
 Finally, one shareholder887 said that the WSE could impose on listed companies an obligation 
to organise mandatory training for directors only and in some areas only (the most crucial for a 
company’s life). Training for supervisors, in areas other than the most crucial ones, could be 
organised by companies optionally. This, however, still might expose companies to loss. Moreover, 
since supervisors have a great influence on the management of a company, they should also take 
part in obligatory training.888 
With respect to my second question – ‘Is training for board members essential for running 
a business?’, 17 respondents out of 34 (the same who responded my first question) were of the 
opinion that such training has a significant meaning for companies because it enables board 
members to discharge their duties more efficiently, which – in consequence – may improve the 
overall company performance. All the interviewees agreed with me that continuous training and 
skill enhancement for directors may improve the flow of information between management and 
supervisory boards in Poland, as directors are not currently obliged to provide supervisors with 
information regarding the company’s operation (see section ‘Other Board Issues’ in chapter V).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
886 A member of the supervisory board of a JSC, interviewed in December 2012.   
887 A minority shareholder of an LLC, interviewed in July 2012. 
888 ibid. 
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G. ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE IN POLAND 
 
The matter of the ‘company’s interest’ is perceived as a fundamental determinant of the operation 
of the company’s authorities and is frequently applied in Poland as a benchmark in assessing the 
legality of a given corporate action889. Prevailing legal doctrine in Poland tends to interpret the 
notion of company’s interest as a ‘result’ or outcome of balancing the interests of persons involved 
in the company, including shareholders as well as stakeholders, eg creditors, employers, 
suppliers890. This is enlightened shareholder value, which has already been explained in chapter III 
(with respect to South Africa and Poland) and in chapter IV (in relation to the US and the UK). 
As I explained in chapter III, in Poland, enlightened shareholder value was reflected by the 
Code of Best Practices of 2005891 and repealed by the Code of Best Practices of 2007, leaving the 
determination of company interest up to the managers, commentators and ultimately to the 
courts. During my pilot interviews892, I heard negative opinions about the repeal, and therefore I 
decided to ask the other participants whether they would like enlightened shareholder value to be 
included with the newest version of the Code, and what they thought of South African stakeholder 
inclusivity in the context of Polish corporate governance. I formulated my questions as follows: 
 
• Do you think that the application of enlightened shareholder value in Polish corporate 
practice should be encompassed by the Code of Best Practices?  
 
The King Code Committee in South Africa has recently included into its code of best practices the 
so-called stakeholder inclusivity, which means that stakeholders’ interests and expectations are 
considered on the basis that this is in the best interests of the company. Thus, they are not 
perceived as a mere tool to serve the interests of the shareholder.  
 
• What do you think of Polish companies taking the same approach?   
Please justify your answer.  
 
Out of 37 participants, 24 answered my question concerning enlightened shareholder 
value. The remaining 13 participants were given a questionnaire and left this question blank (see 
subsection ‘Data Collection’ in chapter II – ‘Research Methodology’). The majority of the 
participants who answered my question were board members. They all took part in unstructured 
                                                          
889 Adam Opalski, ‘O pojęciu interesu spółki kapitałowej’ (2008) 11 Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 16. 
890 Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 461. 
891 General Rules, rule no. 1. 
892 Text to n 529. 
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interviews (for further explanation concerning unstructured interviews conducted during my 
research, see chapter II – ‘Research Methodology’ – ‘Data Collection’) There were also six 
shareholders and four employees in this group of people, who responded via a questionnaire.  
Only ten out of 24 participants expressed their opinion about the South African model of 
corporate governance (the others either left the question blank or did not respond via e-mail). This 
can be explained by the fact that this is a fairly new issue in corporate governance across the world. 
Thus, it might not be entirely understandable for business participants from outside of South Africa.  
The majority of participants (17 out of 24) declared that the enlightened shareholder model 
should be included and explicitly defined in the Code of Best Practices, since it is covered by 
protective legal provisions, for example labour law, insolvency law, consumer law, banking law. Out 
of the remaining participants, for two board members893 and one shareholder894, it is pointless to 
include this model with this Code, as it has been employed by management boards anyway. ‘The 
members of the management board and supervisory board cannot give priority to the economic 
interests of stakeholders before the interests of shareholders as a group’ – one of them895 declared. 
In contrast, two sole entrepreneurs896 and two shareholders897 think that the current regulation is 
sufficient, and that South African stakeholder inclusivity should not be adapted in Poland. As one of 
shareholders898 explained, ‘the notion of a stakeholder is simply too broad, and therefore impossible 
to execute.’ The other participants were against implementing stakeholder inclusivity in Poland, but 
did not justify their answer.  
 
 
H. REMUNERATION POLICY IN POLAND 
 
The debate over the issue of remuneration for corporate officials is summarised in chapter IV 
(mainly with respect to the US and the UK, see also chapter V ‘Corporate Governance in Poland’ – 
‘Remuneration Policy’). In particular, considerable attention has been drawn to the so-called 
advisory vote of shareholders on the remuneration statement, required in the US and the UK.  
 In Poland, the Code of Best Practices refers only to the Commission Recommendation of 30 
April 2009 complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the 
regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies, which raises the issue of advisory 
                                                          
893 One management board vice-president – text to n 801; one management board member – text to n 791.  
894 A minority shareholder of a JSC, interviewed in June 2013. 
895 One management board member – text to n 791.  
896 Two suppliers of limited companies, interviewed in November 2013.  
897 One minority shareholder – text to n 782; and one minority shareholder of an LLC, interviewed in May 2013. 
898 One minority shareholder of an LLC, ibid. 
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vote. This means that companies, which are established in Poland, may (but are not obliged to) 
implement this solution into their statutes/articles of association. Taking this into consideration, I 
asked participants the following question:  
 
Do you think that shareholders should be given the right to approve remuneration for directors? 
Please justify your opinion.  
 
Moreover, I asked participants what they would like to change in the remuneration policy for 
corporate officials in Poland. There are several legislative lacunas in this area (see section 
‘Remuneration Policy’ in chapter V), so I decided to formulate a general question not to impose 
certain answers on my interviewees. I formulated my question in the following way:  
 
Is there any issue in the remuneration policy for corporate officials that – in your opinion – 
requires amendments? Please justify your answer.   
 
Out of 37 participants, 29 answered my first question. The remaining eight participants who 
took part in structured interviews left the question blank (see chapter II – ‘Research Methodology’, 
in which I explain the process of collecting data, including the process of conducting interviews, 
during my research).  
 For 16 participants (mainly board members, who attended unstructured interviews, but 
also shareholders and sole entrepreneurs, who responded via a questionnaire; see chapter II – 
‘Research Methodology’ – ‘Data Collection), shareholders should only have an advisory vote with 
respect to the remuneration scheme of the company. One of them899 noted that supervisory boards, 
which are elected by shareholders’ meetings, decide about directors’ remuneration (Art. 347§1CCC; 
see also section ‘Remuneration Policy’ in chapter V). Thus, supervisors express the opinion of 
shareholders while deciding about remuneration for directors, and there is no need to confirm it by 
an additional vote during a shareholders’ meeting. This would be time consuming and costly. 
However, six out of the 16 participants said that the rule of advisory voting should be clearly 
expressed by the Code of Best Practices. 
 Seven participants (out of 29) declared that shareholders should have the right to approve 
directors’ remunerations, and that the exercise of this right might stop further increases, which bear 
very little relationship to company performance or shareholder returns. This group of participants 
were mainly composed of shareholders and employees. There was one management board 
president and one company lawyer900 amongst them. They both emphasised that the excessive 
                                                          
899 One management board member – text to n 772. 
900 One company lawyer – text to n 816; and one management board president – text to n 796. 
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directors’ remunerations are – in their opinion – the most serious weakness of the Polish system of 
corporate governance.  
 The remaining six participants (one shareholder and sole entrepreneurs) either said that 
the current regulation had worked well enough (four participants) or did not have any opinion about 
the issue (two participants).  
 
 
Chart 5. Opinions on setting a remuneration policy in Poland 
 
16 participants (out of 29 participants who answered my first question) also answered to 
my second question: ‘Is there any issue in the remuneration policy for corporate officials that – in 
your opinion – requires amendments? Please justify your answer.’   
 A significant number of participants (14 in total; mainly board members and shareholders) 
emphasised how important a role a remuneration committee has in the process of setting 
remunerations. According to them, some efforts should be made to bring remuneration committees 
into general use (see section concerning board committees in this chapter and section ‘Other Board 
Issues’ in chapter V).  
 One vice-president of a management board901 suggested that shareholders should give 
approval for share-based remuneration schemes, as well as the remuneration statement. 
 Finally, members of supervisory boards complained about their low remunerations (see 
Appendix 10), which do not provide any incentive for them. For example, one president of a 
supervisory board902 said the following: 
 
‘Only some supervisors view their work as a challenge and as an opportunity to gain 
                                                          
901 Text to n 211. 
902 Text to n 836. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Shareholders should have an advisory vote
Shareholders should approve the remuneration scheme
No change is needed
Did not have an opinion
  
158 
 
additional knowledge and experience. For the majority of specialists, the financial aspect is 
essential, and therefore competitive and motivating remuneration has an impact on the 
efficiency of supervisory boards. If the level of remuneration is not motivating, accordingly 
the engagement of supervisors is low, which results in the lower efficiency of the supervisory 
board.’   
 
In this regard, PricewaterhouseCoopers903 states that there is no relation between the scale 
of responsibility of supervisors, the company’s profit and their remuneration. There is also too large 
a disproportion between the remunerations of supervisors and directors904. 
 
Chart 6. Relationships between the remuneration of members and presidents of supervisory boards 
to members and presidents of management boards905 
 
 
One of my interviewees – a head of an audit committee906 – observed that supervisors do 
not receive additional remuneration for work in committees, which is standard for directors of 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. In general, PricewaterhouseCoopers907 reports that 
supervisors in Poland earned much less than directors abroad. 
For a president of a supervisory board908, small remunerations is one of the reasons why 
foreigners do not want to work on Polish supervisory boards.  
 Surprisingly, only two shareholders mentioned disclosure of director’s remuneration as an 
issue that should to be taken into deeper consideration by the government in Poland. On the other 
                                                          
903 PwC, ‘Rady Nadzorcze 2013. Skuteczność (...)’ (n 539). 
904 ibid. 
905 ibid. 
906 One supervisory board member – text to n 854. 
907 PwC, ‘Rady Nadzorcze 2013. Skuteczność (…)’ (n 539). 
908 Employed by a JSC, and interviewed in October 2012.  
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hand, it should be remembered that it (remuneration disclosure) has statutorily been regulated 
with respect to listed companies, which are obliged to disclose information on directors’ 
remuneration (for members of management and supervisory boards). Both shareholders hold 
shares in an LLC, and this form of doing business is not embraced by this regulation. They both 
declared that an absence of legal regulations that would oblige management of LLCs to disclose this 
sort of information may create an opportunity for fraud and increase the disproportion in pay 
between senior managers and the workforce. In their opinion, it might be one of the biggest 
problems of corporate governance in Poland.  
 
 
I. THE DISCLOSURE SYSTEM IN POLAND 
 
Participants did not mention the issue of disclosure of corporate information while discussing 
remunerations. Thus, in order to find out what they consider a disadvantage of the disclosure 
system in Poland and what they would like to change in this system, I asked them the following 
question: 
 
• What do you think of Poland adopting merit-based system? 
 
Corporate disclosure is mainly regulated on a voluntary basis in Poland, but there is a set of basic 
mandatory standards to ensure that the minimum requirements will be met by companies with 
respect to corporate transparency [see Chapter V]. There are however legal systems where the 
statutory approach to disclosure is dominant [see more in Chapter III – ‘The Disclosure System in 
Singapore’].  
 
• What would you like to change in the disclosure system in Poland?  
Please justify your answers.  
 
None of the participants interviewed via a questionnaire responded to my second question. 
During unstructured interviews (see chapter II ‘Research Methodology’, where I elaborate on the 
process of data collection during interviews), when I suggested that the provision requiring listed 
companies to disclose directors’ remuneration might also be extended to JCSs (see chapter V, in 
which I explain that, in Poland, such an obligation is only imposed on listed companies), eight board 
members said that this is something that would be worth taking into consideration. The other six 
participants were not sure whether this was a good idea. None of the 14 participants who took part 
in my unstructured interviews proposed a change to the disclosure system in Poland.  
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 29 participants (out of 37) answered my first question. The other participants received a 
questionnaire and they left this question blank.  
 Out of the 29 participants who answered, 19 do not think that any change to the currently 
existing disclosure system is necessary. As one president of a supervisory board909 said, ‘too many 
rules and regulations stifle the entrepreneurial spirit, and too few rules leave the investing public 
unprotected against unscrupulous business practices.’ This person also referred to, and compared 
the Singaporean MAS to the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (FSA), highlighting that they bear 
a resemblance to each other. Like the MAS, the FSA is a body that is responsible for overseeing the 
development of the financial market in Poland. Inter alia, issuers are required to lodge their 
prospectus with the FSA, which may refuse them the right to register if they do not meet the 
requirements regulated by Polish law.910 Such a provision is also included in Singaporean law (see 
section ‘The Disclosure System in Singapore’ in chapter III). 
The other participants did not explain their viewpoint in detail. In this group there were the 
other board members, two employees and three shareholders.  
 Out of the ten remaining participants, six did not have an opinion on the issue of corporate 
disclosure, and four said they would rules relating to corporate disclosure to be tightened up, as it 
improved companies’ transparency. In this group, there were eight shareholders, one members of 
a professional partnership (pharmacy) and one sole entrepreneur.  
 In general, participants expressed minimal interest in my questions concerning the 
disclosure system in Poland.   
 
 
J. THE ‘COMPLY OR EXPLAIN’ PRINCIPLE IN POLAND 
 
The aim of my last question was to determine what the participants thought of the ‘comply or 
explain’ character of the Polish Code of Best Practices and the possibility of the implementation of 
the ‘apply or explain’ approach. The main reason why I decided to ask the question to my research 
participants is the reform of South African compliance framework (see section ‘Hybrid Corporate 
Governance’ – ‘The ‘Apply or Explain’ Principle’ in chapter III), embodied in the King Code of 
Governance for South Africa 2009, as well as the fact that the American Congress statutorily 
regulated a part of corporate provisions in the SOX act (see section ‘‘Comply or Else’ Vs. ‘Comply or 
Explain’’ in chapter III). This suggests that the ‘apply or explain’ approach, which, inter alia, South 
Africa took, may not become dominant in corporate governance in the world.  Thus, I asked the 
                                                          
909 ibid.  
910 See Art. 21 (onward) of the Act on Public Offering (...) and Public Companies. 
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following questions: 
 
• What do you think of the functioning of the ‘comply or explain’ principle in Poland?  
• What do you think of changing the ‘comply or explain’ principle to the ‘apply or explain’ 
principle in Poland?  
 
The ‘apply or explain’ principle assumes that boards can decide to apply recommendations 
differently or apply an alternative practice, but still this should attain the objective of the primary 
corporate governance principles.  
 
25 participants in total responded to my questions. The other participants received a 
questionnaire and did not answer these questions (for further explanation concerning the data 
collection process during my research, see chapter II ‘Research Methodology’). All the respondents 
expressed a positive opinion about the application of the ‘comply or explain’ principle in Poland, 
but only some wished to discuss this issue in detail.  
 One board member911 listed the following merits of the non-binding character of the Polish 
Code of Best Practices: 
• Companies choose practices that fit their needs. 
•  It might cut the cost of running a business significantly. 
• It reduces the participation of regulatory authorities to minimum standards. 
• The flexibility of the approach involves greater competition both within the company and at 
national level. 
 
On the other hand, one participant912 said that the ‘comply or else’ approach is 
recommended for the integration process of developing countries, such as Poland. ‘It is better for 
client protection and the conducting of government reconstruction plans. The companies’ structure 
and practices are similar to competent authority’s structures and practices’ – the participant 
reported.  
Only six participants (four board members, one corporate lawyer and one employee) 
expressed their opinion on the implementation of the ‘apply or explain’ approach in Poland, two of 
whom (board members) were of the opinion that it might bring chaos to the idea of corporate 
governance: ‘If the ‘apply or explain’ approach was taken in Poland, the implementation of the 
provisions of the Code of Best Practices might be a challenge for interpreters. They would certainly 
                                                          
911 A member of the management board of an LLC, interviewed in January 2014.  
912 One management board president – text to n 727.  
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interpret particular provisions in a different way’ (a supervisory board president913). For one of them 
(a management board vice-president914), the ‘apply or explain’ approach in Poland might also 
decrease the ratio of compliance with the Code of Best Practices.  
One employee915 declared the following:  ‘The adaptation of the approach requires that 
stakeholders be regularly updated. Whilst the Dutch code requires listed companies to provide an 
explanation for deviations, the other countries merely require a statement for disclosing of non-
conformance. The Dutch code deserved greater attention from the Polish government.’ 
The lawyer916 pointed out that the Code of Best Practices had been criticised in Polish legal 
doctrine917 for being too strongly focused on the procedural rules of corporate governance and 
neglecting the introduction and promotion of general guidance (principles of conduct) for 
shareholders and company organs, such as the loyalty principle, corporate opportunity doctrine or 
the business judgment rule. ‘It seems like the WSE would have to revise the current ‘Best Practices’, 
and give them a completely different shape’ – the person said.  
 
 
K. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter is an analysis of interviews conducted in Poland with 37 business practitioners, and 
develops my discussion on corporate governance in Poland began in chapter V. For this reason I 
include findings from my doctrinal research in some sections.  
This chapter aims to answer all my three research questions, namely: 
 
• What are the weaknesses of Polish corporate governance? 
• What changes should be made to corporate governance in Poland? 
 
and above all: 
• Is a hybrid corporate governance model a realistic choice for Poland? 
 
Section B deals with the issue of concentrated ownership and control in Poland. Sections C, 
D and F are dedicated to board matters, eg the independence of supervisors, the presence of 
employees and women on boards and board committees. In Section E, I ask my participants about 
                                                          
913 Text to n 855. 
914 Text to n 801.   
915 Text to n 866.  
916 One company lawyer – text to n 816.  
917 See Adam Opalski, ‘Nowe Dobre Praktyki w spółkach publicznych’ (2008) 3 Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 14. 
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the possibility of implementing the American or British corporate governance models in Poland. In 
Section G, I go back to the issue of enlightened shareholder value in Poland. Sections H and I focus 
on the issue of remuneration policy in Polish companies. Section I is mainly dedicated to the 
disclosure of remuneration in Poland. In Section J, my participants express their opinion on the 
application of the ‘comply or explain’ principle in Poland, as well as the newest approach to 
corporate compliance, eg introduced in South Africa, namely the ‘apply or explain’ concept. 
My opinion on each of these issues is expressed in the following chapter. I also elaborate 
on my research limitations and delimitations in the next chapter. 
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Polish corporate governance is a traditionally two-tier board system comprising a supervisory board 
and a management board. The management board runs the day-to-day business of the company 
and is responsible for issues that are not vested in the supervisory board and the shareholders’ 
meeting. The supervisory board supervises the management board and oversees the company’s 
financial statements (for further explanation see chapter V).  
As a matter of fact, the supervisory board might also be a management organ. Various 
sources918 provide that the main characteristic of Polish corporate governance system is a high 
concentration of ownership and control, where controlling shareholders extend their influence 
through the supervisory board (I explain this in detail in chapters V and VI).  
Indeed, the ownership structure of Polish companies amounts to 40% on average, while 
this is below 2% in Anglo-Saxon companies919. In companies in which the State Treasury holds 
shares, the ratio can even be higher and amounts to 90% (see Appendix 5).  
The main act regulating corporate governance in Poland is the Company Code of 2000. 
Under its provisions, the supervisory board usually appoints and removes members of the 
management board in a JSC920, and the statutes may provide for its broader scope of powers921. 
Both boards might exclusively be composed of the shareholders, as the Code does not prohibit that.  
The Company Code of 2000, as well as other statutes regulating corporate governance in 
Poland, often give general idea and principles rather than concrete solutions. This only increases 
the power of controlling shareholders, as it gives them a legal basis for having private benefits of 
control at the expense of the minority shareholders. As a consequence, conflicts between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders are very common for Polish companies.922 
Among other things, the Code of Best Practices has been passed to mitigate the difficulties 
that corporate governance in Poland faces, eg the appointment of independent supervisors aimed 
to bring some objectivity to the decision making process in companies923. This, however, cannot 
weaken the highly concentrated ownership structure of Polish companies. Companies have no 
obligation to comply with the Code’s provisions. They are only obliged to report non-compliance if 
they decide to depart from its recommendations. Moreover, the Code of Best Practices regulates 
                                                          
918 See, for example, Tamowicz & Dierżanowski (n 8).  
919 Morck & Steier (n 25).  
920 Art. 368§2 and 4CCC. 
921 Art. 384§1CCC. 
922 See, for example, Oplustil & Radwan (n 7) 455. 
923 Dzierżanowski & Tamowicz (n 8).  
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the functioning of listed JSCs exclusively924. 
Taking this all into account, the main undertaking of my research became to search for 
solutions within foreign legal systems that would equalise right of all shareholders in Poland. My 
attention was drawn to countries where the so-called hybrid changes to corporate governance have 
been implemented. In particular, I became interested in the newest changes to corporate 
governance in Japan and South Africa (they are elaborated in chapter III – ‘Literature Review’, as 
well as other hybrid solutions, which implemented in Malaysia and Singapore).  
The South African King Code Committee, for example, introduced the stakeholder 
inclusivity concept, which imposes on the board of directors the obligation to consider ‘the 
legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders on the basis that this is in the best interests 
of the company, and not merely as an instrument to serve the interests of the shareholder’ 
[shareholder enlightened theory] 925. For some observers926, nature, society (ie all subjects that 
might have an influence on a company’s performance or are influenced by a company’s 
performance) and business are interrelated in compound ways, and therefore should be taken into 
account by corporate decision makers. However, for their opponents this stakeholder theory 
includes too many subjects into the notion of a stakeholder927.  
In general, South Africa has been considered a leader in global competiveness surveys for 
its good corporate governance practices928. However, there is no data that would show how 
effective the new approach to stakeholders in South Africa has been. 
Surveys that found a positive relationship between corporate social performance and 
corporate financial performance have been conducted in the US (see section ‘Shareholder Value’ 
in chapter IV), where legislators passed laws that impose on companies an obligation to take non-
shareholder stakeholders into consideration while making strategic decisions929. This is the 
‘shareholder enlightened value’, which has also been expressed in the UK Companies Act of 2006 
with respect to directors’ duties930.  
In Japan, the government installed an additional model of corporate governance for 
entrepreneurs. This means that they can now choose the way in which they want to manage their 
companies. In fact, the Japanese concept was the main inspiration for my research.  
The new Japanese model was copied from the US, so it includes executives responsible for 
day-to-day management and directors who are the monitoring body. In addition, committees are 
                                                          
924 Preamble of the Code. 
925 King (n 34). 
926 R. Khoza in Albert Luthuli Centre, ‘Interview Summary Report (…)’ (n 203). 
927 Tullberg in ibid.  
928 ibid.  
929 Luoma & Goodstein (n 42). 
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an integral part of this model – especially: auditing, appointment and remuneration committees. 
Each committee is composed of at least three directors, of which a majority have to be outsiders.931  
The new approach was forced by an influx of foreign investors from Europe and the US in 
the 1990s932. Before, companies in Japan were largely owned by the so-called ‘stable shareholders’. 
Stable investors hold their shares mainly to strengthen and grow stable business relations rather 
than to earn on their investments.933 Since they are not focused on maximising their profits, 
managers do not put much effort into improving company performance934.  
By 2008, the one-tier board model was only adopted by forty seven first section TSE listed 
companies, comprising 2.7% of all the listed companies935. It was believed that it might enhance 
the effectiveness of the company’s internal governance mechanism936. There is also an opinion that 
further hybridisation might be the future of Japanese corporate governance. It should combine the 
best elements of the board management and monitoring models.937  
In Malaysia, the Malaysian Bursa (stock exchange) imposed mandatory training on senior 
management938. Importantly, Malaysia is deeply rooted in the common law tradition, where the 
government tends to leave corporate issues to the discretion of companies939.  
Mandatory training was in force in Malaysia for four years until 2005, when it was repealed. 
As Khoo940 reports, the initiative turned out to be too costly. Conversely, Koh and Ngee941 maintain 
that this change in corporate governance was the most rewarding for companies in Malaysia; it 
enhanced directors’ professionalism through constant reskilling942.   
The Singaporean government introduced changes to the corporate disclosure system. This 
reformed system assumes that there has to be a set of basic mandatory standards, and in addition 
to that companies should be encouraged in a voluntary way to adopt a set of best practices. As a 
consequence, Singapore chose an approach that is similar to the system that exists in the UK and 
Canada943.  
Overall, both the Malaysian and Singaporean corporate models have been situated at or 
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near the top of the most prestigious rankings in Asia944.   
The above-mentioned changes created a new phenomenon in world corporate 
governance, called ‘hybridisation’. As I stated in chapter III, in the most general way, hybrid 
corporate governance can be defined as follows: a combination of local and (or) foreign elements945 
or a combination of objects from different jurisdictions946.  
I became curious about whether hybrid corporate governance could be successfully 
implemented in Poland. The idea of borrowing law from different legal systems is familiar in Poland. 
While Polish law has long been under the influence of both German and French law for historical 
and cultural reasons (with certain recent noticeable influences from Anglo-American law), the 
Company Code of 2000 is fundamentally based on the German and Austrian legal tradition947. 
However, the legislative inspirations in this area also include the Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
Hungary and Slovenia948. In addition, the statutory laws have been to some extent overlapped by 
legal practice applied by large law companies, the majority of whom are either part of a 
multinational chain or have borrowed Anglo-Saxon modus operandi and know-how949. 
Moreover, while working on the currently binding Company Code of 2000, the Polish 
government has already considered the possibility of the implementation of a one-tier board model 
in Poland. According to its proposal, entrepreneurs would have a choice between the currently 
existing two-tier board system (in force since the pre-war times) and a one tier-board system. In 
the end, however, the government decided to stick to the traditional approach.950  
On top of that, the Code of Best Practices of 2002 required at least half of supervisory board 
members to be independent members, which was described as an ‘attempt to transplant the Anglo-
Saxon concept of independent directors into the Polish system’951. This far-reaching approach to 
the concept of independence was abandoned in 2005, when the required number of independent 
members in companies where the majority shareholder holds more than 50% of the total votes was 
changed to a minimum of two952.  
Both versions of the Code granted independent members special veto rights with regard to 
some resolutions of the supervisory board (resolutions approving related party transactions)953. In 
                                                          
944 KPMG, ‘Singapore’s Corporate Governance (…)’ (n 59); Asian Corporate Governance Association, ‘Country Rankings (…)’ (n 394); IMD 
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945 Gonzalez (n 217).  
946 Dolowitz & Marsh (n 219). 
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fact, this amendment proved to have only a limited influence on the acceptance of the rule by the 
companies954.  
Since 2005 the government has not attempted to make any changes to corporate 
governance that could be called hybrid. In addition, the Code of Best Practices 2007 repealed 
enlightened shareholder value, leaving the determination of company interest up to the managers, 
commentators and ultimately to the courts (see chapter III ‘Hybrid Corporate Governance in 
Poland’). 
The Code of Best Practices of 2007 also failed to equip independent board members with 
the right to vet specific operations. Since then, all that is required is the participation of a minimum 
two independent members on the supervisory board regardless of the ownership structure of a 
company955. 
In addition, I noticed that the corporate disclosure system in Poland shows a significant 
similarity to the Singaporean disclosure based system (see section concerning the Singaporean 
system in chapter III). Thus, this is a mixed compliance framework, with the prevalence of 
voluntarily binding provisions. I was still interested in whether Polish business practitioners find this 
approach appropriate for corporate practice in Poland. I was also interested in whether they would 
like to see a change in the area of corporate governance in Poland. I was particularly interested in 
the issue of excessive remunerations for corporate officials in Poland and the absence of obligation 
to disclose their size in annual reports (for further explanation see chapter V). Moreover, my 
doctrinal research revealed that this is a common problem for companies all over the world (see 
chapter IV, where I analyse this issue, particularly focusing on the American and British corporate 
remunerations disclosure). 
This issue, as well as other problematic aspects of corporate governance that I came across 
while investigating the issue of hybrid corporate governance, gave me the idea of examining 
corporate hybridisation from the Polish perspective. I formulated the following research questions:  
• ‘What are the weaknesses of the Polish corporate governance system?’, 
• ‘What changes should be made to corporate governance in Poland?’, and 
• ‘Is hybrid corporate governance a realistic choice for Poland?’ 
 
In order to answer these questions, I conducted interviews with business people in Poland. 
It should be added that the issue of hybridisation had not been researched in Poland (see section 
‘Hybrid Corporate Governance in Poland’ in chapter III – for further explanation). Therefore, I could 
not restrict myself to reviewing only business literature about this issue (see chapter II – ‘Research 
Methodology’, which, among other things, is split into doctrinal and non-doctrinal research, and in 
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which I explain why I applied both approaches to my research).   
At this point, it is worth noting that, prior to the interviews and my literature review of 
hybrid corporate governance in Poland, I reviewed all the available literature concerning the 
phenomenon of hybrid corporate governance. With respect to corporate governance in Poland, I 
conducted a literature  review on this topic until August 2014 (the date of my thesis submission), 
as I wanted to keep myself up to date with any changes to Polish law which might have occurred in 
this area956.  
I arranged 37 interviews in four regions in Poland (in fact, more entrepreneurs were 
involved in this project, but eventually they withdrew from it; in particular, chapter II explains the 
process of data collection during these interviews). My interviewees were board members (14), 
minor shareholders (11), employees (2), members of professional partnerships (4) and sole 
entrepreneurs (6). I felt it was important to me to interview people with either a vast knowledge of 
corporate governance or extensive experience in running a business in Poland. The latter group was 
composed of persons whose business has a close relationship with a limited company in Poland, eg 
suppliers. 
The first issues that were raised during the interviews concerned the high consolidation of 
share ownership and supervision in Polish companies.  
For the majority of interviewees, the privatisation procedures are the main reason for the 
consolidation of share ownership and control in companies established in Poland. They also 
declared that it had been damaging for the overall functioning of business in Poland. A research 
participant957 observed that the other means of leveraging corporate control, eg non-voting shares, 
super majorities, ‘squeeze out’, etc, might actually work in favour of business. This reflects the 
findings of my doctrinal research (see also chapters V and VI, where I analyse these issues in detail). 
The participants had different opinions about the actual scope of permitted actions of 
supervisory boards in Poland. In the opinion of the majority of board members I interviewed, 
supervisors in Polish companies have no authority over directors. Only four participants (out of 17 
who answered my question; three shareholders and one director – a member of a management 
board958) felt that the management board is often instructed by the supervisory board, which 
actually performs the role of management (for details, see sections regarding supervisory boards 
in Poland in chapters V and VI). These two opinions would actually comply with my doctrinal 
findings. I have mentioned that some sources, eg business prospectuses, do not mention that the 
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distribution of powers within the corporate governance model in Poland are not well balanced. In 
particular, the dominance of the largest investors in Polish companies is brushed aside. Other 
sources, however, elaborate on this issue excessively959.  
In order to protect the rights of minority shareholders against abuse by shareholders, a 
common practice is to include independent directors/supervisors in corporate governance (see, for 
example, chapter IV, where the role and importance of independent directors in the US and the UK 
is explained)960. As I pointed out in chapter V, the approach to independence within corporate 
governance in Poland has changed to the detriment of minority shareholders over the last 20 years. 
Therefore, I asked participants whether they would like the regulation concerning the appointment 
of independent supervisors in Poland to be amended, and to which extent the concept of 
independent supervisors in Polish corporate governance has influenced the functioning of 
supervisory boards in Poland.  
 All my interviewees (39 participants, including two persons who withdrew from 
participating in this research, but partially filled my questionnaire and returned it to me) 
unanimously agreed that independent supervisors have provided objective criticism to company 
management. However, for the majority of them (see Chart 2 in chapter VI), the current regulation 
of the Code of Best Practices (that requires at least two independent supervisors regardless of the 
company ownership structure) is satisfactory. On the other hand, a significant number of 
participants (see Chart 2 in chapter VI) took the stance that at least half of supervisors should be 
required to be independent. Here, it should be emphasised that I attached a brief description to my 
question, in which I referred to the requirements of the UK Corporate Governance Code. This might 
have had an impact on their opinion (see section ‘The Independence of Supervisors’ in chapter VI).  
In addition, three employees declared that all members of the supervisory board should be 
independent (see chapter VI), but it might be difficult to make this idea in Poland. According to one 
vice-president of a management board961, there is a shortage of corporate professionals who are 
qualified enough to be appointed as independent supervisors. This might lead to either appointing 
‘pseudo’ independent supervisors in order to meet the requirements of the Code of Best Practices, 
or to an increase in non-compliance with the independence rule among companies.  
In my opinion, the British solution is reasonable, as it brings better protection for the rights 
of minority shareholders in Poland. Two independent supervisors are not enough to assure such 
protection in companies in which the ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few shareholders. 
In such a case, independent supervisors may be a lot less powerful than controlling shareholders, 
since they have no right to veto the supervisory board’s resolutions. They may not be able to defend 
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the company’s interests at all.  
The number of corporate misappropriations might also be decreased by implementing the 
one-tier board system of corporate governance in Poland, as an alternative to the currently binding 
two-tier board system. 
According to one shareholder (research participant)962, in countries with consolidated 
ownership and control, it would be possible to mitigate conflicts between the shareholders and the 
board through a unitary system, in which the goals and objectives of companies are largely defined 
by the majority shareholder. In another participant’s963 opinion, this is achievable on condition that 
an appropriate number of independent supervisors/directors are appointed in companies. Thus, 
the interests of minority shareholders can be taken into consideration, which does not usually 
happen in companies where the controlling shareholders have an influence on the process on 
decision-making in the key issues. Despite the fact that, in theory, minority shareholders in the two-
tier board system should have a better opportunity to express their interests through the 
supervisory board, this does not usually happen in Poland – where companies are dominated by 
the largest shareholders.964  
In general, La Porta et al.965 state that legal systems that adopt the unitary board system 
are considered to have good protection of shareholders’ rights, which encourage a diverse 
shareholder base in companies.  
The unitary model – with fewer organisational layers – might produce fewer information 
asymmetries and lessen bureaucratic hurdles that might hinder the decision-making process on 
two-tier boards966. On the other hand, executive and non-executive directors working on one board 
might jeopardise that board’s ability to monitor executive directors and provide independent advice 
to management967. 
Another advantage of the unitary board structure is the fact that all directors (executive or 
non-executive) have equal legal status and equal responsibilities under the law, which in general 
enhances accountability of the system968. However, it should be remembered that this did not save 
certain American and British companies, eg Enron, WorldCom or Polly Peck, from complete collapse 
due to the illegal actions of some of their directors969. 
In contrast, in the two-tier board system, the absence of trust in the relationships between 
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the supervisory and the management boards may cause problems. However, such problems may 
also occur in the one-tier board model, where executive directors may be reluctant to co-operate 
with all or some non-executive directors. In addition, in both systems, there may be insufficient 
commitment on the part of the board members with respect to performing their supervisory 
duties970.  
Interestingly, all participants who answered my question concerning the implementation 
of the one-tier board system in Poland and justified their answers (17 out of 37; for further 
explanation see section ‘The One-Tier Board System in Poland’ in chapter VI) agreed that the Anglo-
Saxon countries could benefit from adopting the unitary board system, which would enable 
dispersed shareholders express their expected goals for the company via supervisory boards, 
particularly when their interests differ971.  As one shareholder972 said, ‘(t)he supervisory board 
would be responsible for supervising and ensuring the management board to establish company’s 
goals on behalf of the shareholders and to identify the common interest of shareholders.’ 
There is a clear separation of power in the two tier board model, but the Polish case proves 
that there can be a weak information flow between the management and the board – as well as 
and information asymmetry – to the disadvantage of the supervisory board973. In particular, the fact 
that supervisors have to rely on the management board as a source of information may increase 
the risk of manipulation and filtering of information by the directors974. Further aggravating this 
situation, there is strict adherence to the collegiality rule within supervisory boards. Laws do not 
empower individual supervisors to request directors to present certain information or reports to 
the supervisory board. This may be detrimental to the effectiveness of supervision, as it may limit 
the board’s reactions and responses to negative occurrences in the company’s affairs.975 The lack of 
information may also be an obstacle to taking legal action against directors’ malpractice976.  
With respect to a faster information flow between corporate bodies, in chapter IV, I referred 
to the issue of separation of the CEO and Chair roles. According to research977, an absence of such 
a separation eliminates the problem of information asymmetries, as both positions are held by the 
same person. On the other hand, a CEO who is at the same time a chairman may lack the scepticism 
necessary to scrutinise information that is screened and filtered by a CEO who does not hold the 
position of Chair prior to that information being provided to the board978. This may slow down the 
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board’s decision making process and stop it from adopting new strategies to meet changing 
business environment979. Each of these opinions should be taken into account while considering the 
implementation of the one-tier board system in Poland.  
Since there is no perfect system of corporate governance, I believe that it is reasonable to 
give Polish entrepreneurs the possibility to opt for an optimum model (be in one-tier or two-tier) 
to fit the particular needs of a given company. This would create flexibility and promote Poland (in 
the eyes of Anglo-Saxon countries) as a convenient place for doing business – as there would be no 
need to familiarise themselves with a new legal system. It should be added that Poland can also be 
an attractive place of destination for overseas business, as it is a country with relatively cheap 
labour980. It is doubtful that the cost of maintenance for the National Court Register (company’s 
register in Poland) would increase, unless the implementation is associated with a sudden increase 
of applications for registration. Finally, four high-profile corporate officials981 (out of nine, see 
section ‘Legal Transplant in Polish Corporate Governance’) declared that it would be possible to 
transplant any of the Anglo-Saxon models of corporate governance in Poland directly – without any 
changes in their structure, as foreign investors had brought a new corporate culture to Poland, eg 
a new management cultures, and there has been a considerable change in economic and legislative 
terms in Poland. For example, the Cadbury Code provisions became an integral part of the Polish 
corporate system. In addition, there is now external control of the market in the form of 
commodity, financial, take-over and other markets. Thus, the internal supervision of Polish 
companies may now be weaker.982 
The advocates of the two-tier board system argue that the legal form of a European 
Company let companies in Poland operate through the unitary system. However, we need to 
remember that an SE can only be established by large companies, which are already operating in 
more than one EU Member State983.  
In total, 19 participants (out of 37 who took part in my research) answered my question 
concerning the implementation of the one-tier board model in Poland, out of whom two 
participants had no opinion about the issue. 13 interviewees (board members) were pessimistic 
about implementing an additional board system in Poland. However, they did not radically oppose 
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such a solution. Only four interviewees (including one board member, one employee of a 
professional partnership – a corporate lawyer, and two minority shareholders) were enthusiastic 
about this idea (for details see section ‘The One-Tier Board System in Poland’ in chapter VI). If we 
assume that the statistics reflect the opinion of all business participants in Poland, this means that, 
again, the majority of them expressed their commitment to the traditional approach to corporate 
governance. In fact, corporate governance literature had suggested about such a possibility. For 
example, Oplustil and Radwan984 declared: ‘(…) the two-tier board model is deeply rooted in the 
Polish legal system and any deviation from that model – even should the law finally allow for choice 
in corporate self-governance – might encounter reluctance on the side of practitioners caught on 
the path of dependence.’ 
The next issue that I raised during the interviews was board committees. I decided to ask 
my interviewees about board committees because the literature considers their absence in the 
majority of Polish companies to be a weakness of Polish corporate governance (see section ‘Other 
Board Issues’ in chapter VI). I also, several times in this thesis, emphasise Anglo-Saxon countries’ 
adherence to the committee system, as well as the adherence of countries whose legal system is 
based on the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition several times in this thesis, eg elaborating on hybrid 
corporate governance in South Africa.  
In Poland, board committees may be appointed on supervisory boards985. An audit 
committee is only obligatory in larger listed companies986. There is no obligation to include a 
remuneration committee on supervisory boards.  
According to my interviewees (11 out of the 37 who took part in my interviews), some effort 
should be made to increase the use of committees in companies, as they: 
• enable supervisors to discuss some important issues more thoroughly in a smaller team of 
professionals; 
• provide supervisory boards with greater control and knowledge of the most crucial areas of 
the company’s operation; 
• give supervisors the chance to express their opinions on particular issues and propose 
recommendations; 
• keep the entire board’s work in order.  
 
(for details see subsection ‘Board Committees on the Supervisory Board’). As Polish doctrine has 
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also criticised the lack of interest in the issue of board committees987, I believe that this is something 
that will be taken into consideration by the government in the nearest future.  
In contrast, the majority of interviewees who answered my question concerning board 
committees (eight out of the mentioned above 11) were of the opinion that the voluntary binding 
regulation is satisfactory and that committees should not operate on a statutory basis. In their 
opinion, including an obligation to establish board committees on supervisory boards in Poland 
might be too costly and superfluous, as companies with smaller boards might not need them. At 
this point, it is worth mentioning that board committees also operate on the ‘comply or explain’ 
basis in the common law systems (see chapters III and IV).  
 The majority of interviewed business practitioners also opposed appointing employees, 
bank representatives and women to supervisory boards in Poland. I asked a question concerning 
such an appointment for the following reasons:  
• one of my interviewees988 wished to discuss with me the issue of board diversity and 
employee appointment during my pilot interviews in July 2012; 
• in Germany, the Cromme Code of 2000 includes the possibility for bank representatives to 
sit on the supervisory board of German corporations (for further explanation see chapter 
VI – the section concerning the presence of bank representative on boards in Poland, and 
section ‘Legal Transplant for Polish Corporate Governance’ in chapter VI, in which I explain 
that the primary source of inspiration was German corporate law); 
• Rodrigues989 points out that an important precursor to independence of thought is diversity 
and proposes that increasing the degree of heterogeneity among board members would 
improve the quality of board oversight (for details see chapter IV); 
• in the middle of 2011, the European Parliament called on EU states to reserve 30% of seats 
on boards for women until 2015 and 40% until 2020990; 
• a number of countries in Europe either enacted legislative measures aimed at improving 
gender balance on company boards, or obliged companies to include a certain percentage 
of women on boards (for further information see chapter IV)991; 
• the participation of women on supervisory boards of listed companies in Poland may need 
to be reviewed, as it is not high (for details see ‘Other Board Issues’ in chapter V)992. 
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Thus, all interviewees who answered my question regarding board diversity (38 in total) 
were positive about the fact that a larger number of women could sit on boards. However, in their 
opinion, this issue should be left to the discretion of companies. As one supervisory board 
president993 declared, board members should only be recruited on the basis of their qualifications 
and work experience. None of my interviewees was able to answer whether greater board diversity 
would have a positive impact on independence in the decision making process. In my opinion, a law 
that would oblige companies to appoint a prescribed number of people who may not be as qualified 
as other potential candidates for this role can be harmful for business. 
 On the other hand, research (for details see section ‘Board Diversity’ in chapter IV) reveals 
that the participation of women in corporate governance may cause a fundamental change in the 
boardroom and enhance corporate governance, eg the content of boardroom discussion is more 
likely to include difficult issues. In addition, it has a positive effect on the financial performance of 
companies. Finally, the above-mentioned Rodrigues’s994 opinion deserves greater attention and, 
probably, a discussion within the Polish business environment.   
Employees (and suppliers) in Poland have a statutory right to select a specified number of 
supervisory board members (workers’ codetermination). This right applies only to companies 
subject to indirect privatisation and allows the workers to elect two-fifths of the supervisory board 
members directly995.  
Out of 37 participants (the total number of participants who took part in my research), 16 
answered that the rule should not be broadened out into the other companies in Poland. Of the 
remaining 21 participants, 14 gave one of the following answers: ‘I am not sure’, ‘I do not think this 
is a good idea’, ‘I do not think so’, or ‘I doubt it would improve the functioning of corporate 
governance’ (for further explanation, see section about the participation of employees on 
supervisory boards in Poland in chapter VI).  
According to one shareholder996, employees on supervisory boards in Poland bring some 
‘outside’ perspectives to the board, as well as the technical knowledge of the company’s subject of 
activity. They facilitate communication and mutual understanding between the governing body and 
the workforce997, and they ‘identify themselves more closely with the company’998.  On the other 
hand, as it was aptly noticed by one supervisory board president999, employees on the board might 
jeopardise the internal consistency of the board and initiate conflicts amongst its members. 
                                                          
993 Text to n 883. 
994 Rodrigues (n 531).  
995 See Articles 12–16 of the Act of 30 August 1996 on the Privatisation Act. 
996 Text to n 865. 
997 According to one employee – text to n 866. 
998 According to one management board president – text to n 869. 
999 Text to n 867.  
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Therefore, I believe that their presence on supervisory boards in Poland should be dependent on a 
company’s shareholders’ meeting.   
With respect to banks, my doctrinal research findings show that their impact on companies’ 
dealings and decision-making reveals that they had a weak influence on corporate governance of 
public companies in the years 1999-20021000. In this period, supervisory boards of almost half of 
surveyed companies had at least one bank representative – usually the major creditor of a given 
company. However, banks are rather reluctant to engage themselves in the decision making 
process in companies to whom they extend credit1001.  Słomka-Gołębiowska’s1002 explains this by 
the rational aversion to legal risk associated with a conflict of interests and the risk of a violation of 
the rules prohibiting insider dealing. 
My research participants show minimal interest in responding to the questions concerning 
bank participation on supervisory boards in Poland. As a consequence, only one participant 
(shareholder)1003 (out of 15 who answered my question concerning banks’ participation in 
corporate governance) declared that banks should have their representatives on the supervisory 
board. It is, however, in the opinion of this person, superfluous for the government to regulate this 
by the Company Code, as companies have already been given the possibility of appointing bank 
representatives by not prohibiting shareholders to sit on supervisory boards (the same answer was 
given by those participants who were against banks’ participation in boards). This participant did 
not explain why – in his opinion – banks should have their representatives on boards. The remaining 
14 participants took the stance that companies should decide about the composition of the 
supervisory board.  
Taking into account the outcome of my doctrinal research in this area1004, it is doubtful that 
an obligation to include bank representatives on supervisory boards in Poland would escalate the 
problem of consolidated ownership and control, and abuse of minority rights by large shareholders 
(see chapters V and VI, where I analyse this issue in detail). However, I agree with the above-
mentioned shareholder that such a regulation would be superfluous, given the fact that such a 
provision actually exists in the Company Code of 2000. Moreover, legislative works on a new 
provision might also turn out to be costly.    
It is interesting that only a small number of participants expressed their opinion about an 
issue as crucial to companies as the participation of banks and employees in company management. 
On the other hand, we need to take into consideration that not all participants who did not respond 
                                                          
1000 Słomka-Gołębiowska (n 877).   
1001 ibid. 
1002 ibid. 
1003 According to one shareholder – text to n 876.  
1004 Słomka-Gołębiowska (n 877).   
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are directly connected with a limited company. They are either members of a partnership or people 
who work for the small businesses, and have a business relationship with limited companies. Thus, 
they might not have a vast knowledge of those issues or might not be interested in them, as they 
are not directly connected with their business. 
Interestingly, all the participants (38 out of 38; one participant withdrew from my research, 
but returned a partially completed questionnaire) answered my question on gender diversity on 
the supervisory board. The reason for this may be the fact there have been cases of discrimination 
of women in the workplace1005, which has recently been discussed in various media. This is thus an 
issue that may have been well-known to my participants.  
The issue of corporate training also drew the attention of my interviewees. I asked them a 
question concerning the obligatory system of training for corporate officials in order to refer to 
Malaysian reform of the training system (see section ‘The Unique System for Training Directors in 
Malaysia’ in chapter III). I asked the following questions: Do you think that training for board 
members should be obligatory? Is training for board members essential for running a business? 
With respect to the latter, 17 respondents out of 34 (37 participants in total participated in 
my research project) were of the opinion that such training has a significant meaning for companies 
because: 
• it enables board members to discharge their duties more efficiently, which may improve the 
overall company performance.  
• continuous training and skill enhancement for directors may improve the flow of 
information between management and supervisory boards in Poland, as directors are not 
currently obliged to provide supervisors with information regarding the company’s 
operation (see section ‘Other Board Issues’ in chapter V).  
 
All 34 participants declared that a decision about training for board members should be left 
to the discretion of the company. They explained that obligatory training might either be too costly 
for companies or superfluous, and, in fact, is against business freedom. 
Nevertheless, I think that one shareholder’s1006 opinion, that the WSE could impose on 
listed companies an obligation to organise mandatory training for directors only and in some areas 
only (the most crucial for a company’s life), deserves special attention. Even more so, if we take into 
account that it may really increase the training participants’ awareness of the importance of their 
role and, as a result, for example, improve the flow of information between boards in companies. 
In my opinion, Khoo’s1007 suggestion that the government could give tax incentives to companies in 
                                                          
1005 See, for example, www.cpk.org.pl (Women’s Right Centre).  
1006 Text to n 887. 
1007 Khoo (n 367).  
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order to encourage them to implement a constant re-skilling system for corporate officials is also 
interesting.  
Another issue that I raised during my interviews was enlightened shareholder value in 
Poland, which I decided to discuss with my participants in the context of South African ‘stakeholder 
inclusivity’ (see section ‘Hybrid Corporate Governance in South Africa’ in chapter III). I asked what 
they think of adopting this concept in Poland and of legal regulating enlightened shareholder value, 
as it was repealed by the Code of Best Practices of 2007.    
17 participants out of 24 who responded (from the 37 participants who took part in my 
research) believe that it should be explicitly expressed in the Code of Best Practices, as it has already 
been captured by various statutes (and court jurisdiction) (see chapter VI for further explanation). 
For one of the remaining participants1008, the economic interests of stakeholders should not be 
prioritised before the interests of shareholders as a group. In contrast, four participants think that 
the current regulation is sufficient, and that South African stakeholder inclusivity should not be 
adapted in Poland. As one of shareholders1009 declared, stakeholder inclusivity is impossible to 
execute, because it embraces too many stakeholders. The other participants were against 
implementing stakeholder inclusivity in Poland, but did not justify their answer.  
Importantly, South African practitioners also expressed negative (and similar) opinions 
about stakeholder inclusivity (see chapter III). In addition, Adam1010 raised the point that 
stakeholder inclusivity may, in fact, mean the same as shareholder enlightened value. 
In my view, these controversies should become subject of a deeper discussion on this 
aspect of corporate governance – at the international level. This might be an area for new research, 
as there is no current publication that has discussed this issue in detail, providing examples from 
real corporate life.  
I believe that the issue of executive remunerations also needs to be reviewed in Poland, 
where there is a large disproportion between corporate remunerations, and where the directors’ 
remuneration is alarmingly excessive (see chapter V). Meanwhile, it bears little relationship to 
company performance or shareholder returns (see chapters V and VI, as well as chapter IV, where 
I discuss the same problem with respect to the US and the UK). Taking this all into consideration, I 
asked interviewees whether shareholders should receive the right to approve remuneration for 
directors, as it has become a way of acting against these occurrences in some countries (see, for 
example, chapter IV – ‘Corporate Governance in the United States and the United Kingdom’). I also 
asked about what changes they would like to introduce to the remuneration policy in Poland.   
Out of 29 participants who answered my questions, seven declared that it should not be 
                                                          
1008 One management board member – text to n 895.  
1009 Text to n 897. 
1010 Albert Luthuli Centre, ‘Interview Summary Report (…)’ (n 203).  
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mandatory to put the remuneration policy and the remuneration report to vote by shareholders. 
As it was aptly noticed by them, shareholders decide about the composition of the supervisory 
board, which is responsible for setting the remuneration policy (see chapter V). Thus, shareholders 
already participate in setting the remuneration policy in Poland. Six other participants declared that 
shareholders should have the right to approve directors’ remunerations, and that it might halt the 
increase of directorial remunerations. In my opinion, given those disproportions in pay and the 
extensive power of controlling shareholders in Poland, this solution could be implemented in 
Poland for a temporary period of time.  
Two other solutions concerning corporate remunerations are worth taking into 
consideration in Poland, namely:  
• the proposal of approving share-based remuneration schemes by shareholders (it is 
currently provided for in the Code of Best Practices, which means that companies may but 
are not obliged to include it in their statutes)1011; and 
• the solution of suspending payments where performance has been poor – also 
recommended by the Code of Best Practices1012 (for details see chapter IV).  
 
They should both be included into the universally binding provisions in Poland. However, none of 
my participants suggested that this would be possible with respect to poor management 
performance.  
On the other hand, one participant1013 drew attention to the low remunerations of 
supervisors, when compared with directorial remunerations (PricewaterhouseCoopers’ research, 
conducted in 2012, revealed the same – see chapter VI). In this person’s opinion, it stops foreigners 
from applying for supervisor positions in Polish companies. I believe that this is another issue that 
deserves the attention of the legal doctrine and the business environment. 
Moreover, the system of disclosing remunerations is also a problematic issue in Poland and 
needs to be reviewed. Under law1014, limited companies are only obliged to inform the public about 
the size of remunerations. The information is revealed annually – together with the annual financial 
statements. The law does not apply to non-listed and limited liability companies, which might be 
reluctant to disclose such information.  
In general, companies are encouraged to choose principles that they want to apply to their 
disclosure policy. However, there is a set of mandatory standards that guarantee the minimum of 
corporate transparency (for further information see chapters V and VI). In this regard, one 
                                                          
1011 According to a vice-president of a management board – text to n 901, see also part I, point 5 of the Code of Best Practices of 2010. 
1012 The Code of Best Practices of 2010, ibid. 
1013 One supervisory board president – text to n 908. 
1014 Regulation on the current and periodic disclosures (…) – §95 sec. 6, point 17 
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participant1015 compared this system to the Singaporean disclosure-based approach to corporate 
governance. For example, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority was compared to the MAS. 
Both organs are regulated statutorily, and responsible for overseeing the development of the 
financial market.  
As one supervisory board president (research participant)1016 noticed, ‘too many rules and 
regulations stifle the entrepreneurial spirit, and too few rules leave the investing public 
unprotected against unscrupulous business practices.’ However, I am not entirely certain whether 
the government should not revise the set of mandatory laws provided for companies, as it might 
not be enough to protect minority shareholders from the abuse of their rights by large 
shareholders. Indeed, four participants out of 29 who answered my question regarding corporate 
disclosure, wished to tighten up the disclosure system. Six participants did not have any opinion 
about the issue, and the remaining 19 were pleased with the currently binding system (for details 
see chapter VI). Thus, it seems to be an issue that deserves considerable attention from the 
government, as well as the Polish legal doctrine and the business environment in Poland. 
My last question concerned the use of the ‘comply or explain’ principle in Poland, and the 
possibility of the implementation of the ‘apply or explain’ approach. The main reason why I decided 
to ask the question to my research participants is the reform of South African compliance 
framework, embodied in the King Code of Governance for South Africa 2009, as well as the fact that 
the American Congress statutorily regulated a part of corporate provisions in the SOX act. This 
suggests that the ‘apply or explain’ approach, which, inter alia, South Africa took, may not become 
dominant in corporate governance in the world. I was interested in what Polish business people 
think of the recent changes to the compliance framework, and whether they would like some 
changes to be implemented in Poland with respect to this issue.   
According to the ‘comply or explain’ principle, companies have to state in their annual 
reports whether they comply with the code of best practices, identify any areas of non-compliance 
and explain the reasons in light of their own particular circumstances1017. In contrast, the ‘comply 
or else’ approach to law means that cases of non-compliance with provisions are sanctioned.  
I asked my participants about the functioning of the ‘comply or explain’ principle in Poland, 
and 25 (all who responded) out of 37 expressed a positive opinion about the approach, as: 
• companies might choose practices that fit their needs, 
• it might cut the cost of running business, 
• it reduces the participation of regulatory authorities to minimum standards, and  
• the flexibility of the approach enhances competition between companies.   
                                                          
1015 One supervisory board president – text to n 909. 
1016 ibid. 
1017 See, for example, the preamble of the Polish Code of Best Practices of 2010. See also other codes of best practices.  
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One participant1018 said that the ‘comply or else’ approach is recommended for the integration 
process of developing countries, such as Poland. 
I also asked my participants what they think of changing the ‘comply or explain’ principle 
to the ‘apply or explain’ principle in Poland. The ‘apply or explain’ principle assumes that boards 
can decide to apply recommendations differently or apply an alternative practice, but this should 
still attain the objective of the primary corporate governance principles1019. However, according to 
my participants (only six participants expressed their opinion on the implementation of the ‘apply 
or explain’ approach in Poland), this concept might bring chaos to the idea of corporate governance 
in Poland and create a real challenge for interpreters of the code of best practices, as they would 
certainly interpret particular provisions in a different way. For one interviewee1020, the ‘apply or 
explain’ approach in Poland might also decrease the ratio of compliance with the Code of Best 
Practices. The advantage of the approach is – as another participant1021 noticed – that, for example, 
in the Netherlands, it requires regular reports to stakeholders for critically scrutinise.  
 One participant1022 also suggested that the Code of Best Practices of 2010 should be more 
focused on the introduction and promotion of general guidance (principles) for shareholders. This 
participant mentioned the loyalty principle and business judgement rule. Unless the first can be 
inferred from a number of provisions of the Company Code of 2000, the absence of the judgment 
rule in Polish corporate law means that law does not specify the principles on which directors 
should base their performance, eg in other countries directors act on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company1023. 
There is thus too much discretion left in the hands of directors in Poland. In practice, courts of law 
resolve problems resulting from this state of affairs, on condition that a lawsuit is filed against a 
director’s wrongdoing (for details see chapter V).  
 At this point, I would also like to add that a solution that Polish business might profit from 
is the instrument of whistle-blowing in identifying management fraud. As I have already mentioned 
in chapter III (see this chapter for further information on whistle-blowing) whistle-blowers are not 
paid informants who are legally protected from reprisals. In my opinion, an idea worthy of 
consideration is passing a law that would require listed companies to have a whistle-blowing 
agenda, as top management might not be motivated enough to install a whistle-blowing 
programme, since it is a cost item.  
                                                          
1018 One management board president – text to n 912. 
1019 See, for example, King (n 34). 
1020 One management board vice-president – text to n 914.  
1021 One employee of a JSC – text to n 915.   
1022 One company lawyer – text to n 916. 
1023 See, for example, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics (Foundation Press 2002) 269; see also Chapter V for further 
explanation of the issue. 
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 In total, I asked 20 questions during my structured interviews. I asked identical questions 
during my unstructured interviews. Alongside my doctrinal research, the interviews enabled me to 
answer my all three research questions. As a consequence, I determined the weaknesses of 
corporate governance in Poland and discussed, with my participants, possible changes to the Polish 
corporate governance model. In particular, I managed to determine that the majority of 
participants are reluctant to accept such radical changes as, for example, the implementation of 
the one-tier board system in Poland. There is also a small group of business participants (mainly 
shareholders) who are very enthusiastic about the possibility of further hybridisation of Polish 
corporate governance (see chapter V ‘Corporate Governance in Poland’ in particular).  
 My interviewees come from various regions of Poland. At the time of the interviews, they 
were either employed in managerial positions or were non-managerial participants in a business 
(shareholders, employees, members of partnerships and individual entrepreneurs), which had a 
close relationship with Polish limited companies. In total, I interviewed 37 people, of whom half 
were corporate officers and the other half were business participants. This is the reason why I 
believe my research to be a representative sample and could reasonably be said to reflect the 
opinion of all business practitioners in Poland. 
However, I would like to emphasise that, initially, my plan was to conduct interviews with 
a larger number of business people. This turned out to be impossible, as business practitioners kept 
rejecting their participation in this project.  
I also experienced difficulties while trying to collect certain information, as it sometimes 
only was available in the national language of a particular nation or not available at all, eg I did not 
collect a large amount information on the Malaysian system of obligatory training. Overall, 
however, I managed to collect enough data in order to conduct a cohesive discussion on particular 
issues. 
The word count limit also turned out to be an obstacle while performing this research, as it 
did not enable me to develop several issues in this thesis, eg I limited the analysis of the Polish 
corporate governance structure to a minimum. Therefore, if I decided to conduct this research 
again, I would narrow my analysis down to the possibility of implementing the two-tier board 
system in Poland and broadened the range of my interviewees into people working in legislative 
committees in Poland, which might enable me to expand the section on the direct transplant of the 
Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance (see chapter VI – section ‘Legal Transplant in Polish 
Corporate Governance’). This, however, means that I would not elaborate on such issues as, for 
example, the corporate disclosure system.  
At this point, it should be added that the issue of corporate disclosure was not analysed in 
a detailed manner in this thesis. The reason for this is that my interviewees showed a minimal 
interest in discussing this issue. For some corporate officials, this might have been an 
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uncomfortable topic to discuss, for example, due to their excessive remunerations, which they do 
not want to be revealed. The other participants might not have had enough knowledge of this issue 
to conduct a conversation about it. Overall, the fact that my research participants did not wish to 
discuss the corporate disclosure system in Poland affected my thesis (this issue is not as developed 
as some other issues), but not the outcome of my research, as – I have already explained in chapter 
III – the issue of corporate disclosure is not directly associated with hybrid corporate governance. 
It was included in my research due to the fact that it might be perceived as a weakness of the Polish 
corporate governance system (see chapter V for further explanation). For the same reason I raised 
the issue of the ‘comply or explain’ principle in Poland in chapter VI. It was also appropriate because 
of the controversies linked to regulating some key corporate matters statutorily in the US, which 
created the most significant difference between the American and British one-tier board systems 
of corporate governance. One of the sections in chapter IV is dedicated to this issue and its impact 
on the performance of corporate governance.  
This research is only dedicated to limited companies, where the agency problem comes 
into play. Under the Company Code of 2000, some partnerships may establish corporate organs, 
which are regulated by the same provisions as corporate governance of limited companies1024. 
Moreover, partnerships are suitable for small business, and are not incorporated. Since each 
partner is liable for obligations of the partnership without limitation, the ownership structure is far 
less consolidated than in limited companies. Thus, all the problems that trouble limited companies 
at the management level, might not be present in the majority of partnerships.  
Finally, in order to present the core aspects of hybrid corporate governance worldwide in 
depth, I limited a review of the issue to eighty articles and a few countries.  
The objectives of this research were the following: 
• to systematise and develop knowledge on hybrid corporate governance, and  
• to contribute to knowledge on legal transplant. 
 
I believe that I achieved these objectives. In the doctrinal part of this thesis, I compile information 
on hybrid corporate governance around the world. Meanwhile, the set of 37 interviews brings some 
practical knowledge on corporate governance in Poland and legal transplant worldwide. In 
particular, two sections of chapter VI that are dedicated to the possibility of implementing the one-
tier board system in Poland (see sections ‘The One-tier Board System in Poland’ and ‘Legal 
Transplant in Polish Corporate Governance’) are – in my opinion – valuable contributions to 
knowledge of hybrid corporate governance and legal transplant.  
 I would also like to emphasise that the research provides several topics for journal articles. 
                                                          
1024 Art. 97 and 142-145CCC; see also Appendix 3.  
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One of them could be, for example, a comparative analysis of the Polish and the Anglo-Saxon board 
models of corporate governance. Data collected during this research would be sufficient to write 
an essay on this topic.  
In a time when large companies create multinational chains, governments have to 
implement standards that are internationally recognisable and protect companies from failure, as 
this may affect the lives of the whole society and the overall performance of the economy. A good 
example are best practices of corporate governance that are applied across the world and often 
have the same prototype, eg the Cadbury Code, the OECD principles, EU recommendations, etc. 
This leads to the convergence in this area of law1025, and makes research on corporate governance 
internationally applicable. I also believe that the outcome of this research might turn out to be 
useful while considering changes to corporate governance in other countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1025 See, for example, Mallin (n 27) 22-23. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Table1. Shareholders and creditor rights1026: 
Categorical Means for Legal Familiesª 
Category   Observationsª Shareholder rights   Creditor rights 
English 
 
18/19 4.00 
     (0.970) 
 
3.11 
     (1.231) 
French 
 
21/19 2.33 
     (1.197) 
 
1.58 
      (1.346) 
German 
 
 
6/6 2.33 
     (1.033) 
2.33 
   (.816) 
Scandinavian 
 
 
4/4 3.00 
   (.816) 
2.00 
   (.816) 
Sample Average 
 
 
49/47 3.00 
     (1.307) 
2.30 
     (1.366) 
  
Differences in Meansᵇ 
English – French 1.67 
      (.000)* 
1.53 
      (.001)* 
English – German 
 
 
1.67 
      (.008)* 
.78 
        .101*** 
 
English – Scandinavian 
 
 
1.00 
          (.085)*** 
1.11 
          (.065)*** 
French – German 
 
 
0.00 
     (1.000) 
–.75 
    (.119) 
French – Scandinavian 
 
 
–.67 
   (.220) 
–.42 
   (.438) 
German – Scandinavian 
 
 
–.67 
   (.291) 
.33 
     (.548) 
 
ª Standard deviations are in parentheses. ᵇ A two-sided two-sample t test with unequal variances 
is performed. P-values are reported in parentheses. * Significant at the 1-percent level; ** 
                                                          
1026 Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard (n 223). 
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significant at the 5-percent level; *** significant at the 10 percent level.   
 
Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard1027 describe this table as follows: 
 
‘Shareholder rights and creditor rights are cumulative indices (…) that measure the scope of 
the protection of shareholder and creditor rights by statutory law. The categorical means on 
the top half of (…) [the table] show that the English have strongest and the French have the 
weakest protection of shareholder and creditor rights, while the German and Scandinavian 
families are in the middle. The bottom half of (…) [the table] tabulates differences in means 
for shareholder and creditor rights for the six different pairs of legal families. The parenthesis 
in each cell contain p-values, which measure the probability of falsely rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the difference in means across a pair of legal families is negligible. Following 
standard statistical practice, we do not reject the null hypothesis when the p-value exceeds 
.10. The p-values show that the difference in means across the English family and the three 
civil law families are statistically significant (…). Thus, the legal families are a useful indicator 
for the quality of the law on the books in the different countries in our sample.’ 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Examples of company explanations on compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code 
 
Example of an explanation that is considered to be satisfactory: 
 
‘In determining its overall policy in respect of service contracts, the Committee aims to balance the 
costs associated with any early termination provisions with the need to protect GlaxoSmithKline’s 
intellectual property rights. The Committee maintains a close watch, through its advisors, on trends 
in contractual terms amongst other companies in the competitor panel and in the wider market 
place. It is committed to ensuring that, in achieving this balance, its processes are fair, while limiting 
as far as possible the scope for ‘rewarding failure’. The Committee has considered the recent 
guidance produced by the Association of British Insurers and the National Association of Pension 
Funds in the UK. It will take this into account, alongside market practice, when reviewing 
contractual terms.  
Executive Directors are employed on service contracts under which the employing company is 
                                                          
1027 Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard (n 223).  
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required to give 24 calendar months’ notice of termination and the Executive Directors are required 
to give 12 calendar months’ notice. 
Executive Directors’ service contracts contain ‘garden leave’, non-competition, non-solicitation and 
confidentiality clauses. 
The Remuneration Committee currently believes that one year contracts would not be in the best 
interest of GlaxoSmithKline with regard to offering a globally competitive overall remuneration 
package and securing maximum protection for its intellectual property rights. 
The Remuneration Committee believes that the current termination payments due under Executive 
Director’s contracts are justified because they represent fair and reasonable compensation in the 
event that the contracts are terminated, given market practice and the associated restrictions 
arising from the need to protect intellectual property (from the 2002 Annual Report of 
GlaxoSmithKline).’1028  
 
Example of an explanation that is considered to be unsatisfactory (it does not identify special 
circumstances): 
 
‘The Board has not identified a senior independent non-executive director, as specified by the Code, 
because it considers such an appointment to be unnecessary at present (from the 1999 Annual 
Report of Reuters).’1029 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1028 Arcot, Bruno & Faure-Grimaud (n 31). 
1029 ibid. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Table 2. Main forms of doing business in Poland1030 
 
Form of  
business/main act 
regulating 
 
 
 
Requirements to 
establish 
 
 
Members 
 
 
Governance 
 
 
Legal personality 
 
 
Liability 
 
Joint-stock 
company 
 
 
The Company Code 
of 2000; The Act on 
Commercialisation 
and Privatisation of 
State-Owned 
Enterprises of 1996 
 
 
Adopting the statute 
of the company in the 
form of a notarial 
deed; a subscription 
of all shares in the 
company by the 
shareholders; making 
contribution by the 
shareholders – the 
nominal share capital 
is PLN 100,000 – 
divided into shares of 
equal nominal value; 
the appointment of 
corporate 
governance; the entry 
of the company in the 
National Court 
Register (KRS). 
 
 
Shareholders – 
natural or legal 
persons, or 
organisational 
units without 
legal personality 
to which the 
applicable laws 
have granted 
legal personality 
 
 
 
Management 
board; obligatory 
supervisory 
board, the 
general meeting 
of  shareholders 
 
It has legal 
personality. 
 
The company bears 
unlimited liability 
for its obligations 
up to the full value 
of all of its assets.  
 
The shareholders 
are not liable for 
the obligations of 
the company. The 
shareholders’ risk 
arising from the 
participation in the 
company is limited 
to the capital 
invested in the 
subscription or 
purchase of shares. 
 
 
Limited liability 
company 
 
 
The Company Code 
of 2000; The Act on 
Commercialisation 
and Privatisation of 
State-Owned 
Enterprises of 1996 
 
 
Adopting the articles 
of association in the 
form of a notarial 
deed; the 
contributions by 
shareholders of the 
entire share capital - 
the  minimum share 
capital is PLN 5,000, 
and the share 
premium 
(difference between 
the price at which the 
shares are acquired 
and their nominal 
value); the 
appointment of a 
management board; 
the appointment of a 
supervisory board or 
auditors' committee; 
registration in the 
entrepreneurs’ 
register of the 
National Court 
Register (KRS). 
 
Shareholders – 
natural or legal 
persons, or 
organisational 
units without 
legal personality 
to which the 
applicable laws 
have granted 
legal personality 
 
 
Management 
board; 
supervisory 
board and/or 
auditors' 
committee – 
obligatory only 
when all 
of the following 
circumstances 
occur jointly: 
a) share capital 
exceeds PLN 
500,000, 
b) number of 
shareholders 
exceeds 25; 
shareholders' 
meeting. 
 
 
As above 
 
 
The company is 
liable for its debts 
and obligations 
with its whole 
property without 
any limitations.  
 
Shareholders do 
not bear any 
liability for the 
company’s 
obligation. Their 
risk is limited to 
funds involved in 
the company by 
virtue of 
contributions or 
additional 
payments. 
 
 
General partnership 
 
 
The Company Code 
of 2000 
 
 
The partners conclude 
articles of association 
(in person or through 
authorised 
representatives). 
The registry court 
enters the 
partnership in the 
 
At least two 
founders from 
among: natural 
persons, legal 
persons, and  
organisational 
units without 
legal personality 
 
Each partner may 
represent the 
partnership 
individually 
unless the 
articles of 
association set 
forth different 
 
It has no legal 
personality, but it 
has:       
a) legal capacity – 
may acquire 
rights and incur 
obligations on its 
own behalf; b) 
 
The partnership 
bears unlimited 
liability for its 
obligations up to 
the full value of all 
of its 
assets. 
                                                          
1030 Based on the Company Code of 2000. For further information on business forms in Poland go to 
<www.paiz.gov.pl/polish_law/forms_of_doing_business> accessed 17 March 2014. 
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National Court 
Register – as of this 
moment the 
partnership is 
established. 
There is no minimum 
capital requirement. 
to which the 
applicable laws 
have 
granted legal 
capacity. 
A general 
partnership may 
be established 
by and between 
different types 
of entities, eg 
a natural person 
and a legal 
person. 
 
rules for 
representing the 
partnership. 
 
judicial capacity – 
may be a party to 
court 
proceedings; and 
procedural 
capacity – may 
appear before a 
court 
independently to 
defend its 
interests. 
 
 
Professional 
partnership 
 
The Company Code 
of 2000 
 
As above 
 
At least two 
natural persons 
who have the 
right to practise 
freelance 
professions 
specified in 
the legal 
provisions. 
 
The partners of 
a limited 
liability 
partnership are 
called 
‘partnerzy’. 
 
 
Each partner may 
represent the 
partnership 
individually 
unless the 
articles of 
association 
set forth 
different rules 
for representing 
the partnership. 
 
Articles of 
association may 
provide that the 
conduct of the 
affairs and 
representation of 
the 
partnership shall 
be exclusively 
entrusted to the 
management 
board, to which 
provisions on the 
management 
board in the 
limited liability 
company shall 
accordingly 
apply. 
 
 
As above 
 
The partnership 
bears unlimited 
liability for its 
obligations up to 
the full value of all 
of its assets.  
 
A partner does not 
bear liability for the 
partnership’s 
obligations arising 
from the practice of 
freelance 
professions by the 
remaining partners 
of the partnership, 
nor for actions and 
defaults of 
employees, 
employed by the 
partnership under 
an employment 
contract or on the 
basis of a different 
legal relationship, 
who worked under 
supervision of the 
other partners at 
the time of 
providing a service 
related to the 
partnership’s 
business.  
 
 
Limited partnership 
 
The Company Code 
of 2000 
 
As above 
 
At least two 
founders from 
among: 
a) natural 
persons, 
b) legal persons, 
c) 
organisational 
units without 
legal personality 
to which the 
applicable laws 
have granted 
legal capacity. 
 
A limited 
partnership may 
be established 
by and between 
different types 
of entities, eg 
 
The partnership’s 
affairs cannot be 
entrusted solely 
to parties other 
than the 
partners. 
 
The right and 
obligation to 
conduct the 
partnership’s 
affairs: 
a) each general 
partner, 
b) limited 
partners have 
neither right nor 
obligation to 
conduct the 
partnership’s 
affairs, 
unless the 
articles of 
 
As above 
 
The partnership 
bears unlimited 
liability for its 
obligations up to 
the full value of all 
of its assets.  
 
The scope of the 
partner’s liability:  
a) in case of a 
general partner – 
with all his assets, 
b) in case of a 
limited partner – up 
to the amount of 
limited liability 
amount, whereas 
he is 
free from the 
liability within the 
contribution made 
to the partnership. 
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a natural person 
and a legal 
person. 
 
There are two 
types of 
partners: 
a) general 
partners 
bearing 
unlimited 
liability (at least 
one), 
b) limited 
partners (at 
least one) liable 
to the amount 
specified in the 
articles of 
association. 
 
association 
provide 
otherwise. 
 
Conduct of the 
partnership’s 
affairs may be 
entrusted to one 
or more partners 
(to the 
exclusion of 
others).  
 
 
Limited joint-stock 
partnership 
 
The Company Code 
of 2000 
 
Adopting the statute 
of the partnership in 
the form of a notarial 
deed; subscription of 
all shares by the 
shareholders; making 
contributions by the 
shareholders – the 
minimum share 
capital is PLN 50,000; 
the appointment of a 
supervisory board – 
obligatory only if the 
total number of 
shareholders exceeds 
25;  
the entry of the 
partnership in the 
register of 
entrepreneurs of the 
National Court 
Register 
(KRS). 
 
 
General partner 
– one or more 
entities from 
among: 
a) natural 
persons, 
b) legal persons, 
c) 
organisational 
units without 
legal personality 
to which the 
applicable laws 
have 
granted legal 
capacity. 
 
Shareholder – 
one or more 
entities from 
among: 
a) natural 
persons, 
b) legal persons, 
c) 
organizational 
units without 
legal personality 
to which the 
applicable laws 
have granted 
legal capacity. 
 
Running the 
partnership’ 
affairs rests with 
general partners, 
with the 
exception of 
matters 
falling within the 
competence of 
the general 
meeting for 
shareholders or 
the supervisory 
board, pursuant 
to the provisions 
of the 
Commercial 
Partnerships and 
Companies Code 
or the statute. 
 
The shareholders 
do not have the 
right to run the 
partnership’s 
affairs. 
 
No individual 
supervision right 
of a shareholder 
over the 
partnership. 
 
The creation of a 
supervisory 
board is 
obligatory, if 
there are more 
than 25 
shareholders. 
 
 
As above 
 
The partnership 
bears unlimited 
liability for its 
obligations up to 
the full value of all 
of its assets. 
 
The general 
partners bear 
unlimited liability 
for partnership’s 
obligations up to 
the full value of all 
of their assets, 
jointly and severally 
with the 
partnership. 
 
The shareholders’ 
risk arising from the 
participation in the 
partnership is 
limited to the 
capital invested in 
the subscription or 
purchase of shares. 
 
Sole 
entrepreneurship 
 
The Act on 
Freedom of 
Economic Activity 
of 2004 
 
 
Filing an application 
to the Central 
Business Activity 
Record and 
Information (CEIDG). 
 
Entrepreneur may 
commence business 
activity after filing an 
 
Entrepreneur 
conducting 
individual 
business activity 
acts on his own 
behalf. He may 
appoint a proxy 
to conduct his 
affairs. 
 
 
The 
entrepreneur on 
his/her behalf 
 
 
Natural person 
conducting a 
business activity 
has: 
a) legal capacity, 
b) capacity to 
undertake legal 
actions, 
c) judicial 
capacity (capacity 
 
Full liability with all 
personal assets 
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application for 
registration. 
 
 to be a party in 
court 
proceedings and 
capacity to 
conduct court 
proceeding). 
 
 
Civil partnership  
 
The Civil Law Code 
of 1964 
 
Concluding the civil 
law partnership 
agreement in a 
written form;  
submitting the 
agreement to: 
a) a competent tax 
office and 
b) the Central 
Statistical Office; 
filing of an update 
application to the 
CEIDG (with regard to 
the assigned NIP (tax) 
and 
REGON (statistical) 
numbers). 
 
 
At least two 
founders from 
among: 
a) natural 
persons, 
b) legal persons, 
c) 
organisational 
units without 
legal personality 
to which the 
applicable laws 
have granted 
legal capacity. 
 
Partners are 
entrepreneurs 
within the 
scope of 
business activity 
conducted in  
civil law 
partnership. 
 
 
The right and 
obligation of 
each partner to 
conduct the 
partnership’s 
affairs. 
 
Scope of 
authorisation to 
run the 
partnership’s 
affairs: 
a) day-to-day 
actions of 
partnership, 
b) every urgent 
action, which, if 
omitted, could 
result in a serious 
damage for the 
partnership 
(regardless of its 
scope, even 
without a prior 
resolution of 
partners). 
 
Before an 
individual 
partner handles a 
matter falling 
within the scope 
of day-to-day 
management, 
any of the 
remaining 
partners may 
oppose its 
handling. In such 
cases, a prior 
resolution of the 
partners is 
required. 
 
 
Civil law 
partnership is not 
a separate legal 
entity. Only its 
partners are such 
entities. 
 
However, civil 
law partnership 
is subject to VAT 
and excise tax as 
if it were a 
separate entity. 
 
 
 
 
Joint and several 
liability of all 
partners for 
obligations arising 
within the 
partnership. 
 
Liability covers 
assets in joint co-
ownership between 
partners, as well as 
personal assets of 
each partner. 
 
 
 
Branch 
 
The Act on 
Freedom of 
Economic Activity 
of 2004 
 
 
Foreign 
entrepreneur’s 
application to KRS. 
 
The branch may 
commence activity 
after having 
been entered into the 
entrepreneurs’ 
register. 
 
 
Foreign 
entrepreneur  
 
Foreign 
entrepreneur 
appoints a 
person 
authorised to 
his/her 
representation. 
 
The branch is not 
an entity 
separate from 
the foreign 
entrepreneur 
and does not 
have: 
a) legal 
personality, 
b) legal capacity, 
c) judicial 
capacity (capacity 
to be a party 
in court 
proceedings and 
capacity to 
conduct court 
proceedings in 
defence of 
its interests). 
 
 
Full liability of a 
foreign 
entrepreneur 
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Foreign 
entrepreneur, 
represented in 
a branch by an 
authorised 
person, has all of 
the aforesaid 
capacities. 
 
 
Agency  
 
The Act on 
Freedom of 
Economic Activity 
of 2004 
 
 
Foreign 
entrepreneur’s  
application to the 
Register of Foreign 
Entrepreneurs’ 
Agencies 
kept by the Minister 
of Economy. 
 
Agency may 
commence activity 
after having 
been entered into the 
Register of Foreign 
Entrepreneurs’ 
Agencies. 
 
 
As above 
 
As above 
 
As above 
 
As above 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 
 
Table 3. Summary of main categories of share ownership in the UK 1963-20101031 
Type of investor  1963 2010 
 % % 
Individuals  54 11.5 
Insurance companies  10 8.6 
Pension funds 6 5.1 
Unit trusts  1 6.7 
Other financial institutions  11.3 16.0 
Overseas  7 41.2 
 
Source: Ownership of UK Quoted Shares 2010 (Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2012)  
(Other categories owning shares include banks, investment trusts, public sector, private non-
financial companies, and charities)  
 
 
 
                                                          
1031 Mallin (n 27) 105. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Table 4. Shareholder structure of five largest Polish companies1032 
 
Corporation* 
 
Shareholders – % of shares* 
PKN Orlen SA The State Treasury – 27.52%, Aviva OFE** –  7.01%, ING OFE  – 9.35%, 
the others – 56.11% 
GK Grupy Lotos SA 
 
The State Treasury – 53.19%, ING OFE – 5.31%, the others – 41.50% 
Polska Grupa Energetyczna SA 
 
The State Treasury – 61.89%, the others – 38.11% 
Jeronimo Martins Polska SA 
 
n/a*** 
GK PGNiG SA The State Treasury – 72.40%, the others – 27.60% 
 
GK Tauron Polska Energia SA The State Treasury – 30.06%, KGHM Polska Miedź SA – 10.39%, ING 
OFE – 5.06%, the others – 54.49% 
 
* Status as at 1 May 2014. 
** OFE (otwarty fundusz emerytalny) – an open pension fund.  
*** not available 
 
 
Table 5. Shareholder structure of banks in Poland1033 
 
Bank* 
 
Shareholders (Country) – % of shares* 
PKO Bank Polski The State Treasury (Poland) – 31.39%; Aviva OFE** (Poland) – 6.72%, ING OFE 
(Poland) – 5.17%, the others – 56.72%; 
Bank Pekao UniCredit S.p.A. (Italy) – 50.10%, Aberdeen Asset Management (Sweden) – 5.03%, 
the others – 44.87% 
Bank Zachodni WBK 
 
Banco Santander S.A. (Spain) – 75.19%, KBC Group NV and KBC Bank NV (Belgium) 
– 16.17%, the others – 8.64% 
BRE Bank SA Commerzbank AG (Germany) – 69.65%, ING OFE (Poland) – 6.67%, the others – 
23.68% 
                                                          
1032 Based on Paweł Tarnowski, 'Lista 500 po 20 latach' Polityka.pl (14 May 2013) <www.lista500.polityka.pl/articles/show/55> accessed 
15 March 2014; and the companies' websites. 
1033 Based on Michał Naskręt, 'Struktura akcjonariatu polskich banków' 590x (7 April 2013) <www.590x.pl/2013/struktura-akcjonariatu-
polskich-bankow/> accessed 2 March 2014; and the banks' websites. 
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ING Bank Śląski ING Bank N.V. (Holland) – 75.00%, OFE PZU „Złota Jesień” (Poland) – 5.10%, the 
others – 19.90% 
Raiffeisen Bank 
 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG (Austria) – 100% 
Getin Noble Bank LC Corp BV (Poland) – 38.98%, Leszek Czarnecki (Poland) – 10.24%, ING OFE 
(Poland) – 7.26%, Getin Holding (Poland) – 5.66%, the others – 37.86% 
Bank Millennium 
 
Millennium bcp (Portugal) – 65.51%, ING OFE (Poland) – 9.30%, the others – 
25.19% 
City Handlowy 
 
Citibank Overseas Investment Corporation (US) – 75.00%, the others – 25.00% 
Nordea Bank 
 
Nordea Bank AB (Nordic countries) – 99.21%, the others – 0.79% 
 
* Status as at 1 May 2014. 
** OFE (otwarty fundusz emerytalny) – an open pension fund.  
 
 
Appendix 6 
 
Chart 1. Average remuneration for members of management boards in 20121034 
 
 
 
                                                          
1034 PricewaterhouseCoopers Poland, ‘Wynagrodzenia Zarządów Największych Spółek Giełdowych w 2012 Roku: Czy Giełda Popłaca?  
(Warsaw, 24 June 2012) <www.pwc.pl/pl/biuro-prasowe/assets/pwc_prezentacja_wynagrodzenia_czlonkow_zarzadu.pdf> accessed 24 
May 2014. 
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Appendix 7 
Table 6. Presence of committees on supervisory boards in Poland1035  
  
Audit 
committees 
 
Remuneration committees 
 
Strategy committees 
 
Risk committee 
In total 41,0% 20,5% 3,9% 1% 
WIG20 94,7% 57,9% 42,1% 15% 
WIG40 72% 52,8% 5,6% 0% 
WIG80 59,2% 18,3% 1,4% 0% 
The others 37,1% 13,9% 1,5% 0% 
 
 
 
Appendix 8 
 
Chart 2. Size of supervisory boards in Poland1036 
 
* Research embraced all companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in March – April 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1035 PwC, ‘Rady Nadzorcze 2013. Skuteczność (…)’ (n 539). 
1036 Deloitte Poland, ‘Raport „Współczesna Rada Nadzorcza 2012” (...)’ (n 722). 
5%
33%
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10%
10%
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Appendix 9 
 
Example of higher financial performance of companies with a larger number of women on their 
boards 
 
‘Statoil Hydro is one of Norway’s largest companies. There are a number of legal requirements in 
Norway relating to members of the board which Statoil Hydro is subject to. There is a Norwegian 
legal requirement for at least 40 per cent of the board members to be female, which means that its 
board is more diverse than is common in most other countries. Also the companies’ employees can 
be represented by three board members.  
Statoil Hydro was established in October 2007 following the merger between Statoil and 
Hydro’s oil and gas activities. It is an international energy company primarily focused on upstream 
oil and gas operations, and operates in thirty-nine oil gas fields, whilst also being the world’s largest 
operator in waters more than 100 metres deep.  
In the case of Statoil Hydro, its Articles of Association provide for a board of ten members. 
Management is not represented on the board, which appoints the president and CEO. The board is 
subject to Norway’s rules which state that all public companies in Norway are obliged to ensure 
that at least 40 per cent of their board directors are women. Of the ten members, four are female 
and six male, which meets the legal requirement of at least 40 per cent of the board being female.  
The board has two subcommittees: an audit committee and a compensation 
(remuneration) committee. Three of the four female directors are members of either the audit 
committee or the compensation committee, and a female Director, Grace Reksten Skaugen, chairs 
the compensation committee. This is interesting as even where females are directors in other 
countries, such as in the UK, it is rare for them to be members of the key board committees, or 
indeed to chair such a committee. The fourth female Director, Lill-Heidi Bakkerud, represents the 
employees on the board. As well as Lill-Heidi Bakkerud, two male directors also represent the 
employees on the board. 
Furthermore, there are another two members (both male in this case) who are in addition 
to the ten board members, and they are employee – elected observers and may attend board 
meetings but have no voting rights. 
Statoil changed its organizational structure to reflect the ongoing globalization of Statoil, 
leverage the position on the Norway Continental Shelf, and simply internal inferences to support 
safe and efficient operations from 1 January 2011. 
In terms of corporate governance features, the board still has 40 per cent female 
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composition and Marit Arnstad is now the Deputy Chair of the Board.’1037 
 
 
Appendix 10 
 
Table 7. Median* annual remuneration for presidents and members of supervisory boards 
according to the size of companies (index WIG)1038 
 
  
President 
 
Member 
 
In total 
WIG20 PLN150,000 PLN94,000 PLN95,000 
WIG40 PLN96,000 PLN42,600 PLN48,500 
WIG80 PLN64,131 PLN19,000 PLN42,000 
The other companies PLN30,000 PLN19,000 PLN23,000 
In total PLN41,454 PLN30,000 PLN36,000 
 
*Median annual remuneration – exactly 1/2 of members/presidents earn above the level of 
remuneration   
 
 
Appendix 11 
 
Participation information sheet (in English) 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Section A:  The Research Project  
 
1. Title of project  
Hybrid Corporate Governance: A Choice for Poland?  
 
 
                                                          
1037 Mallin (n 27) 188. 
1038 PwC, ‘Rady Nadzorcze 2013. Skuteczność (…)’ (n 539). 
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2. Purpose and value of study  
The purpose of the study is to investigate and critically reflect on the functioning of 
corporate governance in Poland, the US and the UK. The researcher also aims to determine 
what changes should be made to models of corporate governance in these countries. Your 
participation in the study might help the researcher reach some new conclusions in respect 
to the research topic. Thereafter they might be published in academic journals or discussed 
in academic conferences.  
 
3. Invitation to participate  
You are invited to participate in this study via semi-structured interviews at a location, 
chosen by you, that allows to protect your confidentiality. You have the right to choose the 
location. However, in order to meet the health and safety requirements of Anglia Ruskin 
University it should take place on business premises in normal hours.  
 
4. Who is organising the research?  
The sole organiser and researcher for this study is Katarzyna Anna Samól.  
 
5. What will happen to the results of the study?  
The results gathered at the interview will be transcribed and analysed for the use in the 
above student’s PhD studies dissertation. Thereafter, the material collected by the 
researcher will either be destroyed or archived, according to your wishes.  
 
6. The sources of funding for the research  
The researcher will be funding the project.  
 
7. Contact for further information  
You can contact the researcher to discuss any matters regarding the project and the 
interview on the below details:  
E-mail: katarzyna.samol@student.anglia.ac.uk 
 
Section B:  Your Participation in the Research Project  
 
1. Why you have been invited to take part?  
Due to your broad knowledge of the research topic or topics related to the research topic, 
you are very important to the progress of the study.  
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2. Whether you can refuse to take part 
You can refuse to take part at any time of the interviews or the whole project.  
 
3. Whether you can withdraw at any time, and how 
You can withdraw at any time by simply completing the withdrawal slip at the bottom of 
the consent form and forwarding it to the researcher. 
 
4. What will happen if you agree to take part? 
The first stage of the interview will consist of a discussion on matters concerning 
confidentiality and anonymity, the second stage will be the interview. If shown no objection 
by you, the interview will be tape recorded or conducted by e-mail correspondence, or 
Skype. If you feel uncomfortable with the questions being asked please inform the 
researcher at any time. There will be one interview, which should take no more than 
two/three hours. In case of interviewing by electronic correspondence, the researcher 
might contact you several times. However, it should not take longer than two/three hours 
in total to complete the interview. 
 
5. Are there any risks involved (eg side effects from taking part) and if so, what will be done 
to ensure your wellbeing/safety? 
See points 2, 3 and 5 in Section A, and points 3, 4 and 9 in Section B.  
 
6. Whether there are any special precautions you must take before, during or after taking 
part in the study 
Before you take part in the study you should read a participant consent form carefully and, 
if you agree with conditions set out in the form by the researcher, sign it, or email the 
researcher informing her that you give your permission to be interviewed on the basis of 
the received consent and according to the conditions set out in the participant information 
sheet. You are advised to attach the consent and the participant information sheet to your 
e-mail. In case of a face-to-face interview, a copy of the consent form should be given to 
you straight away. The copy of the consent, the participant information sheet and – if an 
interview was conducted by electronic correspondence – e-mails, proving that you took 
part in an interview related to the consent, will be necessary if you decide to enforce your 
rights in case of their violation.  
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7. What will happen to any information/data/samples that are collected from you? 
Any material collected by the researcher will be analysed and used in the main body of the 
dissertation and therefore be destroyed or archived in accordance to your wishes.  
 
8. Are there any benefits from taking part? 
The benefits from taking part in this study will be your contribution to research on 
corporate governance.  
 
9. How will your participation in the project be kept confidential? 
Anonymity – throughout the research the researcher will not use your actual name if you 
wish to do so.  
Confidentiality – all the tapes, transcripts, notes and any other material taken during the 
interview will be destroyed or archived in accordance to your wishes.  
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS TO KEEP, 
TOGETHER WITH A COPY OF YOUR CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
Participation information sheet (in Polish) 
 
ZAŁĄCZNIK: INFORMACJA DLA BIORĄCYCH UDZIAŁ W 
BADANACH 
 
Sekcja A:  Projekt badawczy 
 
1. Tytuł projektu 
Hybrid Corporate Governance: A Choice for Poland? [Hybrydalny Zarząd 
Przedsiębiorstwem: Opcja dla Polski?]  
 
2. Cel i znaczenie badań 
Celem badań jest prześledzenie i krytyczne odniesienie się do funkcjonowania ładu 
korporacyjnego w Polsce, Wielkiej Brytanii i Stanach Zjednoczonych. Prowadzący badania 
będzie również dążyć do ustalenia zmian, które powinny być wprowadzone do modelu 
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zarządu przedsiębiorstw w tych państwach. Twój udziału w badaniach może pomóc w 
dotarciu do nowych przemyśleń odnośnie tematu badań.  
Następnie Pana/Pani refleksje mogą zostać umieszczone w rozprawie doktorskiej, 
opublikowane w czasopismach prawniczych i dyskutowane na konferencjach naukowych. 
 
3. Zaproszenie do udziału w badaniach 
Jest Pan/Pani zaproszony/-a do udziału w badaniach poprzez udział w wywiadzie – 
rozmowie, który odbędzie się w miejscu wybranym przez Pana/Panią, i pozwoli na 
zachowanie poufności. Ma Pan/Pani prawo wskazać takie miejsce, które ze względu na 
wymogi bezpieczeństwa znajdujące się w regulaminie Anglia Ruskin Unversity, powinno być 
ulokowane w budynku użyteczności publicznej w godzinach pracy.  
 
4. Kto jest organizatorem badań? 
Jedynym organizatorem i zarazem prowadzącym badania w tym projekcie jest Pani 
Katarzyna Anna Samól. 
 
5. Co stanie się z informacjami zebranymi podczas badań?  
Zebrane informacje zostaną opracowane na użytek wspomnianej wyżej rozprawy 
doktorskiej. Następnie, materiał zebrany przez prowadzącego badania zostanie zniszczony 
lub zarchiwizowany zgodnie z Pana/Pani życzeniem.  
 
6. Źródła finansowania badań  
Prowadzący badania pokrywa całkowity koszt badań.  
 
7. Dane kontaktowy w celu otrzymania dalszych informacji  
W celu otrzymania dalszych informacji dotyczących projektu i wywiadu, jest Pan/Pani 
proszony/-a o napisanie wiadomości na następujący adres e-mailowy:  
katarzyna.samol@student.anglia.ac.uk or ksamol1@o2.pl  
 
Sekcja B:  Pana/Pani udziału w projekcie badawczym  
 
1. O powodach zaproszenia Pan/Pani do wzięcie udziału w projekcie  
Z powodu Pana/Pani rozległej wiedzy na temat projektu badawczego lub znajomości 
tematów związanych z tym projektem. Pana/Pani udział w badaniach jest istotny dla 
usystematyzowania i rozwoju wiedzy dotyczącej poruszanego zagadnienia.  
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2. O możliwości odmówienia uczestnictwa w projekcie  
Posiada Pan/Pani pełne prawo odmówienia uczestnictwa w dalszych etapach projektu (na 
każdym z jego etapów). 
 
3. O możliwości i sposobie wycofania się z projektu na każdym jego etapie 
Posiada Pan/Pani pełne prawo wycofania się z projektu poprzez uzupełnienie oświadczenia 
o rezygnacji z uczestnictwa w programie. Oświadczenie znajduje się na ostatniej stronie 
dokumentu - zgody o wzięcie udziału w badaniach. Deklaracja powinna zostać przekazana 
prowadzącemu badania z jednoczesnym poinformowaniem jego/jej, za pośrednictwem 
poczty elektronicznej, o wycofaniu się z projektu. 
 
4. O tym co nastąpi, kiedy Pan/Pani wyrazi zgodę na udział w badaniu  
Na początku zostaną objaśnione Pani/Panu kwestie dotyczące poufności udziału w 
badaniach. Następnie odbędzie się wywiad na wskazany powyżej temat. Jeżeli nie wyrazi 
Pan/Pani sprzeciwu, wywiad będzie nagrywany lub prowadzony drogą elektroniczną (poczta 
e-mailowa lub Skype). Jeśli pytania sprawią Panu/Pani kłopot, proszę poinformować o tym 
prowadzącego badania. Odbędzie się jeden wywiad, który potrwa nie dłużej niż dwie/trzy 
godziny. W przypadku prowadzenia wywiadu drogą elektroniczną, prowadzący badania 
może skontaktować się z Panem/Panią kilka razy. Jednakże całkowite zakończenie wywiadu 
nie powinno potrwać więcej niż dwie/trzy godziny. 
 
5. O istnieniu ryzyka związanego z udziałem w badaniach (np. efekty uboczne), i środkach 
podjętych w celu jego wyeliminowania i zapewnienia Panu/Pani bezpieczeństwa  
Patrz punkty 2., 3. i 5. w Sekcji A, a także punkty 3., 4. i 9. w Sekcji B.  
 
6. O środkach ostrożności, które Pan/Pani powinien/-a podjąć przed wzięciem udziału w 
badaniach, w trakcie badań i po ich zakończeniu 
Przed wzięciem udziału w badaniach powinien/-a Pan/Pani uważnie przeczytać zgodę na 
udział w projekcie, i jeśli zgadza się Pan/Pani z warunkami przedstawionymi przez 
prowadzącego badania, podpisać ją lub poinformować prowadzącego badania drogą e-
mailową o wyrażeniu zgody na udział w wywiadzie. Jednocześnie prowadzący badania prosi 
Pana/Panią o dołączenie zgody i załącznika do wiadomości e-mail. W przypadku wywiadu 
prowadzonego metodą ‘face to face’, kopia zgody powinna być Panu/Pani wręczona 
natychmiast po jej podpisaniu. Kopia zgody, załącznik zawierający informacje o badaniach i 
warunkach udziału w badaniach, a także – jeśli wywiad prowadzony jest drogą elektroniczną 
– wiadomości e-mailowe, będą konieczne w celu dochodzenia swoich praw na wypadek ich 
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naruszenia.  
 
7. Co się stanie z informacjami/danymi statystycznymi/próbkami dostarczonymi przez 
Pana/Panią? 
Materiały zebrane przez prowadzącego badania zostaną przez niego przeanalizowane i 
najprawdopodobniej użyte w rozprawy doktorskiej, a następnie zniszczone lub 
zarchiwizowane zgodnie z Pana/Pani życzeniem.  
 
8. Czy są jakieś korzyści z wzięcia udziału w badaniach? 
Nie ma korzyści materialnych z udziału w badaniach. Jedynym zyskiem dla uczestnika projektu jest 
satysfakcja z udziału w naukowym projekcie. 
 
9. W jaki sposób Pana/Pani udział w badaniach zostanie utajniony? 
Anonimowość – prowadzący badania nie ujawni (włączając w to rozprawę doktorską) 
Pana/Pani imienia i nazwiska, a także danych personalnych, które pozwoliłyby na Pana/Pani 
identyfikację. Może Pan/Pani jednak zażyczyć sobie jawności danych.  
Poufność – wszystkie taśmy, notatki z wywiadów, a także inne materiały zostaną zniszczone 
podczas wywiadów lub zarchiwizowane zgodnie z Pana/Pani życzeniem. 
 
OTRZYMA PAN/PANI KOPIĘ ZAŁĄCZNIKA, WRAZ Z KOPIĄ ZGODY NA UDZIAŁ W BADANIACH 
 
 
Appendix 12 
 
Consent for Participant (in English) 
 
CONSENT FOR PARTICIPANTS 
  
NAME OF PARTICIPANT:       
 
Title of the project:   Hybrid Corporate Governance: A Choice for Poland? 
 
Main investigator and contact details: Katarzyna Anna Samól 
       
     E-mail: katarzyna.samol@anglia.student.ac.uk 
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Members of the research team:  Katarzyna Anna Samól 
 
1) I agree to take part in the above research. I have read the Participant Information Sheet that 
is attached to this form. I understand what my role will be in this research, and all my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  
2) I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any time, for any reason and 
without prejudice.  
3) I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be 
safeguarded. 
4) I am free to ask any questions at any time before and during the study. 
5) I have been provided with a copy of this form and the Participant Information Sheet. 
Data Protection:  I hereby give consent to the University1039 for the collection, storage and 
processing of my personal data in accordance with the Personal Data Protection Act dated 
29.08.1997 (uniform text: Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland 2002 No 101, item 926 with 
further amendments). I agree to the collection, storage and processing of such data for any 
purposes connected with the Research Project as outlined to me. 
 
Name of participant (print) _______________________Signed ______________________  
Date _________ 
 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS FORM TO KEEP 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
If you wish to withdraw from the research, please complete the form below and return it to the 
main investigator named above. 
 
Title of Project:  Hybrid Corporate Governance: A Choice for Poland?  
 
I WISH TO WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY 
 
Signed: ___________________________        Date: ____________ 
 
 
                                                          
1039 ‘The University’ includes Anglia Ruskin University and its partner colleges. 
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Consent for Participants (in Polish) 
 
ZGODA UCZESTNIKA NA WZIĘCIE UDZIAŁU W BADANIACH 
 
 
Imię i nazwisko uczestnika:        
 
Tytuł projektu: Hybrid Corporate Governance: A Choice for Poland? [Hybrydalny Corporate 
Governance: Opcja dla Polski?] 
 
Główny prowadzący badania i jego dane kontaktowe:          Katarzyna Anna Samól  
E-mail: katarzyna.samol@anglia.student.ac.uk; ksamol1@o2.pl 
      
Prowadzący badania: Katarzyna Anna Samól 
 
1. Wyrażam zgodę na wzięcie udziału w powyższych badaniach. Zaznajomiłem/łam się z 
informacją o udziale w badaniach, załączonym do tego formularza. Rozumiem jaka będzie 
moja w nich rola, i otrzymałem odpowiedź na wszystkie nurtujące mnie pytania, dotyczące 
prowadzenia powyższych badań.   
2. Rozumiem, że mogę zrezygnować z udziału w badaniach w każdym czasie i bez podawania 
powodu.  
3. Zostałem/-łam poinformowany/na, że poufność informacji dostarczonych przeze mnie 
będzie chroniona.  
4. Mam pełne prawo zadawać pytania przed i w czasie badań. 
5. Otrzymałem/-łam kopię zgody i załącznik z informacją o udziale w powyższych badaniach.  
 
Ochrona danych:  Udzielam zgody Uniwersytetowi1040 na kolekcjonowanie, przechowywanie i 
przetwarzanie moich danych osobowych dla potrzeb niezbędnych do realizacji powyższego 
projektu (zgodnie z Ustawą z dnia 29.08.1997 roku o Ochronie Danych Osobowych; tekst jednolity: 
Dz. U. z 2002 r. Nr 101, poz. 926 ze zm.).  
 
Imię i nazwisko uczestnika (drukiem):  
 
___________________________________________ 
                                                          
1040 “Uniwersytet” oznacza Anglia Ruskin University i jego filie.  
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Data:_________________________  
                 
Podpis:______________________________ 
 
 
 
OTRZYMA PAN/PANI KOPIĘ FORMULARZA NA PRZECHOWANIE 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
 
Jeżeli życzy sobie Pan/Pani zrezygnować z udziału w badaniach, proszę o uzupełnienie poniższego 
formularza i zwrócenie go osobie prowadzącej badania.  
 
Tytuł projektu: Hybrid Corporate Governance: A Choice for Poland? 
 
Imię i nazwisko (drukiem): ____________________________________________________ 
OŚWIADCZAM, ŻE CHCĘ WYCOFAĆ SIĘ Z PROWADZONYCH BADAǸ. 
 
Data: ___________________________                                      
Podpis: ___________________________     
 
 
